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an	 invitation	 to	 peace	 talks	 in	 Geneva,	 or	 so	went	 a	 popular	 expression	 of	 post-war	




perhaps	 ironically	 in	part	because	of	 the	 influence	of	human	rights	on	our	notions	of	
humane	punishment,	among	other	reasons.3			
The	 union	 of	 international	 law	 with	 criminal	 law	 has	 proven	 complex.	




law	 is	 coercive.	 	 International	 law	 is	 consensual.	 	 Power,	 not	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 has	
historically	dictated	the	theater	of	operation	for	international	criminal	justice.		For	this	
reason,	 international	 criminal	 justice	 has	 been	 pejoratively	 called	 victor’s	 justice,	neo-
colonial	 justice,	 or	 justice	 with	 double	 standards.4	 These	 are	 not	 shortcomings	 of	
																																																								
1 All but four of the convicted Nazi defendants were sentenced to death at the Nuremberg trial of major war 
criminals. See INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL (NUREMBERG), JUDGMENT AND SENTENCES, reprinted in 
41 AMERICAN J. INT’L L. 172 (1947); See also RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTORS’ JUSTICE: TOKYO WAR CRIMES 
TRIAL (1971); MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007). 
2 Mirko Bagaric & John Morss, International Sentencing Law: In Search of a Justification and Coherent 
Framework, 6 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 191, 253 (2006) (stating that international tribunal sentences are 
“breathtakingly light”).  The average sentence at the ICTY for the 82 finalized sentences is 15 years (this average 
excludes the five life sentences imposed). See also Barbora Hola et al., International Sentencing Facts and 
Figures: Sentencing Practice at the ICTY and ICTR, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. J. 411, 420 (2011). 
3 See further Margaret M. DeGuzman, Harsh Justice for International Crimes? 39 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2014) 
(calling for ICL judges to look to human rights norms in developing “global norms of sentence severity”). 
4 William Schabas, Introduction in: THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3 













hand,	 focuses	 on	 criminal	 responsibility	 for	 individuals.7	 	 International	 criminal	 law’s	
jurisdictional	 reach	 is	 presently	 framed	 in	 terms	 of	 individual	 criminal	 responsibility	
rather	than	state	criminal	responsibility.8		Despite	this	legal	constriction,	atrocity	crimes	




criminal	 justice	 seeks	 to	 protect	 the	 universal	 values	 of	 a	 divided	 global	 community.	
International	 criminal	 justice	 mechanisms	 aim	 to	 end	 impunity	 for	 unspeakable	
atrocities	 victimizing	 the	 peoples	 of	 the	 world.9	 Along	with	 certainty	 of	 prosecution,	
justice	 in	 punishment	 constitutes	 an	 integral	 component	 of	 ending	 impunity.10	 The	
sentencing	practice	of	international	criminal	courts	is	the	public	face	of	the	international	
community’s	 resolve	 against	 perpetrators	 of	 gross	 violations	 of	 human	 rights	 and	
international	humanitarian	 law.	 	Thus,	 the	 law	of	atrocity	sentencing	 is	 important	not	
only	for	achieving	international	justice	but	also	for	re-enforcing	values	fundamental	to	
																																																								
5 Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights and International Criminal Justice in the Twenty-First Century: The End of 
the Post-WWII Phase and the Beginning of an Uncertain New Era, in ARCS OF GLOBAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF WILLIAM A. SCHABAS 3 - 38 (MARGARET M. DEGUZMAN AND DIANE MARIE AMANN eds. 2018). 
6 Bassiouni, Beginning of an Uncertain New Era (2018) at 7-10. 
7 E.g. Article 1, Statute of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). 
8 E.g. ICC Article 25(1). 
9 See Preamble of the Rome Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court; Preamble of Security Council 
Resolutions establishing the International Criminal Tribunals Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.  
10 Joseph W. Doherty & Richard H. Steinberg, Punishment and Policy in International Criminal Sentencing: An 
Empirical Study, 110 AMERICAN J. INT’L L. 49 (2016). 
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international	 sentencing	 operates;	 the	 characteristics	 of	 ICL	 sentencing;	 and	 its	






to	 be	more	 reflective	 on	 a	wide	 range	 of	 topics	 and	 themes	 such	 as	 the	 relationship	
between	 law	 and	 peace,	 the	 role	 of	 atrocity	 trials,	 justice,	 war,	 wrongdoing,	




any	 criminal	 justice	 system	must	 demonstrate	 qualities	 of	 fairness	 and	 be	 principally	
guided.12		The	sentencing	regime	must	at	minimum	clarify	the	types	of	punishment	that	
may	be	imposed,	the	scope	or	maximum	penalty	applicable	to	each	proscribed	conduct,	
and	 factors	 determinative	 of	 the	 quantum	 of	 punishment.13	 Just	 punishment	 is	more	
readily	achieved	when	sentencing	regimes	contain	(1)	positive	 law	that	correlates	 the	
quantum	 of	 punishment	with	 seriousness	 of	 the	 harm	 and	 individual	 culpability;	 (2)	
general	agreement	on	and	systemic	implementation	of	the	purpose	of	punishment;	(3)	a	
structured	and	coherent	 framework	 to	guide	 consideration	of	various	 factors	 that	are	
outcome	determinative;	and	(4)	guidance	for	the	exercise	of	judicial	discretion.14	All	four	
																																																								
11 Prosecutor v. Delalić (“Čelebići Case”), Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, para. 756 (Feb. 20, 2001). 
12 See KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW VOLUME II: CRIMES AND SENTENCING 267-
271 (2014); See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMACY CRISIS (1975). 
13 See generally ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2010). 
14 Id. See also, See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, DISPARITIES IN SENTENCING: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS, COLLECTED 
STUDIES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL RESEARCH Vol. XXVI (1989); Ralph Henham, Developing Contextualized 
Rationales for Sentencing in International Criminal Trials, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 757 (2007); Jan Nemitz, 
The Law of Sentencing in International Criminal Law: The Purposes of Sentencing and the Applicable Method 
for the Determination of the Sentence, 4 YEARBOOK OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 87 (2001). 
 10 





the	 survival	 of	 the	 institutions	 which	 are	 responsible	 for	 that	
administration.	One	of	the	fundamental	elements	in	any	rational	and	fair	
system	 of	 criminal	 justice	 is	 consistency	 in	 punishment.	 This	 is	 an	
important	reflection	of	the	notion	of	equal	justice.	The	experience	of	many	
domestic	jurisdictions	over	the	years	has	been	that	such	public	confidence	
may	 be	 eroded	 if	 these	 institutions	 give	 an	 appearance	 of	 injustice	 by	
permitting	 substantial	 inconsistencies	 in	 the	 punishment	 of	 different	
offenders,	 where	 the	 circumstances	 of	 the	 different	 offences	 and	 of	 the	
offenders	 being	 punished	 are	 sufficiently	 similar	 that	 the	 punishments	
imposed	would,	in	justice,	be	expected	to	be	also	generally	similar.15	
	
Furthermore,	 there	 is	 also	 broad	 agreement	 among	 scholars	 of	 international	
criminal	 justice	 that	 consistency	 in	 sentencing	 bears	 significantly	 on	 the	 integrity	 of	









15 Čelebići Appeals Judgement, para. 756. See also Prosecutor v Mucić et al., Judgment, IT-96-21-A, para. 756 
(20 February 2001).  
16 See e.g. AMBOS ICL TREATISE II (2014) at 268; Pascale Chifflet and Gideon Boas, Sentencing Coherence in 
International Criminal Law: The Cases of Biljana Plavsic and Miroslav Bralo, 23 CRIM. L. FORUM 135, 147 
and 154 (2012); Jennifer J. Clark, Note, Zero to Life: Sentencing Appeals at the International Criminal 
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 96 GEO. L.J. 1686, 1687 (2008) (claiming that 
"commentators largely agree that consistency in sentencing is important to international criminal law"); 
DRUMBL, ATROCITY, supra note 1. Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary 
Crimes, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 683 (2007); OLAOLUWA OLUSANYA, SENTENCING WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES 
AGAINST HUMANITY UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (2005) 
Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Law Sentencing, 87 VA. 
L. REV. 415 (2001) (arguing that "it is especially important that the Tribunals seek to sentence defendants in a 
consistent manner"). 
17 Nancy A. Combs, Seeking Inconsistency: Advancing Pluralism in International Criminal Sentencing, 41 
YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2016).  
18 For example, even as the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 call upon states to criminalize grave breaches, 
they stop short of suggesting what that penalty range should be instead simply calling for “effective penal 
sanctions”. See e.g. Articles 49-54, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31. 
 11 
systems.		These	shortcomings	and	other	characteristics	particular	to	atrocity	sentencing	




I. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CONTEXT 
	
The	enterprise	of	 international	 criminal	 justice	 is	 carried	out	 in	a	political	 and	






















19 See also Bassiouni, Beginning of an Uncertain New Era (2018) at 6, 12-16, 24-26, and 34-38.  
Additionally, shared intuitions, values, and community norms shape perceptions about the fairness of the 
quantum of punishment. See further Paul Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, 
Deontological, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 145 (2008); Paul Robinson et al., The Origins of Shared 
Intuitions of Justice, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1633 (2007). 
 12 
Consequently,	 the	 ICC	 is	compelled	to	administer	 justice	 in	a	political	and	 legal	
environment	 far	 more	 complicated	 and	 uncertain	 than	 that	 facing	 domestic	 criminal	
justice	systems.20		It	is	within	this	context	that	the	organs	of	the	ICC	will	make	decisions,	
rulings,	 and	 judgments	 on	 what	 conflicts	 to	 investigate,	 who	 to	 prosecute,	 what	




II. ABSENCE OF GUIDANCE FROM INTERNATIONAL SOURCES 
	
	 When	the	international	community	revived	the	institution	of	atrocity	trials	in	the	
1990s,	 after	 decades	 of	 hibernation,	 with	 international	 prosecutions	 through	 ad	 hoc	
tribunals,	 a	 body	 of	 law	 on	 punishing	 atrocity	 crimes	 and	 principles	 relevant	 to	
international	 sentencing	were	 largely	 absent.21	 	 The	 sources	of	 international	 law	 that	






20 See generally STEVE ROACH, POLITICIZING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE CONVERGENCE OF 
POLITICS, ETHICS, AND LAW (2006). 
21 Pascale Chifflet & Gideon Boas, Sentencing Coherence in International Criminal Law: The Cases of Biljana 
Plavšić and Miroslav Bralo, 23 CRIM. L. F. 135, 139 and 144 (2012) (stating that ICL judges “have been given 
very little guidance” on the difficult task of sentencing”).  
22 CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 269 (1996) (finding that “none of the 315 international criminal law instruments” 
provides for specific penalties).  
23 E.g. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field (First Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Second Geneva 
Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
(Third Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287; Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 
78, p. 277.  
24 Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 
[hereafter the Genocide Convention]. 
25 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 
1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereafter the Torture Convention]. 
26 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 249, reprinted in 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN INSTRUMENTS; 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 974 
 13 
provisions	 or	 sentencing	 norms.	 	 They	 provide	 normative	 standards	 of	 conduct	 that	
States	are	obliged	to	respect	but	provide	nothing	on	applicable	penalties	or	sanctions.	
Even	those	provisions	that	called	for	States	to	apply	penal	sanctions	were	silent	on	any	
guidance	 regarding	 the	 applicable	 punishment.	 	 Likewise,	 the	 jurisprudence	 of	





III. KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF ATROCITY SENTENCING 
	
The	 key	 feature	 of	 ICL	 sentencing	 is	 the	wide	discretion	 given	 to	 international	
judges.28	 ICL	 judges	assert	 this	power	with	 some	 force,	 even	claiming	authority	 to	go	
beyond	 the	 law	of	 their	own	statutes.29	 	Unlike	 domestic	 criminal	 law,	 the	 statutes	of	
international	 criminal	 courts	do	not	 contain	 sentencing	 tariffs.30	Likewise,	 there	 is	no	
agreed	 upon	 priority	 regarding	 the	 rationale	 of	 punishment	 for	 atrocity	 sentencing.	
Moreover,	a	common	legal	and	cultural	background	that	is	generally	shared	by	judges	in	
a	national	system	is	absent	in	international	criminal	justice.31	Thus,	in	atrocity	trials	and	
punishment,	 “the	 broad	 discretion	 ascribed	 to	 trial	 chambers	 has	 led	 to	 significant	
discrepancies	in	sentencing.”32	
																																																								
U.N.T.S. 177; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 
105 [hereafter collectively anti-terrorism conventions]. 
27 See DRUMBL, ATROCITY, supra note 1. Mirko Bagaric & John Morss, International Sentencing Law: In 
Search of a Justification and Coherent Framework, 6 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 191, 192 (2006); William A. 
Schabas, Sentencing by International Criminal Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L 
L. 461 (1997). 
28 See JAMES DAVID MEERNIK & ROSA ALOISI, JUDGMENT DAY: JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING AT THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 152-153 (2017); See also, Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Sentence, ICTR-
95-1-T (21 May 1999), para. 4; Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic & Kubura, Judgment, IT-01–47-T (15 March 
2006), para 2068.  
29 Kayishema Trial Sentence, para. 4 (“This chamber also finds that it possesses unfettered discretion to go 
beyond the circumstances stated in the Statute and Rules to ensure justice in the matters of sentencing.”); 
Hadzihasanovic Trial Judgment, para. 2068 (“The Statute and Rules do not exhaustively define the points of fact 
and law which the Trial Chambers may consider when determining sentences. Chambers have broad 
discretionary power in determining such matters.). 
30See Ralph Henham, Developing Contextualized Rationales for Sentencing in International Criminal Trials, 5 
J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 757, 774 (2007); Chifflet & Boas, Sentencing Coherence in ICL, supra note 21, at 138. 
31 THEODOR MERON, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, A VIEW FROM THE BENCH: SELECTED 
SPEECHES 278-285 (2011). 

















that	 challenges	 its	maturation	 is	 that	 the	 trial	 chambers	 typically	 do	 not	 indicate	 the	









ICTY.39	 	 It	may	be	 tempting	 to	attribute	 this	 sharp	disparity	 to	 the	greater	number	of	
																																																								
33 Shahram Dana, Revisiting the Blaškić Sentence: Some Reflections on the Sentencing Jurisprudence of the 
ICTY, 4 INT’L CRIM. L.R. 321 (2004).   
34 Id. at 326 footnotes 26 and 27.   
35 ICC Article 78(3). 
36 Doherty & Steinberg, ICL Empirical Study (2016), supra note 10 at 76. 
37 E.g. Prosecution v. Dragan Nikolic, Sentencing Judgment, IT-94-2-S (18 December 2003) para. 214. 
38 Hola Facts and Figures ICTY and ICTR (2011), supra note 2 at 420. 









foot	 soldier.44	 Such	 perceived	 irregularities	 are	 often	 unaccompanied	 by	 explanatory	
analysis	that	could	elucidate	such	outcomes.	For	example,	Biljana	Plavšić	arrived	at	the	





Serbs.	 The	 Iron	 Lady	 threw	 the	 weight	 of	 her	 considerable	 reputation	 as	 a	 highly-
accomplished	scientist	to	publically	advance	the	insidious	view	that	Bosnian	Muslims	are	
genetically	inferior.	In	order	to	mobilize	and	justify	violence	against	Muslims,	she	claimed	





Muslim	 population	was	 annihilated	 or	 the	 areas	were	 ethnically	 cleansed	 of	 Bosnian	
																																																								
40 Doherty & Steinberg, Empirical Study (2016), supra note 10. 
41 Mark Drumbl, Punishment and Sentencing, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 86 (William Schabas ed., 2016) [hereafter Drumbl Punishment 2016] 
42 The statute for SCSL did not include the crime of genocide.   
43	Shahram	Dana,	The	Sentencing	Legacy	of	the	Special	Court	for	Sierra	Leone,	42	GEORGIA	J.	INT’L	&	COMP.	L.	
615,	659	(2014).	
44 Chifflet & Boas, Sentencing Coherence in ICL, supra note 21 (claiming that the reason for this can be 
attributed to ICL judges identifying more with older, well-educated, well-spoken perpetrators than with low 
level soldiers.) 
45 She subsequently convinced the Prosecutor to remove the crime of genocide from her indictment.   
46	Prosecutor	v.	Plavšić,	Sentencing	Judgment,	IT-00-39&40/1-S	(27	February	2003).	
47 MAYA SHATZMILLER, ISLAM AND BOSNIA: CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND FOREIGN POLICY IN MULTI-ETHNIC 
STATES 58 (2002). 
48 FRANKE WILMER THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF MAN, THE STATE AND WAR: IDENTITY, CONFLICT, AND 
VIOLENCE IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 217 (2002). 
49 For a comprehensive study of the relationship between inflammatory and hate speech and atrocity crimes see, 





and	 ruthlessly	 effective	 in	 ethnic	 cleansing.	 For	 this	 unimaginable	 evil,	 Plavšić	 was	
sentenced	to	eleven	(11)	years	of	imprisonment	and	released	six	years	later.		At	the	time	
of	her	sentence,	Plavšić	was	the	most	senior	political	figure	to	be	punished	by	the	ICTY.	
Shortly	 thereafter,	 low-level	 foot	soldier	Miroslav	Bralo	and	camp	commander	Dragan	













IV. RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY 
	
This	 research	 explores	 the	 norms	 of	 atrocity	 sentencing	 with	 the	 aim	 of	
stimulating	 fundamental	 rethinking	 about	 theoretical,	 doctrinal,	 and	 philosophical	
aspects	 of	 punishment	 for	 atrocity	 crimes.	 The	 chapters	 offer	 descriptive	 claims	 and	




50 Chifflet & Boas, Sentencing Coherence in ICL, supra note 21, at 149. The indictment against her contained 
fours schedules that documented thousands of murders, complete ethnic destruction of 850 villages, and extreme 
physical and mental abuse in 408 detention centers. 
51 Prosecutor v. Miroslav Bralo, Sentencing Judgment, IT-95-17-S (7 December 2005); Prosecution v. Dragan 









research	 question	 may	 be	 formulated	 as:	 what	 ought	 to	 be	 the	 determinants	 of	 ICL	
punishment	and	sentencing	for	atrocity	crimes?	Determinants	of	ICL	punishment	may	be	
grouped	 into	 three	 categories:53	 (1)	 international	 human	 rights	 standards;54	 (2)	
perceived	aspirations	of	international	criminal	prosecutions;55	and	(3)	sentencing	factors	
pertinent	 to	atrocity	 crimes.56	Accordingly,	 the	main	 research	question	was	organized	




criminal	 courts,	 what	 impact	 have	 aspirations	 associated	 with	 atrocity	 trials	 had	 in	
determining	sentencing	allocations?	And	what	role	should	they	have?		(3)	Do	differences	
in	the	quantum	of	punishment	mirror	differences	in	gravity	of	the	crime?	If	not,	can	the	




the	 jurisprudence	and	case	 law	of	 international	 courts.	Thus,	 the	methodology	of	 this	
																																																								
53 Other studies on ICL sentencing have likewise grouped the determinants into three categories which are 
organized differently but captured by this study.  For example, Silvia D’Ascoli categorizes them into (1) 
“general influential factors” (e.g. the purpose of punishment and national sentencing practice); (2) “case-related 
factors” (e.g. gravity); and (3) “proceeding-related factors” (e.g. guilty plea and cooperation). Jan Philipp Book 
structures ICL sentencing determinants into (1) gravity of the offence, (2) aggravating factors, and (3) 
mitigating factors. See respectively SILVIA D’ASCOLI, SENTENCING IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE UN 
AD HOC TRIBUNALS AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES FOR THE ICC (2011) and JAN PHILIPP BOOK, APPEAL AND 
SENTENCE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2011). 
54 See William Schabas, Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 461 (1997) (arguing that international human rights law places limits on atrocity sentencing by 
international criminal tribunals);  
55 See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, DISPARITIES IN SENTENCING: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS, COLLECTED STUDIES IN 
CRIMINOLOGICAL RESEARCH Vol. XXVI (1989); ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
(2010); Jan Nemitz, The Law of Sentencing in International Criminal Law: The Purposes of Sentencing and the 
Applicable Method for the Determination of the Sentence, 4 YEARBOOK OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 87 (2001). 
56 See Ralph Henham, Developing Contextualized Rationales for Sentencing in International Criminal Trials, 5 
J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 757 (2007); SILVIA D’ASCOLI, SENTENCING IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE UN 












hierarchy	 of	 an	 organization	 are	 held	 criminally	 responsible	 for	 the	 same	underlying	
charges.	Second,	 the	SCSL	is	 the	only	 international	court	 to	sentence	a	 former	head	of	









sentence	 in	 ICL	 remains	 under-examined	 and	 under-developed.61	 	 A	 few	 studies	
undertook	 the	 difficult	 task	 of	 seeking	 to	 empirically	 explain	 what	 factors	 influence	
sentencing	outcomes.62	These	thoughtful	studies	contribute	helpful	and	new	knowledge	
																																																								
57 The research began with a critical analysis of the jurisprudence of situation specific international tribunals. 
The particularities of the conflicts that occurred in Rwanda and Yugoslavia as well as the prosecution strategy, 
in particular the selection of persons to indict, appears to have had an impact on the diversity of sentencing 
issues addressed in the jurisprudence of each tribunal respectively.  For this reason, the sentencing jurisprudence 
of the ICTY has received more attention. 
58 Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, (30 May 2012). 
59 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-
01/06, 13 July 2012 (“Lubanga Trial Sentencing Judgment”). 
60 See e.g. Shahram Dana, The Sentencing Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 42 GEORGIA J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 615, 659 (2014); See further Charles Jalloh (ed.), THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS 
LEGACY: THE IMPACT FOR AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2014).  
61 AMBOS ICL TREATISE II (2014) at 270 (concluding that ICL sentencing law and practice needs improvement). 
62 Joseph W. Doherty and Richard H. Steinberg, Punishment and Policy in International Criminal Sentencing: 
An Empirical Study, 110 AMERICAN J. INT’L L. 49 (2016); Barbora Hola, Consistency and Pluralism of 
International Sentencing: An Empirical Assessment of the ICTY and ICTR Practice in PLURALISM IN 
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about	atrocity	sentencing,	even	though	some	of	their	findings	are	in	disagreement	with	
each	other.63	Citing	 these	 studies,	Pascale	Chifflet	 and	Gideon	Boas,	both	 former	 ICTY	
legal	officers,	claim	that	“[t]here	is	discordance	in	empirical	studies”	on	ICL	sentencing.64	
Others	criticize	the	coherence	of	the	“overlapping”	categories	used	by	the	empiricists	that	
“do	not	 sit	well	with	 the	written	 law	and	existing	 sentencing	practice.”65	 	 Indeed,	one	
empirical	 study	 by	 Joseph	 Doherty	 and	 Richard	 Steinberg	 sharply	 criticizes	 earlier	
studies	 “as	 being	 undertheorized,	 containing	 methodological	 errors,	 and	 testing	 an	
incomplete	 set	of	hypothesized	 factors.”66	Yet,	while	Doherty	&	Steinberg	 criticize	 the	




empirical	 study,	 the	 authors	 proffered	 a	 compelling	 model	 demonstrating	 that	 ICTY	
sentences	“can	to	a	certain	extent	be	predicted	by	the	examined	legal	factors”	but	they	
also	 frankly	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 model	 left	 40%	 of	 sentencing	 variations	
“unexplained.”68		Moreover,	in	the	words	of	one	of	the	world’s	leading	criminal	law	and	
ICL	 scholars,	 Kai	 Ambos,	 “empirical	 research	 can	 never	 fully	 reveal	 the	 underlying	
reasons	 and	 factors	 for	 concrete	 sentencing	 decisions.”69	 Likewise,	 Ralph	 Henham,	 a	
strong	 advocate	 of	 empirical	 studies,	 considers	 empirical	 research	 limited	 because	 it	
“cannot	 re-conceptualize,	 rationalize	 or	 reposition	 the	 justifications	 for	 international	




INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 187-207 (Elies van Sliedregt & Sergey Vasiliev eds. 2014); SILVIA D’ASCOLI, 
SENTENCING IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE UN AD HOC TRIBUNALS AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES FOR 
THE ICC (2011); Uwe Ewald, Predictably Irrational - International Sentencing and its Discourse against the 
Backdrop of Preliminary Empirical Findings on ICTY Sentencing Practices, 10 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 365 (2010); 
Barbora Hola et al., Is ICTY Sentencing Predictable? An Empirical Analysis of ICTY Sentencing Practice, 22 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 79 (2009); James Meernik & Kimi King, The Sentencing Determinants of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 16 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 717 
(2003). 
63 Chifflet & Boas, Sentencing Coherence in ICL (2012), supra note 21, at 148. 
64 Id. 
65 AMBOS ICL TREATISE II (2014) at 270 and 285. 
66 Doherty & Steinberg, Empirical Study (2016), supra note 10, at 52. 
67 This may very well be the first in-depth study on atrocity sentencing that incorporates the jurisprudence of the 
SCSL and the jurisprudence of the ICTR and ICTY in a single study. 
68 Hola et al., Empirical Analysis ICTY Sentencing, supra note 62 at 89. 
69 AMBOS ICL TREATISE II (2014) at 270. 





In	analyzing	ICL	sentencing	 jurisprudence,	 the	 first	 task	of	 the	research	was	to	
determine	what	the	international	criminal	courts	are	actually	doing	in	their	sentencing	
practice,	not	merely	what	they	claimed	to	be	doing	although	this	too	was	observed	and	
analyzed.	 The	 results	 of	 this	 investigation	 are	 presented	 in	 an	 integrated	 manner,	
focusing	on	areas	where	the	former	departs	from	the	latter.	Additionally,	their	claimed	











Furthermore,	 comparative	 methodologies	 are	 not	 meaningfully	 employed	 by	
international	 judges	 in	 their	sentencing	rationalizations	and	thus,	do	not	appear	to	be	
influential	in	punishing	atrocity	at	international	tribunals.	Nevertheless,	the	reader	will	
periodically	find	references	to	national	laws.72			
The	 advancement	 of	 the	 study’s	 central	 claims	 at	 times	 required	 exposing	 the	
shortcomings	 of	 the	 proffered	 sentencing	 justifications	 by	 international	 courts,	 or	
criticizing	well-intended	 but	misconceived	 approaches,	 or	 demonstrating	 inconsistent	
																																																								
71 For comparative studies of sentencing for international crimes in national systems see Ulrich Sieber (ed.), THE 
PUNISHMENT OF SERIOUS CRIMES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE VOL. 2 
(2004) (analyzing punishment reports from various countries); Daniel B. Pickard, Note, Proposed Sentencing 
Guidelines for the International Criminal Court, 20 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 123, 126 (1997) 
(providing examples of national penalties for international crimes). 
72 Sentencing of international crimes is also carried out by national courts. However, as explained above in 
Section II, the context in which international criminal justice mechanisms operate is quite different from 
national criminal law enforcement. Additionally, as observed in Section III, national sentencing law and practice 
is far a more developed, more mature penal regime with a deeper history and tradition. Given these contextual 
























and	 simply	 stated,	 this	 methodology	 places	 the	 state	 central	 in	 creating	 normative	
obligations.74	 	But	what	if	 the	context	was	not	merely	about	 the	state’s	relationship	to	




that	 certain	 safeguards	 must	 be	 upheld	 in	 the	 relationship	 between	 a	 state	 and	 an	
individual,	 how	 does	 that	 experience	 inform	 such	 considerations	 when	 the	 actions	
involve	a	collective	of	states	against	an	individual?	These	considerations	map	well	onto	
																																																								
73 KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW VOLUME II: CRIMES AND SENTENCING 270 (2014). 
74 Permanent Court of International Justice, Lotus Case (1927), PCIJ Rep. Series A, No. 10. 
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law	as	well	 as	 identify	areas	of	positive	 contribution	 to	atrocity	 sentencing.	Thus,	 the	
chapter	 explores	 three	 underlying	 sub-questions:	 (1)	 what	 are	 the	 legal	 principles	






authority.77	 Is	 there	 support	 for	 conceiving	 nulla	 poena	 as	 encompassing	 a	 “positive	
justice”	dimension	focused	on	improving	the	quality	of	justice	rendered?78	The	chapter	
ends	 with	 a	 critical	 study	 of	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 Rome	 Statute	 of	 the	 International	
Criminal	Court79	pertaining	to	nulla	poena	sine	lege	and	sentencing.		
The	third	chapter	interrogates	sentencing	rationales	and	ideologies	advanced	as	




75 REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (2001). 
76 KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW VOLUME II: CRIMES AND SENTENCING 271 (2014) 
(observing that “it is unclear what exactly the nulla poena principle requires” in international criminal justice). 
77 The concept of “negative liberty”, in contrast to “positive liberty”, was elaborated by Isaiah Berlin in his 
inaugural lecture delivered before the University of Oxford. See, I. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty (1958). The 
analysis assumes that the reader is already familiar with the distinction between negative justice and positive 
justice. 
78 Although not conceptualized as “positive justice” dimensions of the principle of legality, attempts to improve 
predictability in other phase of the criminal justice process have done so by applying the principle of legality. See 
Michiel J.J.P. Luchtman, Towards a Transnational Application of the Legality Principle in the EU’s Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice? 9.4 UTRECHT L. REV. 11 (2013). 
79 UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9.  For a full text of the ICC Statute see International Legal Materials (1998) p. 999; 
see also, www.icc-cpi.int (hereafter referred to as the ‘Rome Statute’, ‘ICC Statute’, or ‘Statute’.)  
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punitive	 goals	 such	 as	 retribution	 and	 deterrence80	 while	 also	 advancing	 restorative	
policy	goals	that	include	at	times	conflicting	international	and	national	priorities.81		The	
research	 outcomes	 offer	 both	 descriptive	 claims	 and	 normative	 critiques.	 Four	 sub-
themes	 are	 specifically	 addressed	 in	 this	 chapter:	 (1)	 Among	 the	 many	 aspirations	
associated	 with	 ICL,	 which	 rationales	 and	 ideologies	 have	 found	 their	 way	 into	 the	
sentencing	phase?	What	purposes	have	been	tied	to	ICL	punishment?	(2)	Do	international	
judges	 implement	 sentences	 in	 accordance	 with	 their	 proffered	 rationales?	 When	
determining	 sentencing	 allocations,	 do	 the	 factors	 they	 consider	 reflect	 their	 stated	
objectives?	(3)	How	can	we	understand	the	vacillation	of	purpose	or	orientation?	What	






punishment?	 	 (2)	 can	 a	 guiding	 principle	 be	 identified	 to	 offer	 direction	 to	 judicial	
discretion	in	a	manner	that	harmonizes	sentencing	outcomes	with	judicial	narratives?		As	
developed	 in	detail	 in	Chapter	Four,	the	process	by	which	 judges	consider	the	various	
sentencing	 factors	 lacks	a	methodical	 approach.	 	Thus,	one	of	 the	 innovative	 research	
outcomes	 of	 this	 project	 is	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 sentencing	 framework	 for	 punishing	










80 For an excellent study of the deterrent capacity of international criminal justice through the lens of a ten conflict 
or post-conflict countries see Jennifer Schense & Linda Carter (eds.), TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK: 
THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 1 (2016). 




this	 research	 study	 can	 be	 summarized	 into	 three	 contributions	 to	 understanding	
atrocity	sentencing.	One	of	the	innovative	outcomes	of	this	research	project	is	explaining	
atrocity	sentencing	through	the	enabler	factor	or	“enabler	responsibility.”	The	enabler	
factor	 closes	 the	explanatory	gap	on	perceived	 sentencing	disparities	 in	 ICL.	 	Another	





















to	 mass	 criminality,	 and	 consequently,	 cannot	 claim	 a	 monopoly	 on	 appropriate	
responses	to	atrocity	crimes.		Appreciating	this	limitation	does	not	mean	that	sentencing	
in	 international	 law	 should	 not	 be	 the	 subject	 of	 scholarly	 study.	 	 Justice	 is	 a	 key	
																																																								
82 According to criminal law theorist and ICL scholar, Kai Ambos, “the Nuremberg precedent” prepared the 
ground for “reduc[ing] the relevance of the nulla poena principle in general.” See KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW VOLUME II: CRIMES AND SENTENCING 275 (2014). 
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ingredient	 in	 the	 foundations	 of	 a	 peaceful	 society.83	 In	 the	 context	 of	 “seeing	 justice	
done”,	the	punishment	and	sentence	are	features	of	atrocity	trials	that	are	often	in	the	







leaders	 in	 the	 face	 of	 legitimate	 questions	 regarding	 their	 failed	 leadership.87	 	 The	
creation	of	international	forums	for	prosecution	of	atrocity	crimes	does	not,	obviously,	
alleviate	us	of	our	obligation	to	police	ominous	situations	and	to	respond	decisively	when	
confronted	 with	 warning	 signals.	 	 Nations	 must	 equally	 commit	 to	 early	 action	 to	
genuinely	prevent	mass	atrocities.88	Otherwise,	we	run	the	risk	that	international	trials	







crimes	against	humanity	or	war	 crimes.	 	The	ensuing	research	 revealed	an	 important	
																																																								
83 Prosecutor v Kambanda, Sentencing, ICTR-97-23-S, para. 58 (“Just sentences contribute to respect for the 
law and maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society.”) 
84 See further KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW VOLUME II: CRIMES AND SENTENCING 
302 (2014) (noting that sentencing decision are of the utmost importance to the parties of international criminal 
proceedings, to both the defendant and the prosecutor, as well as the victims”). 
85 Prosecutor v Aleksovski, Judgment, IT-95-14/1-T (25 June 1999) para. 243 (stating that “in order to 
implement the Tribunal’s mandate, it is crucial to establish a gradation of sentences”); Kambanda Trial 
Sentencing Judgment, supra note 83, para 58; Doherty & Steinberg, Empirical Study (2016), supra note 10, at 
50. 
86 Sadly, we witness the same failures re-occurring.  Although the UN Security Council referred the situation in 
Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC), it failed to take any serious and effective measures to halt the 
violence which consequently spread into Chad, threatening to collapse that country into a failed state. See, 
Stephanie Hancock, ‘Rebels and robbers rampage in eastern Chad’, BBC News, eastern Chad, 20 April 2006, 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4925978.stm.  
87 See generally, Romeo Dallaire, Kishan Manocha & Nishan Degnarain, The Major Powers on Trial, 3 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUSTICE, 861 (2005); J. Kamatali, The Challenge of Linking International Criminal Justice and National 
Reconciliation: The Case of the ICTR, 16 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 115 (2003). 
88 See further Robert I. Rotberg, Deterring Mass Atrocity Crimes: The Cause of Our Era in MASS ATROCITY 
















public	 face	 of	 international	 criminal	 law.	 	 Judicial	 narratives	 in	 sentencing	 judgments	




Sentencing	 by	 international	 courts	 and	 tribunals	 ought	 to	 be	 linked	 with	 the	
objectives	 of	 international	 criminal	 justice.92	 	 Thus,	 a	 solid	 theoretical	 and	 doctrinal	
foundation	must	be	established.		The	international	judge	may	be	seen	as	a	codifier	and	
protector	 of	 international	 values.	 Given	 that	 they	 are	 not	 formally	 acting	 as	
representatives	of	states,	like	members	of	the	Security	Council	or	General	Assembly	do,	
they	 have	 the	 opportunity	 to	 speak	 as	 the	 conscious	 of	 humanity	 in	 building	 shared	





89 On the limited role of sentencing in crime prevention in the domestic context see ANDREW ASHWORTH, 
SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2010). 
90 For objections to overreliance on criminal law as the centerpiece in responding to mass atrocities see Mark 
Osiel, Why Prosecute? Critics of Punishment for Mass Atrocity, 22 HRQ 118 (2000). 
91 See e.g. Henham Developing Contextualized, supra note 56 at 774. 












nominal	 sentence	 imposed	by	 international	 criminal	 courts	 in	 their	disposition	at	 the	
conclusion	 of	 the	 trial	 and	 appeals	 process.	 	 Aside	 from	 a	 few	 references	 to	 provide	
context,	 this	 study	 does	 not	 examine	 in-depth	 the	 execution	 and	 enforcement	 of	 ICL	
sentences,	 including	 issues	 concerning	 selection	 of	 state	 where	 the	 sentence	 will	 be	
served,	prison	conditions,	early	release	and	detention	regime.94		These	matters	naturally	
bear	upon	the	harshness	and	effective	length	of	incarceration.95		However,	as	this	study	










impact	 crimes	 of	 severe	 gravity	 that	 are	 of	 an	 orchestrated	 character,	 shock	 the	
																																																								
93 See KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW VOLUME II: CRIMES AND SENTENCING 270 
(2014) (calling for improvement in ICL sentencing because “the sentencing decision is the most important 
decision in any criminal trial from the perspective of the defendant”). 
94 Responsibility for oversight of the enforcement of ICTY and ICTR sentences, including issues concerning 
early release, are among the functions of the United Nations International Residual Michanism for Criminal 
Tribunals (“Michanism”).  During its initial years, the Michanims operated parallel to the ICTY and ICTR, both 
of which have closed. See, www.unmict.org  
95 DeGuzman Harsh Justice (2014), supra note 3, at 8-9 (discussing how persons convicted by international 
courts face “vastly different norms regarding early release” and “imprisonment conditions [that] vary greatly”). 
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conscience	of	humankind,	result	in	a	significant	number	of	victims	or	large-scale	property	
damage,	 and	 merit	 an	 international	 response	 to	 hold	 at	 least	 the	 top	 war	 criminals	




It	 is	 also	helpful	 to	note	at	 the	outset	 that,	 in	 the	 context	of	 this	study,	when	a	
penalty	 is	 characterized	 as	 “severe”	 or	 “lenient”,	 this	 is	 usually	 from	 an	 internal	
comparative	 perspective,	 unless	 stated	 otherwise.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 assessment	 is	
made	 relative	 to	 other	 sentences	 imposed	 by	 international	 criminal	 courts.	 	 It	 is	 not	







as	a	 lack	of	 empathy	 for	 the	victims.	 	 It	 is	 important	 to	acknowledge	 this	prior	 to	 the	
substantive	analysis	because	at	times	the	arguments	may	appear	very	matter-of-fact	or	
even	 cold.	 	 Additionally,	 at	 other	 times,	 comparisons	may	 be	 drawn	between	 various	
perpetrators	 regarding	 the	 relative	 severity	 of	 their	 punishments.	 	 None	 of	 this	 is	










96 DAVID SCHEFFER, ALL THE MISSING SOULS: A PERSONAL HISTORY OF THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 429-30 
(2012). 
97 ZACHARY KAUFMAN, UNITED STATES LAW AND POLICY ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, 
AND PRAGMATICS 2 (2016). 
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guilty	 of	multiple	murders.	 	 Indeed,	 the	 average	 sentence	 at	 the	 ICTY	 is	 15	 years	 for	
















REIMAGINING NULLA POENA SINE LEGE  
 
If an international court were to be set up, it would be 
unwise to give it the very wide power to determine the 
penalty to be applied to each crime. 
 - Mr. Carlos Salamanca Figueroa,      
 International Law Commission (1954) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Only the innocent deserve the benefits of the principle of legality.  This statement naturally 
offends our notions of justice and fairness.  By today’s human rights standards, it would be 
unacceptable for a legal system to institutionalize such an approach.  Yet, in the context of 
prosecuting mass atrocities, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, international 
criminal law appears to be resigned to such a principle, if not openly embracing it. Although 
ranking among the most fundamental principles of criminal law, nulla poena sine lege (no 
punishment without law) has received surprisingly little attention in international criminal 
justice.  So little, in fact, that it may be considered the poor cousin of nullum crimen sine lege 
(no crime without law) which has attracted far greater consideration in scholarship and 
jurisprudence.1  Whereas nullum crimen sine lege addresses the punishability of the conduct in 
question, nulla poena sine lege deals with the legality of the actual punishment or penalty itself.  
Given that both are at the core of the principle of legality,2 the neglect of nulla poena is difficult 
																																																								
1 See C.R. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 20190/92, 335 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1996) at 68-69; S.W. v. United 
Kingdom, App. No. 20166/92, 335 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1996), at 41-42; THOMAS RAUTER, JUDICIAL PRACTICE, 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE (2017); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (1999); MACHTELD BOOT, GENOCIDE, CRIMES 
AGAINST HUMANITY AND WAR CRIMES: NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE AND THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2002); STANISLAW POMORSKI, AMERICAN COMMON LAW AND THE 
PRINCIPLE NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE (Elżbieta Chodakowska trans., 2d ed. 1975); L. C. Green, The Maxim 
Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Eichmann Trial, 38 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 457 (1962); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., 
Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189 (1985); Jordan J. Paust, It’s No 
Defense: Nullum Crimen, International Crime and the Gingerbread Man, 60 ALB. L. REV. 657 (1997); Mohamed 
Shahabuddeen, Does the Principle of Legality Stand in the Way of Progressive Development of Law?, 2 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 1007 (2004); Beth Van Schaack, Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the Intersection of Law 
and Morals, 97 GEO. L. J. 119 (2008). 
2 Susan Lamb, Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege in International Criminal Law, in THE ROME STATUTE 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 773, 773-74, 756 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & 
John R. W. D. Jones eds., 2002); Paul H. Robinson, Legality and Discretion in the Distribution of Criminal 
Sanctions, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 396-97 (1988); William A. Schabas, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, in 
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to justify, although not entirely without explanation.3  As renowned legal scholar Jerome Hall 
observed, nulla poena sine lege “affects only proven criminals” while nullum crimen sine lege 
“protects the mass of respectable citizens.”4  Commenting on the traditional approach of strict 
adherence to nullum crimen combined with a cavalier attitude towards nulla poena, eminent 
criminal law professor Paul Robinson observed that such a practice “bestows the benefits of 
legality on innocent people and denies it only to the criminals.”5  While most national criminal 
justice systems have made considerable efforts over the years to close this gap, international 
criminal justice has not. The potential contribution of nulla poena has been largely overlooked 
on the international level by policy makers, drafters, and judges.6  Likewise, there exists a 
lacuna in academic scholarship on this subject.7  Under-theorization of nulla poena in 
international criminal justice stalls the maturation in international law of this long standing 
criminal law principle, keeps dormant its contribution to justice, and challenges the legitimacy 
of international prosecution and punishment. This Chapter aims to remedy this lacuna by 
undertaking three distinct tasks. First, it develops the normative content of nulla poena under 
international law. Second, this Chapter critically evaluates whether the statutes of international 
criminal courts and their sentencing jurisprudence adhere to this standard.  Third, I advance a 
new understanding of the role and potential contribution of nulla poena in international law 
that goes beyond its simple caricature as a principle of negative rights, designed merely to 
prevent retroactive punishment, to one that captures its role as a quality of justice principle, 
aimed at realizing justice in the distribution of punishment.   
The Chapter’s methodology deconstructs the nulla poena maxim into its underlying legal 
principles, examines sources of international law pertaining to each principle, and then 
reconstructs an international nulla poena maxim.  The inquiry takes the approach that a fuller 
appreciation of the function and purpose of nulla poena, gained through an elucidation of its 
underlying legal principles, can facilitate a more penetrating analysis of its normative 
development in international law. Accordingly, Part II of this Chapter examines the purpose of 
																																																								
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE 
BY ARTICLE 463, 463 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999). 
3 See generally Francis A. Allen, The Erosion of Legality in American Criminal Justice: Some Latter-Day 
Adventures of the Nulla Poena Principle, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 385 (1987). 
4 JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 55 (2d ed. 2005). 
5 Robinson, supra note 2, at 398. 
     6  KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW VOLUME II: CRIMES AND SENTENCING 272 
(2014) (arguing that the legitimacy of international criminal tribunals can be enhanced by a more faithful 
observance of nulla poena). 
     7  Id. at 271 (observing that “it is unclear what exactly the nulla poena principle requires” in international 
criminal justice). 
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and interests protected by nulla poena and draws attention to its modern function.8  The 
analysis then connects these functions and protected interests with the underlying attributes of 
the maxim, formulated as legal principles.  I argue that the goal of nulla poena is not merely to 
prevent retroactive punishment or abuse of power9 but that it also has a quality of justice 
function: it contributes to realization of equality before the law, justice in the distribution of 
punishment, and consistency in sentencing.10  The former reflects a narrow understanding of 
nulla poena whereas the latter manifests a modern approach.11 
Part III investigates sources of international law in order to determine the international 
standard for nulla poena through an analysis of international and regional conventions, 
customary international law, general principles of law, and international judicial precedent.  
Rather than giving a desultory treatment of nulla poena under international law, this Part 
examines sources of international law as they pertain to the four underlying attributes of nulla 
poena: lex praevia (the prohibition against retroactive application), lex scripta (punishment 
must be based on written law), lex certa (the form and severity of punishment must be defined 
with clarity), and lex stricta (the prohibition against applying a penalty by analogy). Drawing 
upon this analysis, this Chapter advances an international standard for nulla poena integrating 
the particularities of international law with the requirements of criminal justice. 
In Part IV, the Chapter moves its examination of nulla poena into the context of 
international criminal justice.  This Part critically analyzes the statute and case law of 
international criminal courts and tribunals. The discussion begins with the sentencing 
jurisprudence of post-World War II atrocity trials; continues with an examination of the UN 
Security Council created ad hoc Tribunals of the 1990s;12 and culminates in a critique of the 
																																																								
8 As the historical background of nulla poena sine lege has been covered by other authors, it will not be further 
revisited here. See Kai Ambos, Nulla Poena Sine Lege in International Criminal Law, in SUPRANATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW: A SYSTEM SUI GENERIS 17-22 (Roelof Haveman, Olga Kavran & Julian Nicholls eds., 2003); 
Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 127-35.  See generally CARL LUDWIG VON BAR, THE HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL 
CRIMINAL LAW (Thomas S. Bell trans., Rothman Reprints 1968) (1916); Pomorski, supra note 1; Jerome Hall, 
Nulla Poena Sine Lege, 47 YALE L.J. 165 (1937); Aly Mokhtar, Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege: Aspects 
and Prospects, 26 STATUTE L. REV. 41 (2005). 
     9 For the sake of shorthand, I refer to these protections as “negative rights” safeguarded by nulla poena. By 
negative rights and positive rights, I draw on the distinction between “negative liberty” and “positive liberty” 
discussed by Isaiah Berlin in his inaugural lecture delivered before the University of Oxford. See, ISAIAH BERLIN, 
TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1958). The analysis assumes that the reader is already familiar with the distinction 
between negative justice and positive justice. 
     10 For sake of shorthand, I refer to these features as nulla poena’s “positive justice” function or “positive rights” 
or “quality of justice” function. 
11 The broader approach to nulla poena is associated with its “positive justice” dimension or “quality of law” 
function.  See infra notes 18 & 20 (discussing a broader approach). 
12 The “International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991” was 
established by the U.N. Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in 1993 
pursuant to Resolution 827.  See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, 
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International Criminal Court, representing a new era of a permanent treaty-based mechanism 
for international criminal justice. The treatment of nulla poena by international criminal courts 
is examined against the backdrop of the analysis developed in Parts II and III.  The ICTR and 
ICTY share effectively the same statutory provisions on punishment and sentencing.  
Moreover, the two tribunals shared a common Appeals Chamber and thus, its conceptualization 
of nulla poena, sentencing principles, and statutory interpretation served a guidance for judges 
at both tribunals. Given that the first war criminal sentenced from this period was a defendant 
before the ICTY, its sentencing judgment and discussion of nulla poena and the national law 
provision merit detailed examination because its interpretations and ruling on these principles 
and provisions were upheld by the Appeals Chamber and subsequently followed by both 
tribunals.  
 Next, the Chapter critiques the provisions of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC)13 pertaining to nulla poena and sentencing.  Here, the Chapter elucidates 
the strengths and weaknesses of the ICC Statute in light of the international standard for nulla 
poena and its potential contribution to international criminal justice. It concludes that while 
one of the rationales underlying nulla poena, for example preventing retroactive punishment, 
may not raise serious concerns for international punishment of individuals guilty of war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide, this does not mean that nulla poena has lost relevance 
to international criminal justice.  Other rationales underlying the maxim, in particular those 
connected with its positive justice function, such as equal treatment before the law, consistency 
in sentencing, and improving the quality of justice, continue to require a rethinking of the role 
of nulla poena in advancing international law and justice. 
 
II. THE NATURE OF NULLA POENA SINE LEGE 
A. VALUES: INTERESTS PROTECTED AND PURPOSES SERVED 
Nulla poena sine lege and its counterpart, nullum crimen sine lege, serve as the bedrock 
of the principle of legality.  They protect one of the most treasured individual rights of all — 
																																																								
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute], reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: 
A COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN INSTRUMENTS 53 (Christine Van den Wyngaert ed., 3d ed. 
2005). 
13 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 1, 2002) [hereinafter 
ICC Statute]; United Nations: Rome Statute of the Criminal Court, 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998).  The full text of the 
statute is also available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/EA9AEFF7-5752-4F84-BE94-
0A655EB30E16/0/Rome_Statute_English.pdf.  
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the right to liberty.  In legal positivism, their emergence is connected with the struggle against 
the dangers of unbridled and absolute power.14  Hence, they developed alongside other 
doctrines, such as trias politica, that were likewise designed to curb abuses of centralized 
power, although their application is not theoretically limited to a particular form of 
government.15  In a trias politica system, the principle of legality places obligations and 
limitations on the powers of all three branches of the government.  For example, they oblige 
the law-making body to define as precisely and clearly as possible the penalty applicable to a 
particular crime, including the form and severity of the punishment.  They place on the 
judiciary the obligation to limit sanctions to those explicitly provided for by the legislature and 
prohibit judges from applying penalties retroactively.  It may even be argued that nulla poena 
requires the judiciary to articulate reasons in support of the selected penalty.16 
Nulla poena protects interests similar to those protected by nullum crimen.17  First, it 
protects an individual’s interest in being free from abuse of power leading to loss of life, liberty, 
or property.  For example, nulla poena protects an individual’s right to liberty by requiring 
codified limits on the length of imprisonment.  Second, it safeguards the principle of fair notice.  
Fairness and justice in the administration of criminal law demand that individuals know, or at 
least have the opportunity to know, the specific consequence for violating a particular law.  
Nulla poena serves this purpose by making the punishment for a crime foreseeable.  In most 
national systems, this is expressed through codified penalty ranges for each crime. 
Another interest protected by nulla poena is legal certainty.  Legal certainty may be 
considered the sum of the first two interests.  However, society’s interest in legal certainty and 
modern justifications for respecting nulla poena are broader than the goals of providing notice 
and preventing abuse of power, and include, for example, justice in the distribution of 
punishment and consistency in sentencing.18 The fact that nulla poena sine lege has outgrown 
																																																								
14 See also Hall, supra note 8, at 165-72; Mokhtar, supra note 8. 
15 See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR 
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 270-80 (1996); Hall, supra note 8, at 167-70; see also FARHAD MALEKAIN, THE 
CONCEPT OF ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 20-22, 179-80 (1994) (noting the 
relevance of nulla poena sine lege and nullum crimen sine lege in Islamic legal traditions). 
16 At least one judge of the ICTY Appeals Chamber voiced concern in this regard, remarking that ICTY 
judgments “should be more elaborate on the reasons as to how a Chamber comes to the proportional sentence.”  
Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Separate Opinion of Justice Schomburg, para. 1 (Sept. 17, 2003).  
Upon entering new convictions on appeal, the Appeals Chamber doubled the sentence without providing any 
substantive reasoning as to how it determined the new penalty.  Id. at Judgment, para. 264. 
17 See In re Rauter, Spec. Crim. Ct., The Hague (May 4, 1948), reprinted in H. LAUTERPACHT, ANNUAL DIGEST 
AND REPORTS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES 526, 542-43 (1949) (recognizing two interests protected by 
nulla poena: legal security and individual liberty); see also, Robinson, supra note 2, at 396-97 (“The rationales 
that support precise written rules governing assignment of liability and its degree apply as well to criminal 
sentencing.”). 
18 The common trends in reform of domestic penal policy, for example in the United States during the 1950s 
and 1960s with the proclamation of the Model Penal Code and again in the late 1980s with the Federal Sentencing 
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its “negative” justice dimension19 and developed a “positive” justice attribute20 is evidenced 
by movements in various countries to reform sentencing laws, which began in the 1970s and 
built momentum over the last two decades.21  Undertaken in both civil law and common law 
countries, these reforms in sentencing policy transcend the traditional dichotomy between 
adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems.22  One common element emerging from the 
movements is that, in undertaking these reforms, the concern of policymakers is not that the 
state has abusively employed its power against individuals, but rather the concern has been to 
achieve justice and equal treatment in sentencing.23 In post-human rights reforms of domestic 
penal policy, greater emphasis has been placed on the positive values protected by nulla poena.  
For example, in the mid-1970s, Finland started reforming its criminal justice system, focusing 
on legal security, proportionality, predictability, and equal treatment.24 Likewise, common law 
countries have moved away from unfettered judicial discretion in sentencing in favor of 
gradation by statutory law.25 The reason for this, according to Kai Ambos, is “gradation by 
normative decree (statute, binding guidelines) guarantees more certainty than gradation by 
judge-made law.”26  This reflects a broader approach to nulla poena sine lege. 
Accordingly, a modern approach to the principle of legality appreciates nulla poena’s 
utility for not only limiting judicial authority, but also safeguarding it by preventing factors 
such as popular prejudice, political pressure, or immediate public opinion from influencing the 
sentence.  It partly restrains these potential threats to justice in sentencing as well as the 
																																																								
Guidelines, in Scandinavian countries in the 1970s, and in Eastern European countries following the Cold War, 
all suggest constant and increasing movement towards placing greater emphasis on the values protected by the 
“positive” features of nulla poena sine lege.  For further contemplation of the broader relevance and importance 
of nulla poena sine lege, see Allen, supra note 3, at 385-412. 
19 For example, the prevention of abuse of power and application of retroactive penalties. 
20 Take, for example, equality before the law, consistency in sentencing, proportionality, and predictability.  
See Robinson, supra note 2, at 394 (“While commentators do not always include it as a traditional purpose of the 
legality principle, another important effect is to assure some degree of uniformity among decision makers—both 
judges and juries—in imposing criminal sanctions in similar cases.”). 
21 See Daniel B. Pickard, Note, Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for the International Criminal Court, 20 LOY. 
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 123, 126 (1997). 
22 The 1976 revisions of the Finnish Penal Code provide an illustrative example of such reforms in a civil law 
system.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1991) (containing examples of reforms in a common law 
system); Pickard, supra note 21; Bill Mears, Rehnquist Slams Congress Over Reducing Sentencing Discretion, 
CNN.COM, Jan. 1, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/01/01/rehnquist.judiciary/ (reporting the reaction by the 
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court).  The author acknowledges that some national systems face an 
ongoing debate about how much discretion to give judges.  Moreover, it is not the author’s intention to advocate 
a blanket endorsement of the methods underlying the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines for the purpose of 
international sentencing. 
23 See Pickard, supra note 21. Significantly, in the context of international criminal justice, current and former 
judges of the ICTY have expressed concern that lack of consistency in atrocity sentencing may undermine 
confidence in international prosecutions. See Rachel S. Taylor, Sentencing Guidelines Urged, INST. WAR & PEACE 
REPORTING, Mar. 8, 2004. 
     24  See Pickard, supra note 21.    
     25 AMBOS, ICL TREATISE II (2014), supra note 6 at 286. 
     26 AMBOS, ICL TREATISE II (2014), supra note 6 at 286. 
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appearance of such an influence.  Thus, in addition to safeguarding the rights of a defendant, 
nulla poena also protects the integrity of the criminal justice process.  It provides a legal 
framework in which consistency in sentencing can be more readily achieved in practice.  By 
creating a statutory framework for penalties, nulla poena actually preserves judicial 
independence, safeguarding judges from pressures arising from non-legal influences. Most 
importantly, the positive justice dimensions of nulla poena contribute to justice in sentencing, 
which “calls for equality, that is, the equal treatment of equal cases and the unequal treatment 
of unequal ones.”27   In short, a broad approach to nulla poena sine lege, in tune with its modern 
development and recognizing its characteristic as a quality of justice principle, affords several 
interconnected benefits including advancing consistency in sentencing, safeguarding judicial 
authority, protecting the integrity of criminal justice, and upholding justice in the eyes of the 
public. 
B. ATTRIBUTES: LEGAL PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING NULLA POENA  
The extent of protection accorded to these interests depends in part upon the degree of 
adherence to four attributes of nulla poena sine lege.  They consist of two threshold 
requirements on the quality of criminal law and two prohibitions on its application.28  The 
threshold requirements are expressed in the legal principles of lex scripta (punishment must be 
based on written law) and lex certa (the form and severity of punishment must be clearly 
defined and distinguishable).  The two prohibitions can be described as lex praevia (the 
prohibition against retroactive application) and lex stricta (the prohibition against applying a 
penalty by analogy). 
As to the quality of law, lex scripta and lex certa work in tandem and are recognized 
requirements of nulla poena in most legal systems.29  Continental European legal systems 
interpret the lex scripta principle as requiring penalties to be based upon written laws provided 
																																																								
     27 AMBOS, ICL TREATISE II (2014), supra note 6 at 286. 
28  BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 123-26; Hall, supra note 8, at 165; Roelof Haveman, The Principle of Legality, 
in SUPRANATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A SYSTEM SUI GENERIS 39, 40 (Roelof Haveman, Olga Kavran & Julian 
Nicholls eds., 2003); Lamb, supra note 2, at 733-66; see also, Boot, supra note 2, at 94-102.  In commentaries on 
the principle of legality, these four attributes have been discussed as they relate to the nullum crimen principle.  
They are also useful in analyzing the substance of the nulla poena principle.  As applied to nullum crimen, these 
attributes address the punishability of a particular conduct.  Applied to nulla poena, they place limits and set 
standards for the punishment itself. 
29 Haveman, supra note 28, at 40-43; see also Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case Nos. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-Abis, 
Judgement, Separate Opinion of Judge Cassese, para. 4 (Jan. 26, 2000) (“[T]he nulla poena sine praevia lege 
poenali principle . . . is generally upheld in most national legal systems . . . .  Under this principle, for conduct to 
be punishable as a criminal offence, the law must not only provide that such conduct is regarded as a criminal 
offence, but it must also set out the appropriate penalty . . . .”). 
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by the legislature.30 Although common law traditions historically permitted “written law” to 
include judge-made law, the United States, in addition to most common law countries,31 
follows a continental law approach to lex scripta, as evidenced by the practice of relying on 
statutory law in the application of criminal penalties.32 Many states within the United States 
have enacted legislation that specifically states that the criminal code, as promulgated by the 
legislator is the exclusive source of criminal law.  Accordingly, it may be concluded that lex 
scripta requires that the law, which is relied on by judges for their legal authority to punish the 
accused, be written and provided for by the legislature.  Thus, nulla poena limits the use of 
custom for the determination of a sentence.  Here, nulla poena protects not only against abuse 
of power, but it also guards against the influence of prejudicial factors, such as transient 
emotional outrage or politically charged motives.   
Lex certa requires that the law authorizing the nature (form) and degree (severity) of 
punishment be specific, definite, and clear.  This includes specifying the type of punishment 
that a judge is authorized to impose on an accused.33 Punishment that is not specifically 
authorized by the legislator is prohibited. Lex certa also requires the law to differentiate 
between the severity of crimes by specifying maximum penalties applicable to different 
crimes.34 Lex certa also promotes accountability by establishing clear standards against which 
the conduct of leaders measured.35 Finally, it would mean that the law of penalties should also 
distinguish between different forms of participation in criminal conduct such as commission, 
attempt, aiding and abetting, and so on.  The majority of states follow this approach in their 
domestic legal systems, and it typically includes the practice of articulating a maximum penalty 
specific to each criminal offense.  By requiring definite and precise law on penalties, the lex 
certa requirement of nulla poena sine lege protects the individual’s interest in legal certainty.  
Thus, working together, lex certa and lex scripta can improve the quality of justice in the 
application of sentencing laws. 
																																																								
30 See Haveman, supra note 28, at 41. 
31 Roelof Haveman claims that Scotland is a remaining exception, where the High Court claims declaratory 
power to create new crimes.  See id. at 41 n.6. 
32 See id. at 41. 
33 For example, death, incarceration, forced labor, fines, and so on. 
34 Hereinafter referred to as either “precise,” “specific,” or “individualized” penalties.  By use of these terms 
herein, I mean the practice of providing a penalty range or maximum penalty per crime.  I do not argue for exact 
penalties (that is, for example, fifteen years exactly for a particular crime, no more and no less).  Moreover, while 
the law in the first instance sets the outer limits of a penalty, the determination of the actual sentence within that 
range in a given case is influenced by a number of factors.  However, an analysis of all sentencing factors is 
beyond the scope of the present contribution. 
 35 KENNETH S. GALLANT, THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL 
LAW 30 (2009). 
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Turning to the prohibition characterized as lex praevia, nulla poena requires strict 
adherence to the principle of non-retroactivity as to the nature and degree of the imposed 
punishment.36  It prohibits the imposition of a penalty heavier than the one applicable at the 
time the crime was committed.  The principle of non-retroactivity is a fundamental feature of 
any criminal justice system37 and has been explicitly recognized in international human rights 
declarations and treaties.38  Moreover, the lex praevia attribute of nulla poena is consistently 
among the non-derogable provisions of these international instruments, prompting some 
commentators to argue that it ranks among the core human rights protections.39  In the context 
of nullum crimen sine lege, writers from the civil law tradition described the lex stricta element 
as a prohibition on interpretation by analogy.40  Jurists from the common law tradition explain 
lex stricta, more generally, as the requirement of strict interpretation.41  This includes the notion 
that penal statutes should not be extended to the detriment of the accused.  Accordingly, 
whereas the lex stricta component of nullum crimen prohibits expansion of criminal laws by 
analogy to cover conduct not within the law, the lex stricta attribute of nulla poena would 
prohibit substituting an alternative penalty by analogy.42 
 
III.  NULLA POENA SINE LEGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 Interrogating the normative force of principles of legality in international law immediately 
triggers the incapability of two bodies of law, as raised in the opening chapter. Principles of 
legality and international law operate on desperately different frameworks in relation to the 
																																																								
36 United Nations General Assembly, Mar.-Apr. & Aug. 1996, Report of the Preparatory Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, para. 189, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (1996) [hereinafter ICC Prep. 
Committee’s 1996 Report]; see also Schabas, supra note 2, at 463. 
37 The views expressed by states during the ICC preparatory meetings confirm this principle as a primary 
feature of their national legal systems.  See ICC Prep. Committee’s 1996 Report, supra note 36, para. 189. 
38 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A at 55, art. 15.1, U.N. GAOR, 
21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/6316 (adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession on 
Dec. 16, 1966) (entered into force on Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 73, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter 
UDHR].  For regional international treaties, see African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People’s Rights art. 7(2), 
June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter African Charter]; Organization of 
American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 
[hereinafter ACHR]; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 
7(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
39 See Lamb, supra note 2, at 757. 
40 BOOT, supra note 1, at 94, 100-02; Haveman, supra note 28, at 46-48. 
41 See Hall, supra note 8, at 165. 
42 In the Erdemović case, an ICTY trial chamber succumbed to this type of interpretation when it made 
comparisons between genocide and crimes against humanity.  Discussed in full infra Part IV(B).  See Prosecutor 
v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, paras. 35-40 (Nov. 29, 1996).  While most national 
legal systems allow for some judicial discretion in the application of penalties, this discretion is strictly limited 
by legislative parameters.  As noted by one commentator, “only a few permit resorting to analogy outside 
legislatively enacted penalties.”  See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 124. 
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notion of sovereignty.  Principles of legality approach state sovereignty from the perspective 
of the individual.  Here, the stakeholders are in a hierarchical vertical relationship to each other.  
International law, on the other hand, approaches sovereignty from the perspective of the 
states.43  Here the stakeholders (states) are in a horizontal relationship of co-equals to each 
other.  From the standpoint of the former, the object is to protect the individual from the state.  
Generally speaking, the state cannot do what it is not permitted to do.  From the standpoint of 
the latter, the object is to free the state from any interference in its activities by another state.  
The state is generally free to do that which it is not prohibited from doing.44 
While the resulting rules orientate differently, they are not in tension because their 
underlying concerns are in harmony.  In both cases, the rule seeks to protect the weaker from 
the more powerful.  In the case of the former, the concern historically has been to protect the 
individual from abuse by the state.  In the case of the latter, the rule protects a weaker state 
from a more powerful state. 
Accordingly, this study approaches principles of legality in the context of international 
criminal justice from the perspective of the individual.  This is in harmony with the underlying 
rationale of both perspectives (international law and criminal law): protection of the weaker 
participant.  This choice has consequences for the methodology of this section.  In seeking to 
identify a rule of international law, international legal analysis normally follows the 
methodology of exploring international treaties and customary international law. If analysis of 
these sources does not reveal an obligation, then the typical conclusion presumptively is that 
the state is not bound by an international rule on the matter in its relation to other co-equals 
(i.e. states).45  This methodology places the state central.  But what if the context was not merely 
about the state’s relationship to another co-equal, but to an individual?  Or the relationship 
between a collective of states to a single individual? Principles of legality, however, place the 
individual central. If wisdom and experience tell us that certain safeguards must be upheld in 
the relationship between a state and an individual, then the reasons are equally, if not more, 
compelling when the situation involves action by a collective of states against an individual. 
The nature of principles of legality is to seek balance and justice in the relationship between 
																																																								
 43 Although, normative and institutional developments in international law evidence a slow trend to re-
orientate the foundations of international law in a manner that would make the human interest less peripheral. See 
REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (2001).  
 44 Permanent Court of International Justice, Lotus Case (1927), PCIJ Rep. Series A, No. 10. 
 45 General principles of law also provide a source of international law, however, they are generally rules 
relevant to adjudication of a dispute between states and typically do not impact the obligation of one state 
towards another state in the realm of performance. 
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the individual and the state, not between two states.46   Therefore, these divergent orientations 
must be considered in the weighing the sources of international law. 
 
A. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS: AN INCOMPLETE CODIFICATION? 
According to some scholars, the principle of legality has been “integrated into the concept 
of fundamental human rights in criminal justice.”47  Regarding national legal systems, this 
proposition seems beyond serious debate.  But what about the character and content of nulla 
poena sine lege in international law and international criminal justice?  When analyzing human 
rights instruments for an understanding of the principle of legality in international law, 
commentators typically begin with Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) (1948): 
No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which 
did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it 
was committed.  Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable 
at the time the penal offence was committed.48 
Nearly identical language is found in several international and regional human rights 
treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966),49 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR) (1950),50 and the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) (1969).51 This 
language also appears in the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions of 
1949.52  Several commentators consider the second sentence to represent the incorporation of 
nulla poena sine lege in international law as a fundamental human rights principle.53  This 
																																																								
 46 This should not be misunderstand as claiming that this vertical relationship between the individual and the 
state is the only concern of nulla poena; as discussed above, nulla poena also has a horizontal dynamic.  
47 BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 15, at 265; see also MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 358 (2d ed. 2005) (1993); Schabas, supra note 2, at 463. 
48 UDHR, supra note 38. 
49 ICCPR, supra note 38, art. 15(1) (“[N]or shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable 
at the time when the criminal offence was committed.”); see NOWAK, supra note 47, at 358-68 (providing a 
general commentary on this article). 
50 ECHR, supra note 38, art. 7(1) (“[N]or shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable 
at the time the criminal offence was committed.”); see DAVID J. HARRIS, MICHAEL O’BOYLE & COLIN WARBRICK, 
LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 274-82 (1995) (providing a general commentary on 
Article 7). 
51 ACHR, supra note 38, art. 9 (stating that a heavier penalty shall not be imposed than the one that was 
applicable at the time the criminal offense was committed); see also JO M. PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Thomas Buergenthal ed., 2003). 
 52  See, Additional Protocol I, Article 75(4)(c); Additional Protocol II, Article 6(2)(c). 
53 See NOWAK, supra note 47, at 359.  See generally KENNETH S. GALLANT, THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW (2009). 
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provision is consistently among the non-derogable provisions of these international human 
rights treaties.54 Moreover, all three conventions codify the provision in an article separate from 
other procedural guarantees in criminal law, indicating “its special significance for criminal 
trials . . . as well as for legal certainty in general.”55 Its formulation further indicates that the 
international nulla poena sine lege prohibits both retroactive and retrospective punishment.56 
The text itself explicitly incorporates into international law one attribute of nulla poena, 
namely the lex praevia principle: the prohibition of ex post facto penal laws and retroactive 
application of penalties.57  The European Court of Human Rights (European Court), however, 
held that this provision includes the lex stricta prohibition against application of penalties by 
analogy, as well as the lex certa attribute of nulla poena sine lege: 
Article 7 embodies, inter alia, the principle that only the law can define a crime and 
prescribe a penalty (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) and the principle that the 
criminal law must not be extensively construed to an accused’s detriment, for instance by 
analogy.  From these principles it follows that an offence and the sanctions provided for 
it must be clearly defined in the law.58 
Here, the European Court took a broad approach to nulla poena, viewing it not merely as 
a protectionist principle but also as a quality of law principle.59  Although the case involved a 
situation in which “it may be difficult to frame laws with absolute precision and [a] certain 
degree of flexibility may be called for,” the European Court did not hesitate to apply a strict 
																																																								
54 See ICCPR, supra note 38; ACHR, supra note 38, art. 27(2); ECHR, supra note 38.  It also appears in 
international humanitarian law treaties.  See e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 75(4)(c), Aug. 
12, 1949, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
55 NOWAK, supra note 47, at 358. 
56 See Adamson v. United Kingdom, App. No. 42293/98, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD209 (1999); Welch v. United 
Kingdom, App. No. 17440/90, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD42 (1996).  “Retroactivity” generally refers to making a 
certain conduct, innocent at the time it was performed, criminal and punishable after the fact, in other words 
creating a new crime ex post facto; whereas “retrospectivity” refers to an ex post facto change in the legal effect 
or consequence of a conduct that was already criminal.  For further reading, see Bouterse Case, Amsterdam Court 
of Appeals, Opinion of Professor C.J.R. Dugard, para. 8.4.5 (July 7, 2000) (on file with author). 
 57 The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 on the protection of civilian persons in time of war also prohibits 
retroactive application of penalties. See GCIV Articles 65 and 67. 
58 Başkaya v. Turkey, App. Nos. 23536/94 & 24408/94, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 10, para. 36 (1999) (emphasis 
added). 
59 This is consistent with the court’s approach to Article 7 in general.  For example, in Kokkinakis v. Greece, 
the court interpreted the general scope of Article 7(1) to include the principles of lex certa, lex scripta, and lex 
stricta in a case concerning the “punishability” of the conduct.  See App. No. 14307/88, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397, 
411 (1994) (“[Article 7(1)] also embodies, more generally, the principle that only the law can define a crime and 
prescribe a penalty . . . and the principle that the criminal law must not be extensively construed to an accused’s 
detriment, for instance by analogy; it follows from this that an offence must be clearly defined in law.”).  However, 
in the context of national prosecutions, the court ruled that Article 7 was not violated where the “punishability” 
of the conduct was foreseeable in light of the interpretations of national courts.  Problems with applying the 
foreseeability test in the context of international law are addressed below. 
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standard for nulla poena sine lege and rejected the use of analogy in fixing a penalty even 
where nullum crimen sine lege had been respected.60  Likewise, leading commentators consider 
the nulla poena provision of ICCPR Article 15(1), ECHR Article 7(1), and ACHR Article 9 as 
also giving rise to the lex scripta (written law), lex certa (certain and predictable), and lex 
stricta (prohibition of analogy) attributes of nulla poena sine lege, in addition to explicitly 
incorporating lex praevia (prohibition of retroactivity).61 
The passive language of these provisions also leaves open to interpretation the notion of 
“law.”  What “law” satisfies the lex scripta requirement of nulla poena sine lege when 
determining the penalty “applicable” at the time of the offense? 62  The European Court stated, 
obiter dictum, that “[w]hen speaking of ‘law’ Article 7 alludes to the very same concept as that 
to which the Convention refers elsewhere when using that term, a concept which comprises 
statutory as well as case-law.”63  In cases dealing with the nullum crimen principle,64 the 
European Court has applied the test of accessibility and foreseeability when determining 
whether the conduct in question falls within the scope of a criminal statute.65  However, caution 
should be taken before mechanically applying the foreseeability test to penalties in 
international prosecutions.66  First, international adjudication accepts a wider range of sources 
of law than the two types referred to by the European Court.  In addition to treaty law, other 
																																																								
60 Başkaya, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. paras. 39, 42. 
61 See, e.g., NOWAK, supra note 47, at 359-60. 
62 A few decisions address this question in interpreting the nullum crimen principle set forth in the first clause 
of Article 7(1).  See C.R. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 20190/92, 335 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 68-69 (1996); S.W. v. 
United Kingdom, App. No. 20166/92, 335 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 41-42 (1996).  In these cases, the European Court of 
Human Rights held that so long as the law is “accessible” and “foreseeable,” then the nullum crimen principle is 
respected. See also, Coëme and others v. Belgium, App. Nos. 32492/96 et al., Judgment, 22 June 2000) para. 145. 
63 Başkaya, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. para. 36.  Note, however, that in this case as well as in the Welch and Adamson 
cases, the lex scripta principle was not directly in issue.  The issue in the latter two was not whether judge-made 
law could serve to satisfy the nulla poena principle in Article 7(1), but whether the measure constituted a “penalty” 
within the meaning of the Convention.  The legislation in question in both cases was held to have retrospective 
effects and therefore, if the measure was deemed to be punitive, it would be held to violate the second clause of 
Article 7(1).  Adamson v. United Kingdom, App. No. 42293/98, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD209, 1 (1999); Welch v. 
United Kingdom, App. No. 17440/90, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD42, paras. 26-27 (1996).  In Welch, the court held 
that the confiscation provision of the Drug Trafficking Offenses Act of 1986 were penalties within the meaning 
of Convention, and therefore its retrospective application to the defendant violated the nulla poena sine lege 
principle within Article 7.  16 Eur. H.R. Rep. paras. 33-35.  In Adamson, however, the majority court held that 
the application was inadmissible because the challenged measure under the Sex Offenders Act of 1997, although 
also resulting in retrospective consequences, did not violate Article 7(1) because the measure was not a penalty.  
28 Eur. H.R. Rep. at para. 1. 
64 That is, whether the conduct in question is punishable in the first place, or in other words whether the conduct 
falls within the scope of a criminal statute. 
65 C.R. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 20190/92, 335 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1996); S.W. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
20166/92, 335 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1996); Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397, 411 
(1994). 
66 Some writers have no trouble relying on the nullum crimen cases to perfunctorily apply the foreseeability 
test to a nulla poena analysis.  See, e.g., Schabas, supra note 2, at 463.  However, the fact that such authors do not 
cite cases where the court itself applies the accessibility and foreseeability test to a nulla poena issue is revealing.  
The absence of cited case law applying the test to penalties is neither surprising nor without possible explanation.  
See infra text accompanying notes 70-72. 
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sources of international law include international custom and general principles of law.67  
While the court has given a liberal interpretation to the notion of “law,” state practice and 
opinio juris is presumably not what the court had in mind when referring to “case-law.”  The 
diverse sources of international law and the complexities surrounding international law-making 
processes challenge a straightforward application of the accessibility and foreseeability test. 
Second, the cases in which this test has been applied involved prosecutions in which the 
conduct in question and the law applied arose in the same forum.  In international prosecutions, 
the applicability of this test is complicated by the fact that the penalties are rendered in a forum 
far removed from the locus delicti.  If the law of the locus delicti prohibited the application of 
a particular penalty, can that penalty still be considered foreseeable?  Should the “applicable 
penalty” be determined by the law of the locus delicti or the law of the locus fori? The rulings 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on this point have 
been controversial, if not contrary to the intent of the statute’s drafters.68  As discussed in the 
next section, the drafter’s inclusion of the national law provision reflects underlying concerns 
about foreseeability and fairness in punishment.  Yet, through clever stratagem, the ICTY 
avoided the intent of the drafters and effectively marginalized punitive norms of the locus 
delicti, for example the prohibition of life imprisonment, when laying the foundations for its 
sentencing practice.69 Third, the foreseeability test arose in cases dealing with the issue of 
punishability of conduct, and not the punishment itself.  In other words, the court was 
addressing nullum crimen, not nulla poena.  
In fact, judgments by the European Court of Human Rights interpreting nulla poena sine 
lege are scarce.70 The infrequency of challenges itself suggests the entrenchment of the maxim 
in municipal law and practice, as do the types of challenges among the few that have come 
before the European Court.  Typically, the challenged measure is found in law passed by the 
legislature.71  This is not surprising and reinforces the fact that most states address the issue of 
criminal sanctions exclusively through written law in the form of legislative enactment, that is 
within the criminal code itself.72 
																																																								
67 These sources of international law are discussed in detail infra Parts III.B (international custom) and III.C 
(general principles of law). 
68 See infra Part III.B and text accompanying notes 91-96. 
69 See infra Part IV.B. The ICTY also applied this methodology in the interpretation of the principle of lex 
mitior.  See Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgment (Dec. 18, 2003). 
70 See HARRIS, O’BOYLE & WARBRICK, supra note 50, at 274-75 (“Very few cases have been admitted for 
consideration on the merits under Article 7.”). 
71 E.g., Adamson v. United Kingdom, App. No. 42293/98, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD209, para. 1 (1999); Welch 
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 17440/90, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD42, paras. 9, 12 (1996). 
72 This is true of the current practice of even common law traditions such as the United Kingdom and United 
States.  In both Welch and Adamson, the challenged measure was found in a law passed by the legislature.  In both 
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B. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A POSSIBLE SOURCE FOR STRENGTHENING NULLA 
POENA SINE LEGE? 
In addition to international treaties and conventions, international custom may serve to 
inform the examination of nulla poena sine lege under international law. When enforced 
through ad hoc tribunals or the International Criminal Court (ICC), however, international 
criminal law differs from other branches of public international law in that international norms, 
standards, and rules are directly applicable to individuals.  Moreover, it contains a unique 
sanction—incarceration of a person—not found in other areas of public international law 
which, unless exercised lawfully and legally, constitutes a breach of international human rights 
law.73  Therefore, a customary rule in international criminal law must satisfy the combined 
requirements of human rights law and general principles of criminal law.74 In this sense, 
international custom can strengthen the rule of law in international criminal justice. 
Pursuant to Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law” serves as an essential 
source of law for identifying international standards.75 “International custom” may be 
described as a general recognition among States of a certain practice as obligatory.76  There 
must exist a degree of uniformity and consistency in the practice of states (i.e., state practice) 
accompanied with a view that conformity with the practice at issue is obligatory (i.e., opinio 
juris et necessitatis).77  Complete uniformity in practice among states is not required.78  
According to international law scholars, a state’s domestic practice, as expressed in its 
legislation, constitutes appropriate evidence of state practice.79  In other words, state practice 
																																																								
cases, the State (the United Kingdom) chose to approach the subject of criminal sanctions via a legislative act.  In 
the United States, almost all states have codified their penal laws and penal sanctions are specified by the 
legislature. 
73 The principal distinction between “lawful” and “legal” is that the former contemplates the substance of the 
law while the latter pertains to the form of law.  To say that an act is “lawful” implies that it is authorized by the 
law, and to say that it is “legal” indicates that it is performed in accordance with the forms and usage of law.  See 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 885, 892 (6th ed. 1990). 
74 See also William A. Schabas, Sentencing by International Criminal Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach, 
7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 461 (1997) (arguing that sentencing in international criminal law should measure up 
to contemporary human rights standards). 
75 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1999 I.C.J. art. 38(1)(b). 
76 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (6th ed., 2003); see also George Norman 
& Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 541 (2005) (applying the model 
of a multilateral prisoner’s dilemma to demonstrate, as a rebuttal of critics, that it is plausible that states would 
comply with customary international law under certain conditions). 
77 BROWNLIE, supra note 76, at 6-12. 
78 See id. at 7; MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 79 (5th ed., Cambridge University Press 2003) 
(1997). 
79 BROWNLIE, supra note 61, at 8. 
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may be determined not only by the practice followed by states in their external relations, but 
also the practice followed by states internally.80 
An examination of criminal sanctions in national legal systems reveals substantial and 
widespread uniformity in the practice of articulating maximum penalties for each crime 
individually.81  As noted above, the criminal codes of most states contain gradated maximums 
tailored to specific crimes.82 As to the applicable penalty, they make distinctions not only 
between types of crimes but also between completed crimes and inchoate crimes.83  Thus, the 
lex scripta and lex certa attributes of nulla poena sine lege feature prominently in current state 
practice.  Moreover, a consequence of a system’s adherence to these two principles of nulla 
poena is that the need to resort to analogy naturally falls away.  This indirect affirmation of the 
lex stricta principle has obviated the need to codify constitutionally the prohibition against 
punishing by analogy in many national systems.  The lex praevia attribute of nulla poena 
likewise constitutes a fundamental principle of domestic legal systems and in many cases has 
been codified in national constitutions or criminal codes.84  As stated by Theodor Meron, 
former President and judge of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), the “prohibition of retroactive penal measures is a fundamental principle of criminal 
justice, and a customary, even peremptory, norm of international law that must be observed in 
all circumstances by national and international tribunals.”85  Thus, state practice indicates that 
nulla poena sine lege contains strong lex scripta, lex certa, lex stricta and lex praevia features. 
On the other hand, after examining international conventions defining international 
crimes, one may be tempted to conclude that international practice suggests a lack of concern 
																																																								
80 Andrea Carcano, Sentencing and the Gravity of the Offence in International Criminal Law, 51 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 583, 587 (2002). 
81 See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case Nos. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-Abis, Judgement, Separate Opinion of Judge 
Cassese, para. 4 (Jan. 26, 2000) (“[T]he nulla poena sine praevia lege poenali principle is generally upheld in 
most national legal systems . . . .  Under this principle, for conduct to be punishable as a criminal offence, the law 
must not only provide that such conduct is regarded as a criminal offence, but it must also set out the appropriate 
penalty.”); see also supra, Part II. 
82 See also WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 162 (2001). 
83 See Pickard, supra note 17, at 141-62.  Pickard provides a comparative overview of a variety of crimes, 
including genocide, murder, rape, torture, assault, and others, for twelve countries from diverse legal systems.  
The study indicates that each country makes the said distinctions.  These countries include Argentina, China, 
France, Nigeria, Romania, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, India, Korea, Japan, Germany, Afghanistan, 
and Turkey. See also, KENNETH S. GALLANT, THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE 
CRIMINAL LAW 8 (2009) (finding that “both nullum crimen and nulla poena (in reasonably strong – though not 
the strongest – forms) have become rules of customary international law that bind both states and international 
organizations.”). 
84 The principle of non-retroactive application of penalties is widely adhered to in the internal practice of states, 
and is considered a fundamental feature of a criminal law system.  See ICC Prep. Committee’s 1996 Report, supra 
note 36, at 43; see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying 
International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 235, 290 (1993) [hereinafter Bassiouni Study]. 
85 THEODOR MERON, Ex Post Facto?, in WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE 244, 244 (1998). 
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for adherence to lex scripta and lex certa because international criminal law treaties do not 
contain provisions for applicable penalties.86 Such a conclusion, however, would fail to take 
account of the fact that these international treaties envisioned a system of indirect enforcement 
whereby states would legislate appropriate maximum penalties within the framework of their 
domestic criminal codes.87  These treaties and conventions typically address only one aspect 
of substantive criminal law.  They usually do not contain provisions on general principles of 
criminal law, such as principles of criminal liability, relevant defenses, or, particularly relevant 
for our purposes here, specific penalties.  Moreover, the absence of an international forum, 
such as an international criminal court with powers of direct enforcement, meant that 
articulating precise penalties within the treaties was not a legal necessity. As Kai Ambos notes, 
the “indirect enforcement” explanation “for the conspicuous absence of sentencing standards” 
in international treaties “does not justify imprecise and/or overly broad sentencing ranges with 
the framework of the direct enforcement model [of] international criminal tribunals.”88 
Interestingly, at the preliminary stage of discussions on creating an international forum for 
the prosecution of international crimes, this deficiency in international criminal law 
conventions was noted by many states as falling short of adequate respect for nulla poena sine 
lege.89 Likewise, the International Law Commission (ILC) in its early work on a draft code of 
international crimes and a draft statute for an international criminal court recognized that 
precise penalty ranges would be necessary.90 Therefore, it seems unwarranted to conclude that 
state practice does not support the requirement for crime–specific maximum penalties in 
accordance with nulla poena sine lege from the mere fact that international criminal law treaties 
do not contain precise penalties. 
As to the question of opinio juris, many states have expressed a sense of legal obligation 
to act in accordance with nulla poena sine lege.  During the drafting of the ICTY statute, several 
states, presumably mindful of the quality of law function of nulla poena, supported the 
																																																								
86 See International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 249, reprinted in 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN INSTRUMENTS, supra note 
12; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 
1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 
23, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 860 
U.N.T.S. 105; Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 
277. 
87  AMBOS, ICL TREATISE II (2014), supra note 6 at 272; BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 125-26; Haveman 
Principle of Legality, supra note 28 at 54; BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 15, at 689. 
     88  AMBOS, ICL TREATISE II (2014), supra note 6 at 272. 
     89 E.g., Summary Record of the 17th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/49/SR.17 at 2 (Nov. 17, 1994) (discussing the 
ILC report on an international criminal court); ICC Prep. Committee’s 1996 Report, supra note 36, at 63, para. 
304. 
     90  Schabas, Article 23 in TRIFFTERER COMMENTARY. 
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application of national penalties and norms which, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, 
excluded life imprisonment as cruel and inhumane.91  For example, with the exception of the 
death penalty, Italy, Russia, and the Netherlands explicitly referred to national penalties in their 
proposals.  The Netherlands expressed the view that “[a]n appropriate sanction norm has to be 
created both for war crimes and for crimes against humanity to be applied by the ad hoc 
tribunal.  In the opinion of the Netherlands this sanction norm should be derived from the norms 
which were applicable under former Yugoslav national law.”92  The United States favored the 
adoption of sentencing guidelines.93  Italy, in a letter to the U.N. Secretary General, stated that 
“the need to respect the principle nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, the basis of 
fundamental human rights, has induced the Italian Commission to decide in favor of the 
penalties set forth by the criminal law of the State of the locus commissi delicti.”94  In this 
expression of opinio juris, Italy decisively accepts the binding nature of nulla poena even in 
international law.  In other words, in contemplating action at the international level, Italy’s 
position is that states are legally obligated to fully respect nulla poena when acting on a matter 
within the principle’s ambit.  Thus, as to the content of the principle, Italy affirmed the lex 
scripta and lex certa aspects of nulla poena sine lege at the international level. Additionally, 
Italy characterized nulla poena as a fundamental human right.  Slovenia called for even greater 
certainty by suggesting the inclusion of minimum as well as maximum penalties.95  The 
Organization of the Islamic Conference said that “the tribunal should promulgate penalties 
before adjudicating cases, based on its statute and general principles of law of the world’s 
major legal systems.”96  Presumably, it had in mind something more than the final version of 
Article 24, which merely excludes the death penalty. Thus, among the states making 
submissions on the issue, the overwhelming majority of nations recognize a nulla poena rule 
that is deeper and extends beyond merely the prohibition of retroactive punishment. 
Further insights on the views of states as to the appropriate quality and character of nulla 
poena in international law can be gained from opinions expressed by state delegations during 
preparatory meetings and negotiations on the statute of the ICC.  Numerous states voiced their 
																																																								
91 See VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 440-43 (1995). 
92 Schabas, supra note 74, at 473 (citing Note Verbale from the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands, 
to the Secretary-General, United Nations (Apr. 30, 1993) U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25716 at 5). 
93 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 91, at 442. 
94 Letter from the Permanent Representative of Italy, to the Secretary-General, United Nations, at l, art. 7 §§ 1-
2, U.N. Doc. S/25300 (Feb. 17, 1993) (emphasis added). 
95 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 91, at 443. 
96 Id. at 441. 
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opinion that punishment for crimes must be in accordance with nulla poena sine lege.97  Indeed, 
there was even broad agreement on this point.98  It was noted that “the principle of legality 
(nulla poena sine lege) required that penalties be defined in the draft statute of the ICC as 
precisely as possible.”99  Some states also suggested that the punishment applicable to each 
offense, as well as the enforcement of penalties, should be set forth in the ICC’s statute.100  
Moreover, states also widely expressed the view that adherence to fundamental principles, such 
as nulla poena sine lege, was essential in order to ensure predictability or equality before the 
law.101  These expressions of opinio juris indicate that the positive justice dimension102 of nulla 
poena sine lege, already recognized in domestic law for its valuable contribution in improving 
sentencing practice, is being considered in the international context.  In addition, not only were 
there consistent expressions of opinio juris by the states on the importance of fundamental 
principles of criminal law but also, significantly, the reasons articulated for faithful adherence 
to them reflect those interests protected by the lex certa, lex scripta, lex stricta and lex praevia 
requirements103 of nulla poena sine lege.  Accordingly, any compromise on the quality of nulla 
poena sine lege as measured by these four requirements would directly undermine the reasons 
widely expressed and agreed upon by states for their opinion that punishment in international 
criminal law must comply with nulla poena sine lege. 
At least one author has been puzzled over the “preoccupation” with nulla poena.104 
William Schabas described the positions of states, outlined above, as reflecting a narrow 
“concern about the issue of retroactivity.”105 He concludes that “such a concern . . . is difficult 
to understand given that this question was supposedly well settled at Nuremberg.”106  His 
argument is quite simple: if post-World War II trials permitted the death penalty, can any 
defendant seriously argue that he faces a heavier penalty than the one applicable at the time the 
offense was committed?  However, the practice of post-World War II tribunals is not 
dispositive of the nulla poena inquiry today. Suppose, as is the case in many countries, that the 
death penalty has been abolished for all crimes for some period of time. Can it really be said 
that the defendant’s argument that the death penalty should not be applied in his case is not an 
																																																								
97 ICC Prep. Committee’s 1996 Report, supra note 36, at 41. 
98 Id. at 41. 
99 Id. at 63, para. 304. 
100 Id. at 41. 
101 Id. 
102 See supra Part II.B. 
103 See supra Parts II.A-B. 
104 Schabas, supra note 74. 
105 Id. at 468-69. 
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argument that should be taken seriously? Assume further that life imprisonment has also been 
abolished for some time and the maximum penalty available is 20 years imprisonment 
(increasable to 25 under extraordinary circumstances). A defendant, who commits a crime after 
the change in law abolishing the death penalty and life imprisonment, has a solid legal claim 
that the death penalty and life imprisonment are not applicable penalties to his crime. It matters 
not that his country, in the past, had allowed life imprisonment. If his crime occurred after the 
change in law removing life imprisonment as a legal sanction, then he cannot be punished to 
life imprisonment without violating nulla poena. In other words, arguments like Schabas’s 
assume that the legality question is determined only once and frozen in time. It does not account 
for interventions by law that change the norm and the foreseeability, viability, and legality of 
a particular punishment. 
 More significantly however, Schabas’s point is limited to the lex praevia attribute of nulla 
poena and he assumes that life imprisonment is not a more severe penalty than capital 
punishment.107 Yet, it is reasonable to infer that perhaps, in expressing their support for 
adhering to a national penalties regime, the states were concerned with more than simply the 
prohibition of retroactive penalties.108 States appear to have been also concerned about legal 
certainty (lex certa) and consistency in sentencing, concerns captured by a broader approach 
to nulla poena sine lege that gives due appreciation for its function as a principle of positive 
justice.  As noted above, for example, the United States encouraged the adoption of sentencing 
guidelines.  The mere presence of such a proposal strongly indicates that the concern is not so 
much about abusive or retroactive punishment, but more about the quality of justice and 
achieving equality before the law in terms of punishment of individuals brought before the 
court.   
Likewise, one could view adherence to national penalties as a more organic means of 
achieving the stated goals of the ICTY as reflected in the opinion of the Netherlands which 
encouraged following the sentencing norms of the locus delicti.  As Schabas acknowledges, 
when adopting the ICTY statute, states were aware of the complexities surrounding applicable 
penalties, such as the fact that Yugoslavian law limited terms of imprisonment to twenty years, 
had no provisions for life imprisonment or prison sentences of twenty-five, forty-five, or forty-
																																																								
107 The issue of whether life imprisonment is not a more severe penalty than capital punishment is further 
discussed below, infra text accompanying notes 196-202. 
     108 AMBOS, ICL TREATISE II (2014), supra note 6 at 277 (concluding that inclusion of the national law provision 
in the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals “speaks in favour of a stricter understanding of nulla poena”). 
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six years,109 but allowed for the death penalty which would not have passed a veto of at least 
one member of the Security Council.110  Accordingly, it may be too speculative to attribute to 
the states a narrow conception of nulla poena, limited to the lex praevia principle, and on that 
basis, proceed to diminish the relevance of nulla poena in international criminal justice.111 
The drafters’ concerns, extending beyond the mere issue of non-retroactivity, become even 
plainer when the matter is considered from another perspective.  If one removes the national 
law provision, on the assumption that it is unnecessary because lex praevia is not in issue, we 
are left with a provision that provides no better guidance to judges than the penalty provision 
of the International Military Tribunal (IMT).  Since the death penalty is already excluded by 
operation of the first sentence, what serious guidance can be gleaned from criteria of “gravity 
of the offense”112 that cannot be read into the IMT criteria of “just punishment”?  If, as Schabas 
points out, the Hans Corell commission113 was ill at ease with the IMT sentencing precedent, 
then there is no reason to presume that it was limited to the issue of non-retroactivity.114 
In sum, based on the views expressed by states above, the following observations can be 
made as to the quality of nulla poena sine lege in international law.  First, almost without 
exception, states share the view that the principle of non-retroactivity (lex praevia) is a 
fundamental feature of any criminal justice system, including international criminal law.115  
Second, lex scripta and lex certa are likewise recognized as essential requirements of nulla 
poena sine lege.116  It was noted that “the principle of legality (nulla poena sine lege) required 
																																																								
109 Such as those, respectively, visited upon Prosecutor v. Kordić, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment (Feb. 26, 
2001), aff’d, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment (Dec. 17, 2004), Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T-A, 
Judgment (July 29, 2004) (reducing the original sentence to nine years), and Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-
98-33-A, Judgment (Apr. 19, 2004) (reducing Krstić’s sentence to thirty-five years). 
110 Schabas, supra note 74, at 479. 
111 For a broader approach to nulla poena, see BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 15, at 700; Allen, supra 
note 3; Robinson, supra note 2. 
112 Or even the criteria of “concerning the individual circumstance of the accused.” 
113 In February 1993, while acting under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, a team of experts lead by Hans Corell, along with Helmut Turk and Gro Hillestad Thune, proposed to the 
United Nations the formation of an international criminal tribunal to prosecute the perpetrators of the mass 
atrocities unfolding in Yugoslavia. 
114 Schabas, supra note 74, at 471.  This misattribution of meaning concerning nulla poena in this context 
perhaps reflects old differences traditionally between common law and civil law lawyers.  While certain common 
law systems, like United States, now follow a practice of strict articulation of penalties per crime, generally 
speaking it has not been theoretically linked to nulla poena sine lege.  Thus, the instinctive reaction to the principle 
of legality among common law lawyers still focuses narrowly on its prohibition of retroactive penalties.  Civil 
law traditions, in which Mr. Corell once served as a criminal judge, take a broader approach to nulla poena sine 
lege, accounting also for its “positive justice” function and demonstrate a deeper tradition in doctrinally linking 
their practice to nulla poena.  In the many excellent commentaries that Schabas has written on international 
sentencing, this broader conception of nulla poena sine lege is not contemplated.  See also Schabas, supra note 
2; William A. Schabas, Penalties, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1497-
1534 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John Jones eds., 2002); William A. Schabas, Perverse Effects of the Nulla 
Poena Principle: National Practice and the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 11 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 521 (2000). 
115 See ICC Prep. Committee’s 1996 Report, supra note 36, at 43. 
116 Id. at 41-43. 
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that penalties be defined in the draft statute of the Court as precisely as possible.”117  For 
example, some states expressed the view that more precise maximum penalties should be 
included as part of the definitions of specific crimes.118  This proposal mirrors state practice at 
the domestic level where national criminal legislation typically contains a specific maximum 
penalty following the definition of the crime.  It was further expressed that not only maximum 
penalties, but also “minimum penalties for each crime should be carefully set out in the draft 
statute.”119  Suggestions were also made to include even more detailed sentencing regulations 
addressing, for example, “cumulative penalties for multiple crimes, an exhaustive list of 
aggravating circumstances and a non-exhaustive list of attenuating circumstances.”120 
Thus, state practice and opinio juris on nulla poena sine lege suggest that customary 
international law recognizes a nulla poena sine lege rule which contains significant lex certa, 
lex scripta, lex stricta and lex praevia qualities.  Moreover, in the context of criminal law and 
in the imposition of penal sanctions, the applicable penalties should be defined precisely, even 
if there is some disagreement in certain cases on what the maximum penalty should be.  In this 
sense, it can be reasonably concluded that customary international law on nulla poena sine lege 
contains stricter requirements regarding the application of penalties than is reflected in treaty 
provisions of positive international law. 
C. NULLA POENA SINE LEGE AS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF LAW 
A third source of international law to consider in order to distill the international standard 
for nulla poena sine lege is general principles of law.121  “General principles of law” are 
principles guiding a legal system or overarching legal norms which find widespread acceptance 
in national law of states.122  Lord Phillimore, a key figure in the formulation of the concept, 
explained that by “general principles of law” he meant “maxims of law.”123  The primary 
function of “general principles of law”’ in international adjudication is “to make the law of 
nations a viable system for application of judicial process.”124  “General principles of law” are 
																																																								
117 Id. at 63, para. 304. 
118 See id. at 228 n.68 [hereinafter Compilation of Proposals].  For example, as to various violations of the 
laws and customs of war, some suggested distinguishing specific maximum penalties. 
119 ICC Prep. Committee’s 1996 Report, supra note 36, at 63, para. 304 (emphasis added). 
120 Id. 
121 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1999 I.C.J. art. 38(1)(c).  See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 
76, at 15-19; BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 
(1987); SHAW, supra note 78, at 92-99; Michael Bogdan, General Principles of Law and the Problem of Lacunae 
in the Law of Nations, 46 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 37 (1977). 
122 BROWNLIE, supra note 76, at 16; SHAW, supra note 78, at 94; Bogdan, supra note 121, at 42. 
123 CHENG, supra note 121, at 24. 
124 BROWNLIE, supra note 76, at 16. 
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particularly relevant when international tribunals must rule on substantive issues in matters not 
readily susceptible to international state practice.  Emerging or rapidly growing areas of 
international law are prime examples, including international criminal prosecutions, which 
provide an adjudicatory forum for the direct application of criminal sanctions to individuals by 
international institutions.125 Given that international justice, as a legal system, may be 
considered to be at a rudimentary stage,126 “general principles of law” allow international 
tribunals to draw upon elements of better developed systems, resulting in the advancement of 
the international legal system.127  This is particularly true for international criminal justice.  As 
both a body of law and as an adjudicatory process, international criminal law is replete with 
lacunae. A lacuna, however, should not be misunderstood as a normative standard. Because 
international treaties generally lack details regarding penalties, international sentencing will 
need to draw on general principles of law to make international criminal justice as viable legal 
system for the application on international judicial process.    
The majority of commentators consider Article 38’s reference to “general principle of law” 
to include general principles of national legal systems.128  This approach is also generally 
followed in international criminal justice and judgments of post-World War II tribunals.  For 
example, the United States Military Tribunal at Nuremberg stated that where a principle is 
“accepted generally as a fundamental rule of justice by most nations in their municipal law, its 
declaration as a rule of International Law would seem to be fully justified.”129  Modern 
international criminal tribunals also turn to municipal law when formulating a “general 
principle of law” in order to fill lacunae.130  While a principle must represent a common theme 
in the different legal traditions, most commentators agree that it is not necessary to demonstrate 
																																																								
125 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 193 (2nd ed. 2005). 
126 Id.; SHAW, supra note 78, at 93. 
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128 Id. (citing Root, Phillimore, Guggenheim, and Oppenheim); SHAW, supra note 78, at 93-94 (“[B]oth 
municipal legal concepts and those derived from existing international practice can be defined as falling within 
the recognised catchment area.”); Bogdan, supra note 121, at 42.  The ICTY also followed this approach in its 
first sentencing judgment.  Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, para. 19 (Nov. 
29, 1996).  For a discussion and further references on additional conceptions of “general principles of law”, for 
example one which contemplates “natural law”, see CHENG, supra note 121, at 2-4.  For the drafting history of 
the provision, see id. at 6-26. 
129 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, The Hostages Trial: Trial of Wilhelm List and Others (Case No. 47), in 8 
LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 34, 49 (1949) [hereinafter Hostages], available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Law-Reports_Vol-8.pdf. 
130 Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, para. 57 
(“[G]eneral principles of law are to be derived from existing legal systems, in particular, national systems of 
law.”); see also Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen, paras. 25, 
63, 65 (Oct. 7, 1997); Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on the Motion to Allow Witnesses 
K, L and M to Give Their Testimony by Means of Video-Link Conference, para. 8 (May 28, 1997). 
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that the principle is universal.131  Nevertheless, the four attributes underlying the principle of 
legality are well represented in the world’s diverse legal systems.132 
In a comprehensive survey of 192 national constitutions of member states of the United 
Nations, Kenneth Gallant demonstrated that more than three quarters of the nations recognize 
nulla poena, especially lex praevia, in their constitution, including Islamic, Asian, civil law, 
and common law countries.133  Several other countries adhere to nulla poena pursuant to 
domestic statutes.134 A separate 1993 survey by Cherif Bassiouni of 139 national constitutions 
revealed that 96 states contain an expression of the principle of legality in their constitutions, 
in addition to the good many others that adhere to the principle in case law or practice.135  
Moreover, rulings of national courts indicate that the nulla poena norm, whether found in the 
constitution or in statute, is not limited to its lex praevia function, the prohibition of retroactive 
application of a heavier penalty. Challenging the presumption that only civil law countries 
adhere to a full nulla poena principle, a state court in the United States overturned a conviction 
for attempted murder because the offense as defined in the criminal code was not accompanied 
by a penalty specific to that crime.136  In doing so, the court upheld not only the lex certa 
principle of nulla poena sine lege, that the penalty must be clearly defined, but also its lex 
stricta attribute, the prohibition against application of criminal penalties by analogy.137  
Likewise, in light of nulla poena’s widespread presence in national legal systems, international 
courts have implicitly relied on “general principles of law” in order to apply a nulla poena  rule 
that extends beyond its lex praevia function.138 This is further supported by scholarly research 
concluding that “comparative law recognizes – apart from the lex praevia attribute – the lex 
certa element of nulla poena.139  Accordingly, nulla poena sine lege may be considered a 
																																																								
131  SHAW, supra note 78, at 94; Bogdan, supra note 121, at 46; see also Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, 
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132 Bassiouni Study, supra note 84, at 290; see also supra text accompanying notes 28-42, 84-92. 
133 KENNETH S. GALLANT, THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL 
LAW 243-46 (2009). 
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135 Bassiouni Study, supra note 84, at 291. 
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     139  AMBOS, ICL TREATISE II (2014), supra note 6 at 274. 
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“general principle of law” within the meaning of Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice.140 
D. INTERNATIONAL PRECEDENT: THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 
In 1935, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) was offered the opportunity 
to address the principle of legality in the Advisory Opinion on the Consistency of Certain 
Danzig Legislative Decrees with the Constitution of the Free City.141  In August of 1935, the 
city of Danzig, following the example of Nazi law, amended its criminal code to permit 
punishment in the absence of a legal provision.  The amendment decreed that an act is 
punishable: 
(1) where it is declared by law to be punishable, and 
(2) where, according to the fundamental idea of a penal law and according to sound 
popular feeling, it deserves punishment.  Where there is no particular penal law applicable 
to the act, it shall be punished in virtue of the law whose fundamental conception applies 
most nearly.142 
Another decree accorded “[w]ider latitude . . . to judges” and permitted the “‘[c]reation of 
law . . . by the application of penal analogy.’”143  The PCIJ noted that the “object of these new 
provisions is stated to be to enable the judge to create law to fill up gaps in the penal 
legislation.”144  On the other hand, Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code in force in Danzig 
before the amendment provided: “‘An act is only punishable if the penalty applicable to it was 
already prescribed by a law in force before the commission of the act.’”145  The court 
recognized that this provision gave effect to the maxims nullum crimen sine lege and nulla 
poena sine lege.  The consequence, according to the PCIJ, was that the “law alone determines 
and defines an offense” and that the “law alone decrees the penalty.”  In relation to nulla poena 
sine lege in particular, the court further held that the maxim carries with it the principle that 
“[a] penalty cannot be inflicted in a given case if it is not decreed by the law in respect of that 
case” and a “penalty decreed by the law for a particular case cannot be inflicted in another 
case.”146  Thus, the PCIJ opinion recognized the lex stricta principle, that is, the prohibition on 
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the application of a penalty by analogy, as part and parcel of nulla poena sine lege.  Moreover, 
the PCIJ also ruled that the imposition of a penalty must be in accordance with the principles 
of lex scripta and lex certa, although the opinion cannot be read so far as to limit satisfaction 
of lex scripta to statutory written law.  The PCIJ went on to condemn the 1935 penal provision 
as incompatible with the principles of law in the Constitution.147  In doing so, the PCIJ affirmed 
several important general principles of law and recognized an international nulla poena sine 
lege norm with strong attributes of lex scripta, lex certa, and lex stricta.148  Only lex praevia 
was not addressed and this appears to be because the question of retroactive application of the 
decree did not arise.  According to the research performed thus far, the principle of nulla poena 
sine lege does not appear to have been addressed by the International Court of Justice. 
E. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL STANDARD FOR NULLA POENA 
Before continuing on to the next section to examine nulla poena sine lege in the 
jurisprudence of international criminal courts and tribunals, it may be useful to provide here a 
brief summary of some preliminary observations arising from the analysis of this section on 
nulla poena sine lege in international law.  Positive international law incorporates the lex 
praevia principle of nulla poena as a fundamental human right from which no derogation is 
permitted.  In interpreting this principle under Article 7 of the ECHR, the European Court of 
Human Rights held that this provision also embodies the lex stricta principle as a fundamental 
attribute of nulla poena as an individual right.  But this ruling comes as no surprise as leading 
commentaries on human rights conventions have long taken the view that nulla poena is not 
limited to merely prohibiting retroactivity.  In fact, the status of lex stricta under international 
law was previously cemented by the PCIJ decision in the Danzig Decrees case, which explicitly 
rejected the application of penalties by analogy.149  Although it may be tempting to argue that 
a few cases are not conclusive of the issue, the absence of contentious cases addressing the lex 
stricta principle does not necessarily undermine its position in international law.  It may simply 
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148 The court was mindful, nevertheless, that nulla poena was not the only principle relevant for consideration.  
It acknowledged that  
[t]he problem of the repression of crime may be approached from two different standpoints, that of the 
individual and that of the community.  From the former standpoint, the object is to protect the individual 
against the State: this object finds its expression in the maxim Nulla poena sine lege.  From the second 
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Nullum crimen sine poena. 
Id. at 16. 
The PCIJ observed, however, that the decrees were based on the second principle where as the Constitution took 
the former principles as the starting point.  See id. at 16. 
149 See supra Part III.C. 
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be the result of restricted adherence to the principle by states in the context of their own national 
legal systems, where the practice of articulating specific penalties per crime obviates the need 
to resort to analogy in order to impose a penalty.  More significantly, as we shall see later, the 
solidification of lex stricta as a principle of international law in relation to the application of 
penalty was achieved in the Rome Statute. 
In connection with lex scripta and lex certa, customary international law can contribute to 
a fuller appreciation of the international character of nulla poena sine lege.  State practice, as 
evidenced in the national legislation of an overwhelming majority of states, coupled with state 
expressions of opinio juris, strongly indicate that the legal principles of lex scripta and lex certa 
may be considered as part of an international nulla poena sine lege norm.150  Additionally, as 
discussed above, these four underlying principles of nulla poena sine lege may be considered 
as “general principles of law.”  Accordingly, the four legal principles underlying nulla poena 
sine lege may be considered as part of its international character. 
 
IV.  NULLA POENA AND PUNISHING ATROCITY CRIMES 
A. POST-WORLD WAR II PERIOD: PRAGMATICS OVER PRINCIPLES 
The question of legality was ardently contested in the proceedings before the International 
Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg.  The debate focused primarily on the question of 
punishability of the conduct, i.e. a nullum crimen issue, not on nulla poena, i.e. the legality of 
the penalty itself.  Nazi defendants before the IMT argued that the charges against them for 
crimes against the peace and crimes against humanity violated nullum crimen sine lege.  The 
IMT rejected this argument.  It reasoned that the crimes under its jurisdiction had been 
prohibited under international law since The Hague Regulations of 1907 and The General 
Treaty for the Renunciation of War of 1928 (Kellogg-Briand Pact).151 The Hague Regulations 
and the Kellogg-Briand Pact themselves, however, do not characterize their breach as criminal, 
nor call for individual criminal responsibility, nor prescribe a penalty. Nevertheless, these 
notable absentees did not appear to trouble the IMT which observed that these international 
agreements “deal with general principles of law, and not with administrative matters of 
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procedure.”152  The judgment discusses at length the nullum crimen question, but offers little 
or no analysis of nulla poena. 
Accordingly, while the Nuremberg precedent serves as an illustration of treatment of the 
principle of legality by an international court, its utility as an international source of law arising 
from a “judicial decision”153 may be considered to be limited to the nullum crimen sine lege 
maxim. Same is true for the Tokyo war crimes tribunal (hereafter “IMTFE”).154 According to 
Neil Boister and Robert Cryer, nulla poena sine lege issue “does not seem to have arisen at 
Tokyo.”155 Therefore, caution must be exercised in drawing broad inferences from the IMT 
and IMTE precedents regarding the nature of the principle of legality generally because the 
nulla poena debate is not well represented.  Although some references to nulla poena are made 
at the IMT, it seems that for the large part this maxim was overlooked by all parties involved 
at both post-World War 2 tribunals.156 The oversight seems to flow from collapsing two 
separate issues into one inquiry. For example at the Nuremberg trials, rather than dealing with 
nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege individually, the inquiry focused on whether 
the conduct proscribed in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal was reflected in 
general prohibitions found in international treaties.  From the Nuremberg records and 
commentaries, it appears that it was widely presumed that if the punishability of the conduct 
was deemed to have satisfied the principle of legality then ipso facto the penalties prescribed 
by the Charter were appropriate.157  In other words, once punishability (nullum crimen) was 
satisfied, the legality of the penalty (nulla poena) was not considered. The Charter permitted 
the imposition of the death penalty158 but it would be a mistake to assume that its legality was 
generally accepted. Little consideration was given to the fact that, even prior to World War II, 
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     154  The International Military Tribunal for the Far East. 
     155  NEIL BOISTER AND ROBERT CRYER, THE TOKYO INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL: A REAPPRAISAL 
248 (2008). 
156 Schabas, Penalties, supra note 114, at 1498. 
     157  See AMBOS, ICL TREATISE II (2014), supra note 6 at 275 (discussing how “the Nuremberg precedent 
completely ignored the nulla poena aspect of the principle” focusing all its legality analysis on the issue of 
punishability, i.e. on nullum crimen sine lege). 
158 Article 27 of the Charter authorized IMT to impose “death or such other punishment as shall be determined 
by it to be just” upon a convicted war criminal.  See Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg 
Charter), Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, art. 27, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A COLLECTION OF 
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN INSTRUMENTS 55 (Christine Van den Wyngaert ed., 2d ed. 2000).  This vague 
and general clause was the Nuremburg Charter’s only provision addressing the subject of penalties.  Article 27 
was reproduced in Article 16 of the Tokyo Charter, Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(Tokyo Charter), Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, and Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons 
Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, Nuremberg Trials Final Report app. D, art. 
II(3) (Dec. 20, 1945), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt10.asp. 
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several European countries had already moved away from the notion that the death penalty is 
an appropriate form of punishment.159 
In the post-war period, the International Law Commission (ILC) also briefly reflected on 
the issue of penalties by its consideration of the Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind.  The 1951 proposal contained a terse article on penalties: “The penalty 
for any offence defined in this Code shall be determined by the tribunals exercising jurisdiction 
over the individual accused, taking into account the gravity of the offence.”160  Although the 
subsequent revised 1954 proposal removed this article, the ILC’s discussion of the issue 
suggests that this decision does not signal a defeat of the nulla poena norm in international 
law.161  In fact, several members supported a penalty provision more precise than the above 
article.162  Several states also favored this approach as reflected in their comments on the 
proposed text.163  In the end, the ILC shied away from including a more specific penalty 
provision for a variety of reasons unrelated to the legality principle.  For example, there were 
concerns that the task of the Commission here was limited to defining the crimes, and not to 
dictating the type of penalties.164  Several members expressly stated that penalties were not 
included because it was left to the states to specify the penalty according to their domestic laws, 
as protected by Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations.  However, there was a strong 
consensus that states themselves were obliged to provide the necessary penalties and the final 
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report included a comment to that effect.165  Thus, it is clear that the absence of a penalty 
provision was not a reflection on the applicability of nulla poena sine lege to the punishment 
of international crimes.  It certainly was not intended to suggest that international criminal 
justice enjoys carte blanche when it came to penalties, as best captured by the comments of 
one expert, Carlos Salamanca Figueroa, who at the time was a member of the International 
Law Commission: 
If the offenses in question were to be tried by a national court, that court would necessarily 
have to apply penalties laid down in the particular State’s criminal law.  If an international 
court were to be set up, it would be unwise to give it the very wide power to determine 
the penalty to be applied to each crime.  No doubt that problem would be dealt with when 
such a court came to be set up.166 
 
Figueroa’s warning was not heed when modern international criminal courts where established 
and international judges were given very wide powers to determine penalties.  
B. NULLA POENA IN THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS: THE PHANTOM MAXIM 
When the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia were called 
upon to interpret and apply their sentencing provisions, the IMT judgments and norms arising 
from other sources of international law167 presented divergent approaches to the task of 
sentencing in accordance with nulla poena sine lege.  The tribunals were technically not bound 
by either and yet each could be argued in support of a particular approach.  In light of the 
comments of the United Nations Secretary-General and the representatives of other 
countries,168 a firm approach to nulla poena sine lege would have probably raised little 
objection.  Regarding the determination of a penalty, the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals 
contained a reference back to national practice.  Article 24 of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) statute and Article 23 of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) statute provides: “The penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber 
shall be limited to imprisonment.  In determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial 
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Chambers shall have recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts 
of [the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda].”169 
Although several commentators observed that the national law provision was included out 
of concern for respecting nulla poena sine lege,170 two characteristics of the construction of 
this article open a window to debate the binding force of the national law provision on the 
discretion of judges when determining a sentence. The first provision of this article provides a 
clear limitation on the authority of judges regarding the form of punishment that may be 
imposed. Penalties “shall be limited” to imprisonment.171 Thus, by implication, the ICTY and 
ICTR are not authorized to impose the death penalty.  In contrast, the second provision is 
drafted rather awkwardly.  Like the first provision, it employs the directive “shall,” instead of 
“may,” suggesting that the judges do not have discretion to ignore the directive contained 
within this provision.  Unfortunately, it follows this imperative (“shall”) with a less then 
forceful instruction (“have recourse to”).  The force of the national law provision as a binding 
instruction on the judges is further compromised by the fact that it follows a provision that 
unambiguously sets a clear limit.  The inevitable comparison between the two provisions 
(“shall be limited to” versus “shall have recourse to”) further opens the window to argue that 
it is not a binding limitation on the sentencing discretion of judges. 
Dražen Erdemović’s decision to plead guilty unexpectedly provided the ICTY’s first 
opportunity to interpret the national law provision of Article 24.172 Given that sentencing 
matters arise, if at all, at the end stages of the criminal justice process, it was unforeseen that 
one of the ICTY’s earliest decisions would call upon the judges to interpret its sentencing 
provisions.  Academics, legal officers, and judicial law clerks had been focusing on questions 
of jurisdiction, applicability of treaties regulating international armed conflicts, and substantive 
elements of crimes.  Little analysis had been done on the articles of the ICTY statute and rules 
of procedure and evidence pertaining to sentencing.173 
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While the Erdemović case provided the ICTY with its first opportunity to render an 
interpretation of Article 24 in a sentencing judgment, it seems that the question of the 
applicability of the national law provision as a limitation on its sentencing authority had already 
been predetermined by the judges.174  The Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE), 
promulgated and adopted by the judges themselves prior to the Erdemović sentencing 
judgment, seem to have already determined the issue.  Rule 101 of the RPE, as initially adopted 
on February 11, 1994, provides that “[a] convicted person may be sentenced to imprisonment 
for a term up to and including the remainder of his life.”175  As the penal code of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the former Yugoslavia) in force at the time of the commission 
of the offences did not permit the imposition of a life sentence, Rule 101 foreshadowed the 
judges’ approach towards the national law provision.   
The Erdemović case involved a low level soldier in the Bosnian Serb Army who 
participated in the killing of groups of Muslim civilians, namely men between the ages of 
seventeen and sixty from Srebrenica, collected at a farm site near Pilica, northwest of 
Zvornik.176  By his own admissions, Erdemović murdered approximately seventy 
individuals.177  He admitted his involvement in these crimes, but insisted that he was forced to 
do so under threat of death to himself and his family.178 Formally, he was pleading guilty to 
the charges while asserting a defense or excuse for his actions. Thus, before the Trial Chamber 
could proceed to a determination of the sentence, it had to deal with a more fundamental 
issue—the validity of his guilty plea.179 Having satisfied itself that the plea was valid,180 
notwithstanding Erdemović’s claim that he acted under duress, the Trial Chamber proceeded 
to the sentencing phase. 
Regarding national laws and sentencing practice, Articles 141 to 156 of Chapter XVI of 
the	 criminal	 code	 of	 the	 Socialist	Federal	 Republic	 of	Yugoslavia	dealt with, inter alia, 
genocide and war crimes committed against the civilian population.  The penalty provided 
under Yugoslav law was a minimum of five years and a maximum of fifteen years or a death 
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sentence.181  Pursuant to these same provisions, a twenty-year prison term could be imposed 
instead of the death penalty.  The Trial Chamber reasoned that full consideration of the national 
law provision in the ICTY Statute also requires taking into account the case law of the courts 
of the former Yugoslavia.  In this regard, there have been two significant trials for genocide in 
Yugoslavia.  The first took place in 1946 following World War II against Mikhailovic and 
others.182  The majority of defendants were sentenced to death and executed.183  The second 
trial took place forty years later in which Artuković was also sentenced to death, but died in 
prison of natural causes.184  Thus, the practice of the courts of the former Yugoslavia on what 
the judges considered to be “analogous” crimes was limited and the Trial Chamber concluded 
that it “cannot draw significant conclusions as to the sentencing practices for crimes against 
humanity in the former Yugoslavia.”185 However, recognizing a principle of statutory 
interpretation, the Trial Chamber acknowledged that it must interpret the national law provision 
in a manner that gives it practical and logical effect.186  Beginning with what appears to be an 
implicit acknowledgement of the view of commentators, the Trial Chamber reasoned: 
It might be argued that the reference to the general practice regarding prison sentences is 
required by the principle nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege.  Justifying the reference to 
this practice by that principle, however, would mean not recognising the criminal nature 
universally attached to crimes against humanity or, at best, would render such a reference 
superfluous.  The Trial Chamber has, in fact, demonstrated that crimes against humanity 
are a well established part of the international legal order and have incurred the severest 
penalties.  It would therefore be a mistake to interpret this reference by the principle of 
legality codified inter alia in paragraph 1 of Article 15 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, according to which “no one shall be held guilty of any criminal 
offence on account of any act or omissions which did not constitute a criminal offence, 
under national or international law, at the time when it was committed (. . .).”  Moreover, 
paragraph 2 of that same article states that “nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial 
and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was 
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committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by the 
community of nations.”187 
The Trial Chamber’s analysis here appears to be misplaced.  It improperly framed the issue 
as an inquiry into the punishability of the conduct rather than the determination of the 
applicability penalty. In other words, the Trial Chamber’s arguments focus on justifying why 
this conduct must be punished (a nullum crimen issue), but that does not necessarily inform us 
about the appropriate lawful punishment. The error in reasoning stems from its argument that 
interpreting and applying the national law provision in light of the nulla poena principle would 
result in “not recognizing the criminal nature” of the crimes committed by the accused.  This 
is simply incorrect.  Applying the national law provision in accordance with nulla poena sine 
lege does not mean that the defendant goes unpunished.  It simply means that the sentence 
would have to be in accordance with Yugoslavia’s penalty provisions.  The Trial Chamber’s 
misframing of the issue is further demonstrated by its discussion of the principle of legality 
under Article 15 of the ICCPR.  Although it is dealing with the question of applicable penalties 
under Article 24 of its Statute and Yugoslavia’s laws and sentencing practice, the Trial 
Chamber turns to an analysis of the nullum crimen sine lege provision in Article 15 of the 
ICCPR.  Thus, the Trial Chamber oddly attempts to reject a nulla poena argument on the 
grounds that nullum crimen has been satisfied. 
Whether by stratagem or unwittingly, the Trial Chamber collapsed the analysis of the two 
principles nulla poena sine lege and nullum crimen sine lege.  It conflated the two maxims and 
referred to the “requirements” of “nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege,” and then concluded 
that adherence to this conflated principle would prevent recognition of the accused’s acts as 
criminal.  Moreover, its preoccupation with Erdemović’s acts going unpunished as the 
consequence of the nullum crimen principle, which is essentially a punishability issue, was 
extraneous to its inquiry on the appropriate sentence since, by this stage in the proceedings, the 
legality of punishing the act had already been satisfied.  Indeed, it appears that the accused did 
not even raise the nullum crimen question, rendering the Trial Chamber’s focus on it even more 
puzzling. Furthermore, at his initial appearance before the Trial Chamber, Erdemović pled 
guilty to crimes against humanity as charged in count one of the indictment.188  The Trial 
Chamber noted that crimes against humanity, as defined in Article 5, are not “strictly speaking” 
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provided for in the criminal code of the former Yugoslavia.189  The Code did however cover 
genocide and war crimes against civilians.190  Analogizing that the former Code penalized 
crimes “which are of a similar nature to crimes against humanity,”191 the Erdemović Trial 
Chamber satisfied itself with regards to nullum crimen sine lege.  This further highlights the 
oddity of the Trial Chamber’s return to the nullum crimen principle at the sentencing stage 
when interpreting the national law provision of Article 24. 
The legal stratagem used by the Erdemović Trial Chamber to free itself from any potential 
limitation arising from Article 24(1) is not immediately apparent.  As noted above, the use of 
analogy in application of penalties is not unprecedented.192  However, the use of analogy 
generally follows the approach of analogizing between similar crimes in order to identify an 
appropriate penalty.  But the Erdemović Trial Chamber went beyond analogizing between 
similar crimes to analogizing between different legal systems.  It employed analogy at two 
levels.  First, it drew an analogy between genocide and war crimes committed against civilian 
populations under the former Yugoslavia’s criminal code on the one hand, and offenses under 
Article 5 (crimes against humanity) of its Statute, on the other hand.  Having identified the 
“analogous” crimes, however, the Trial Chamber did not content itself with the penalties 
provided by law establishing the relevant “analogous” crimes.  Instead, it continued with a 
second level of analogizing between the penalty attached to the identified “analogous” crimes 
under the laws of the legal system of the locus delicti to the penalty attached under a different 
legal system, that of the locus fori and the ICTY legal regime. This method of expansive 
interpretation is beyond the typical scope of the practice even in countries that allow resort to 
analogy in determining penalties.193   
The Trial Chamber justified this methodology by claiming that the Criminal Code of the 
former Yugoslavia “reserves its most severe penalties for crimes, including genocide, which 
are of a similar nature to crimes against humanity.”194  The observation is correct, but it does 
not explain why the Trial Chamber did not limit itself to the penalties provided by the Code.  
Rather than selecting a severe Yugoslav penalty, which marks the logical conclusion of its 
reasoning, the Trial Chamber chose to select the most severe international law penalty.  This 
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latter step is not covered by its justification.195 It would be a different matter if the ICTY Statute 
authorized such a maneuver — that is, substituting international law’s most severe penalty in 
place of Yugoslavia’s.  But it does not, and in fact the Statute does just the opposite: it instructs 
trial chambers to turn to Yugoslavia’s sentencing laws and practice. 
Furthermore, the Trial Chamber’s analysis rests heavily on a troubling assumption that 
reasonable minds might disagree with, namely that life imprisonment is not a more severe 
penalty than capital punishment.  The assumption here cannot be said to have gained sufficient 
universal acceptance so as to justify its blanket endorsement by an international institution. 
Yugoslavia was not alone or the first nation to hold the view that life imprisonment is crueler 
and more severe than capital punishment.196 Considered a “slow death’ and a fait “worse than 
death”, the French Constitution Assembly abolished it in 1789.197 A number of European states 
have abolished life imprisonment, including Portugal, Spain, Norway, and Cyrus.198 Tellingly, 
during the preparatory work for the ICC statute, some members of the committee on Article 77 
“highlighted that life imprisonment was incompatible with current human rights norms and 
especially human dignity.”199 Concerns about life imprisonment were also raised directly by 
states, including Andorra, Chile, Cuba, Israel, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and 
Venezuela.200   
The former Yugoslavia, while permitting capital punishment, had abolished the penalty of 
life imprisonment.201 It is entirely reasonable, depending on a society’s presumptions about the 
metaphysical and the purpose of incarceration, to permit capital punishment but abolish life 
imprisonment.  The error in reasoning and methodology here stems from the Trial Chamber’s 
reliance on a subjective assessment as to what constitutes a “heavier penalty.”  So long as the 
comparison is between penalties of the same type, the determination of whether the imposed 
penalty is heavier than the one applicable at the time the offense occurred is straight-forward 
and objective.202  However, where the comparison is between different types of penalties, the 
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assessment becomes more subjective and less objective.  Consequently, it is more difficult to 
objectively conclude that the prohibition against the imposition of a “heavier penalty” has not 
been breached when substituting in life imprisonment. 
As noted above, a latent tension exists between the IMT legacy and the principles arising 
from human rights treaties when it comes to sentencing in accordance with nulla poena sine 
lege.203  In this regard, the Erdemović Trial Chamber’s reliance on the treatment of nulla poena 
by IMT and other judgments in the immediate wake of World War II204 can be criticized for 
failing to take sufficient account of the development of international human rights law on this 
point since World War II.205  Since then, as illustrated above, major international human rights 
treaties, widely supported by states, have recognized the principle of nulla poena sine lege as 
a norm of international law and a fundamental right of an accused.206  There has also been a 
corresponding development of criminal law principles in domestic law systems.207 
Yet, the Erdemović Trial Chamber overlooks these developments and turns instead to a 
single decision from 1949 of a Netherlands special court for guidance on what nulla poena 
requires fifty years later.208  In addition to failing to appreciate the normative development of 
nulla poena over the past five decades, the Erdemović Trial Chamber’s reliance on the Dutch 
case is misplaced for yet another reason.  The argument of the accused before the Dutch special 
court was that he could not be punished at all because of a lack of legal sanctions previously 
prescribed by law.209  The laws of the former Yugoslavia, however, did provide for legal 
sanctions previously prescribed;210 thus, the ICTY in Erdemović was facing a different issue 
than the Dutch court.  The issue before the ICTY was not that Erdemović could not be punished, 
but rather what that punishment should be, and more generally how should the ICTY go about 
determining the period of incarceration and the relevance of national sentencing laws. Again, 
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we see that the error stems from the Trial Chamber’s failure to distinguish between nullum 
crimen and nulla poena.211   
Taking the position that the national law provision in its statute was not binding upon the 
ICTY, the Trial Chamber attempted to bolster its view by emphasizing a single isolated 
comment contained in a UN report attached to a proposed draft of the ICTY statute.212  The 
Trial Chamber drew specific attention to the permissive tone of the Secretary-General’s 
comments: “[I]n determining the term of imprisonment, the Trial Chambers should have 
recourse to the general practice of prison sentences applicable in the courts of the former 
Yugoslavia.”213  It isolated this phrase and relied on it to the judges of any limitation on 
sentencing arising from the general practice of the former Yugoslavia.  
There are at least two problems with the Trial Chamber’s reasoning and methodology here.  
First, the Trial Chamber fails to appreciate the context of the Secretary-General’s report and 
the relationship between the Secretary-General and the Security Council. The Trial Chamber 
characterizes the Secretary-General’s comment as an “interpretation” of the Statute.  The 
comment, however, is not intended as an “interpretation” of the Statute, but rather as a 
rationalization for the inclusion or exclusion of matters from the scope of the Statute.214  These 
comments are made as an introduction to the proposed text of the Statute that follows.  The 
permissive tone is intended to defer to the authority of the Security Council to ultimately decide 
upon the final text of the Statute.  It recognizes that the decision of whether to use “shall” or 
“should” is a policy choice to be made by the Security Council in its role as the legislative body 
of the ICTY Statute.  In the end, the Security Council chose “shall.”  For the judges to go back 
and engage in a debate on whether the national law provision is binding or permissive is to go 
beyond their judicial function and legislate from the bench, effectively redrafting their own 
statute. 
In Resolution 808, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General’s office to 
produce a draft statute for an international tribunal for the Council’s consideration. This 
institutional context and the role of the Secretary-General in responding to Resolution 808 
explains the permissive tone of the Secretary-General’s comment. It was not intended to 
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modify the actual text of the Statute from “shall have” to “should have.” If the Secretary-
General in fact intended “should have,” as the Trial Chamber believes, then he presumably 
would have used that language in the actual text of the proposed Statute.  If the Secretary-
General intended “should,” and not “shall,” then his proposed text would have stated “should.” 
The Trial Chamber’s erroneous reasoning is accentuated if we attempt to apply it to the 
very next comment in the Secretary-General’s report. We see another situation of “should” in 
the report and “shall” in the actual statute. The reported states “[t]he International Tribunal 
should not be empowered to impose the death penalty.”215 The text of the Statute corresponding 
to this comment reads: “The penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to 
imprisonment.”216 Applying the Trial Chamber’s reasoning would lead to the conclusion that 
this provision is likewise not binding on trial chambers, and consequently the ICTY could also 
apply the death penalty.  Clearly, this result is not intended by the Secretary-General’s use of 
the permissive language (“should”) in his report, and the Trial Chamber’s contorted 
conclusions defies the rules of statutory interpretation. 
Second, the Trial Chamber may be reasonably criticized for not taking full account of 
statements by Italy, Russia, the Netherlands, and other states on this issue.217  Given that the 
Security Council approved the report of the Secretary-General in Resolution 827 establishing 
the ICTY, the contents of the report may be considered as part of the “legislative history” of 
the ICTY Statute.  However, it is only one among several possible sources that may be 
considered as part of the “legislative history” of the Statute, including comments from members 
of the Security Council at that time.  The Trial Chamber’s presumption of exclusivity, or at the 
very least of priority, towards the comments of the Secretary-General is questionable in this 
regard.  Moreover, even if the statements of the Secretary-General are to be given greater 
weight than the views of a state, the use of legislative history in the interpretation of a statute 
has limitations, and cannot have the effect of contravening the plain and ordinary meaning of 
the text. 
In the end, the Erdemović Trial Chamber concluded that the laws and practice of the courts 
of the former Yugoslavia can be turned to for guidance, but they are not binding on the trial 
chambers: 
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Whenever possible, the International Tribunal will review the relevant legal practices of 
the former Yugoslavia but will not be bound in any way by those practices in the penalties 
it establishes and the sentences it imposes for the crimes falling within its jurisdiction.218 
Despite the Erdemović Trial Chamber’s declaration that it would not be bound by Yugoslavia’s 
sentencing practice, the penalty it imposed on Erdemović was in fact within the penalties 
provided for under Yugoslavia’s law.  The Erdemović holding, that the national law provision 
in Article 24(1) is not binding on the ICTY, has been reiterated by other trial chambers219 and 
consistently affirmed by the Appeals Chamber.220  The holding is now a well-established 
principle in the sentencing jurisprudence of the ICTY and was followed by judges at the ICTR 
and the East Timor Special Panels for Serious Crimes.221 This “guidance but not binding” 
approach has proved illusory and, in practice, has amounted to little more than a perfunctory 
reference to Yugoslavia’s sentencing laws.222 In subsequent judgments, some effort was made 
to give the national law provision a small measure of relevance by requiring trial chambers to 
give reasons for departing from it.223 In such instances, the Appeals Chamber held, the trial 
judges “must go beyond merely reciting the relevant code provisions,”224 a ruling which not 
only pointed the way forward but also implicitly confirmed that the existing practice of reciting 
the national law provision was indeed merely perfunctory.  
 While earlier commentators on the ICTY Statute conceded that the ambiguous language 
of the provision permitted such an interpretation, they held strong reservations about ICTY 
judges exercising unlimited discretion in sentencing. Bassiouni, for example, argued that “the 
Tribunal should follow the law of the former Yugoslavia” when determining penalties.225  And 
while Morris and Scharf take the position that the ICTY is not bound by the sentencing practice 
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of the former Yugoslavia, they seem to do so with the assumption that the ICTY will “establish 
its own uniform sentencing guidelines.”226  The optimism of these observers that a flexible 
“directive but not binding” approach would “achieve consistency in sentencing” never 
materialized in practice.227 
The Erdemović judgment does not provide much analysis of the nulla poena maxim itself.  
Thus, it provides little guidance on the content and character of the norm in international 
criminal proceedings. In fact, to date, no judgment or decision of the ICTY or ICTR has 
elucidated the international standard for nulla poena sine lege.  In his separate opinion in the 
Tadić case,228 Judge Antonio Cassese briefly discussed the relevance of nulla poena sine lege 
in international criminal justice.  Although he does not address the substantive content of nulla 
poena, Judge Cassese makes general observations about its objectives.  
This principle is clearly intended to achieve three main objectives: 
(i) to spell out the varying degree of disapproval or condemnation of certain instances of 
misbehaviour by the social order.  Clearly, the more reprehensible a course of conduct is 
considered, the heavier the penalty imposed on persons engaging in that conduct.  Thus, 
if a national legal system provides for a penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment for murder 
whereas it envisages 10 years for theft, this signifies that this legal system attaches greater 
importance to human life than to private property. 
(ii) to ensure legal certainty by reducing the discretionary power of courts (arbitrium 
judicis). 
(iii) to bring about some relative uniformity and harmonisation in the application of 
penalties. 229  
 
Consistent with the arguments developed in this chapter, the main objectives of nulla 
poena, as identified by Judge Cassese, relate to its positive justice function.230 Cassese 
reinforces this chapter’s key normative claim that that nulla poena sine lege is more than just 
a negative rights principle.  Cassese further acknowledges that nulla poena is upheld in most 
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national legal systems. Notwithstanding the fact that his list of nulla poena objectives apply 
with equal force to international prosecutions, Cassese inexplicably concludes that the principle 
“is still inapplicable in international criminal law.”231 This latter conclusion is not developed 
or justified, and his opinion would have benefited from further reasoning.  Significantly, this 
conclusion appears in a separate opinion and does not represent the views of the court. The 
other appeals judges were not prepared to join Cassese in ruling out nulla poena’s application 
to international criminal justice. More importantly, the objectives Cassese identified strongly 
suggest an alternative conclusion as does a teleological understanding of nulla poena and its 
acknowledged adherence in national practice.  
Cassese likely reached this conclusion by drawing on the fact that international 
conventions on criminal matters do not specify penalties.  However, as already noted, this 
cannot be read to mean that nulla poena is inapplicable to international criminal justice. As 
Bassiouni argues, the absence of penalties provisions in these conventions should be 
understood in light of the fact that international criminal law regimes were generally indirect 
enforcement systems, requiring states to prosecute the relevant crime domestically, and if need 
be, enact appropriate legislation which provided the applicable penalty.232  Since the 
international community did not directly enforce the crimes within these treaties, there was no 
need to lay out specific penalties in the international instrument.  Thus, Cassese correctly 
observes the absence of specific penalty provisions in treaties that rely on indirect enforcement 
through national law, but this does not per se nullify the force of nulla poena sine lege in cases 
of direct enforcement by the international community, a distinction made clear by the 
International Law Commission.233 A lacuna does not establish an alternative international 
standard for nulla poena, nor make the principle inapplicable to international prosecutions.  As 
Cassese’s own treatise on international law states, the very function of “general principles of 
law” as derived from municipal systems is to fill such a lacuna.234  In addition, Cassese’s 
sweeping conclusion that nulla poena is inapplicable in international criminal law is obiter 
dictum to his arguments in favor of a hierarchy between war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.  
In the early practice of the ICTY, it could be argued that despite their strong rhetoric that 
they were not bound by the penalty scheme of the former Yugoslavia, trial chambers, with a 
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few exceptions, generally sentenced within the range of penalties acceptable under Yugoslavia 
law.235  The exceptions were limited to cases of notoriously sadistic perpetrators,236 high-
ranking officers,237 and persons convicted of genocide.238  Indeed, in order to persuade the 
Appeals Chamber to reduce his sentence, at least one accused argued that the practice of the 
ICTY up to that point had been to stay within the sentencing range provided by Article 38 of 
the former Yugoslavia’s criminal code.239  In that case, the Trial Chamber predictably rejected 
the defendant’s argument that imposing a term of imprisonment of more than fifteen years 
would violate the principle of legality.240  As a matter of practice before the ICTY, defense 
counsel would profit from noting that the Appeals Chamber’s ostensible position is that 
comparing one accused to another for the purposes of determining a penalty “is often of limited 
assistance” and that “often the differences are more significant than the similarities.”241 
Since the untimely death of Slobodan Milošević in his prison cell, the number of accused 
sentenced to more than twenty years in prison has increased.  However, an interesting 
development took place in the Kunarac case.242  The Appeals Chamber held that family 
circumstances constitute a mitigating factor and that the Kunarac Trial Chamber should have 
considered it when determining a sentence.243  It is worth taking note that the Appeals Chamber 
made this ruling relying on the “existing case-law of the Tribunal” and by “having recourse to 
the practice of the courts of the former Yugoslavia.”244  The Appeals Chamber further noted 
that: 
Family concerns should in principle be a mitigating factor.  Article 41(1) of the 1977 Penal 
Code required the courts of the former Yugoslavia to consider circumstances including 
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the “personal situation” of the convicted person.  The Appeals Chamber holds that this 
should have been considered as a mitigating factor.245 
Perhaps the Appeals Chamber’s specific reference to and reliance on the practice of the courts 
of the former Yugoslavia should serve as a signal to the trial chambers, and now the United 
Nations Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (UN-MICT), to give greater weight 
and consideration to the provisions of national law and the practice of the courts of the former 
Yugoslavia when it comes to mitigating factors.  Given the established principle in the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY that national practice is not binding, this is the most the Appeals 
Chamber could do to strengthen the role of sentencing provisions in laws of Yugoslavia in the 
determination of a sentence by ICTY trial chambers without overruling a well-entrenched 
principle and throwing the integrity of its past sentences into jeopardy. 
In the Čelebići trial judgment, the legality of the penalty was aberrantly analyzed under 
the nullum crimen sine lege principle rather than nulla poena sine lege.246  It is unclear whether 
this mishap spawned from the defendant’s brief and was simply responded to in kind by the 
Trial Chamber247 (in which case it would have been preferable for the Trial Chamber to make 
note of the error) or whether the Čelebići Trial Chamber itself, like the Erdemović Trial 
Chamber, failed to adequately distinguish between the two maxims.248 
The Čelebići Trial Chamber acknowledged the existence of some “controversy” regarding 
its sentencing policy of substituting the Yugoslavia maximum penalty (capital punishment) 
with the ICTY’s maximum of life imprisonment, in light of the fact that the former Yugoslavia 
had abolished the latter sanction, which it viewed as cruel and inhuman.249  It defended this 
policy by summarily concluding that it is “consistent with the practice of States which have 
abolished the death penalty”250 and by reference to the views of one member of the Security 
Council.251  Even if it is assumed that life imprisonment is a suitable substitute for the death 
penalty, a proposition which as noted above has not gone unchallenged,252 the Trial Chamber’s 
analysis is incomplete from another important perspective. Under Yugoslav law, an accused 
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could be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of up to fifteen years or sentenced to capital 
punishment, which could be mitigated to a sentence of twenty years.  However, a term of 
imprisonment beyond twenty years was not permissible.  It was either twenty years or the death 
penalty.  Thus, even if the ICTY policy of substituting the death penalty with life imprisonment 
is correct, this does not automatically justify terms of imprisonment that exceed twenty years.  
A sentencing policy that would be faithful to the Statute’s directive of having “recourse to the 
sentencing practice of the former Yugoslavia” would be one that set a maximum term of 
imprisonment at twenty years while permitting life imprisonment.253 In other words, the ICTY 
judges had the option of adopting a sentencing framework similar to the ICC where terms of 
imprisonment would be limited to 20 years or, where justified by the extreme gravity of the 
crime, life imprisonment, and refrain from imposing terms of sentences in between such as 45 
years, 40 years, or 30 years. This approach is supported by eminent scholars, such as Cherif 
Bassiouni, that have aptly concluded that imprisonment in excess of twenty years allowed 
under “the applicable national codes” would violate the principle of legality.254 
The Čelebići Trial Chamber took explicit note of Bassiouni’s position and rejected it, 
characterizing his opinion as “an erroneous and overly restrictive view of the concept.”255 The 
Čelebići judges held that “the governing consideration for the operation of the nullum crimen 
sine lege principle is the existence of a punishment with respect to the offence. . . .  The fact 
that the new punishment of the offence is greater than the former punishment does not offend 
the principle.”256 This ruling clearly violates the lex praevia principle of nulla poena. 
According to the Trial Chamber, once a penalty—any penalty—is provided for, then the 
accused are put on notice generally that their conduct can subject them to criminal jurisdiction, 
and thus the principle of legality is not violated, even if the court now substitutes its own higher 
penalty for the original penalty.257  Once again, international judges misconstrue the principle 
of legality as encompassing only the nullum crimen principle, and fail to consider nulla poena 
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separately.258  While the existence of a law making certain conduct a punishable offense 
satisfies nullum crimen, the substitution and enforcement of a higher penalty after the 
commission of the conduct violates nulla poena, specifically the lex praevia which is well-
established in treaty law, customary international law, and general principles of law. The 
Čelebići Trial Chamber’s application of the principle of legality here grants the benefits of 
legality on the innocent but withholds it from the guilty. 
The Trial Chamber’s analysis leads to two serious implications: the first is an explicit 
departure from the long-standing prohibition against imposing a greater penalty than the one 
applicable at the time the crime was committed, and the second is a rejection of the prohibition 
against the use of analogy on the discretion of international criminal adjudicators.259  While it 
may be argued, in turn, that this weakens the lex praevia and lex stricta attributes of nulla 
poena sine lege under international law, the better inference to be drawn is that the Trial 
Chamber’s analysis of the principle should not be given serious weight as international 
precedent for determining the international standard for nulla poena sine lege.  First, although 
it is addressing the question of penalties, the Trial Chamber’s discussion is in terms of nullum 
crimen sine lege.  The Trial Chamber’s failure to adequately distinguish between the two 
maxims weakens its authority as precedent on the nulla poena sine lege inquiry.  Second, the 
Trial Chamber’s dismissal of the lex stricta principle can be criticized for failing to consider, 
even nominally, the international precedent arising from the Advisory Opinion on the 
Consistency of Certain Danzig Legislative Decrees with the Constitution of the Free City.260  
It may be said that to some extent this criticism can be deflected by the fact that traditionally 
resorting to analogy was permitted on a limited basis, but this counter-argument has less force 
in light of modern practice of criminal law.  With the exception of one or two isolated states, 
national criminal justice systems prohibit the expansion of criminal sanctions by analogy.  Yet, 
even if breach of the lex scripta principle was to be deemed acceptable in international criminal 
justice, the Trial Chamber’s analysis is liable to an even more serious criticism.  Contrary to 
the well-established principle of lex praevia in international and national law, the Trial 
Chamber concluded that a “new punishment” which is “greater than the former punishment 
does not offend” the principle of legality.261 
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In light of the sentences imposed, it seems quite unnecessary for the Trial Chamber to 
reach such controversial conclusions.  In this case, the judges acquitted one defendant on all 
charges, and imposed imprisonment sentences of seven, fifteen, and twenty years on the other 
three. Hazim Delic, who received the harshest penalty of twenty years imprisonment, argued 
that, based on the principle of legality, the Trial Chamber could not impose a sentence greater 
than fifteen years.262 Indeed, the standard maximum under the former Yugoslavia’s penal code 
was fifteen years.263 However, as already mentioned, under certain circumstances national 
courts could increase the penalty to twenty years.  These include cases where the death penalty 
was applicable but for some reason, such as mitigating circumstances, the court chose to not 
impose it and cases where “criminal acts . . . were perpetrated under particularly aggravating 
circumstances or caused especially grave consequences.”264  Accordingly, the Trial Chamber 
did not need to go so far as to engage in a controversial analysis which could call into question 
its judgment or damage the credibility of international judges, or even cast a shadow on the 
endeavor to fight impunity through international criminal justice.  It could simply have 
reasoned that Delic’s crimes were of such gravity as to fall within the provisions of the former 
Yugoslavia’s penal code, which permitted an increase in penalty from fifteen years to twenty 
years. 
The Čelebići Appeals Chamber appropriately reframed the analysis in terms of nulla 
poena sine lege.265  More significantly, it also focused the issue towards whether nulla poena 
sine lege required an international criminal tribunal to be bound by the penalties available under 
national law.266 The Appeals Chamber steered clear of any overreaching declarations such as 
those made by the Trial Chamber that “[t]he fact that the new punishment of the offence is 
greater than the former punishment does not offend the principle.”267  This could arguably be 
considered as an implicit disavowal of the Trial Chamber’s ruling on this point.  After limiting 
the inquiry to whether nulla poena sine lege required strict adherence to national law, the 
Appeals Chamber concluded that the penalty of life imprisonment authorized by the ICTY 
Statute and RPE did not violate the nulla poena principle because it reasoned that “the accused 
must have been aware” that their crimes were “punishable by the most severe penalties.”268  
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Thus, the Appeals Chamber limited its holding, and consequently the rulings of the Trial 
Chamber, by the principle of foreseeability.  Citing decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights, the Appeals Chamber reasoned that so “long as the punishment is accessible and 
foreseeable, then the principle cannot be breached.”269 
The difficulties in applying the foreseeability test in this context have been addressed 
above already.270  It is fair to say that it was foreseeable that serious violations of international 
humanitarian law would be subject to the “most severe penalties,” as the Appeals Chamber 
pointed out.271  However, in a country that had abolished life imprisonment as a cruel form of 
punishment, can it fairly be said that such a sanction was foreseeable?272  In a country that did 
not permit terms of imprisonment beyond twenty years on the fundamental belief that such 
imprisonment was cruel and inhumane, it would be fair to argue that sentences of twenty 
years,273 forty years,274 forty-five years,275 or forty-six years276 were not foreseeable. 
C. NULLA POENA SINE LEGE IN THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
1. ICC Statute Framework for the Legality of Sanctions 
Within Part III of the ICC Statute on General Principles of Criminal Law lies Article 23, 
the keystone to understanding the legality of the ICC’s power to impose a particular 
punishment.277  Entitled “Nulla poena sine lege,” Article 23 states: “A person convicted by the 
Court may be punished only in accordance with this Statute.”278  Although at first glance this 
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single succinct sentence seems rather stingy for content, underlying its brevity are important 
requirements for the legality of any selected sanction within the ICC framework.  First, the list 
of sanctions provided by the Statute is exhaustive.  If a particular punishment is not provided 
for by the Statute, then the ICC has no power to impose it.  Second, the language “only in 
accordance with this Statute” obliges the ICC to comply with any conditions, qualifications, or 
other requirements attached to any sanction, whether in regard to its determination, imposition, 
or enforcement.  From this perspective, it may be said that the Statute reaffirms the lex scripta 
principle underlying nulla poena sine lege. 
While the inclusion of nulla poena sine lege via an individualized article within the ICC 
Statute may be considered a positive contribution to the development of the norm under 
international law, it must be admitted that Article 23 contains a peculiar expression of its 
namesake.279 Kai Ambos criticizes the ICC statute’s articulation of nulla poena for failing to 
go “beyond a mere reference to [a] statutory framework.”280 Ambos concludes that “it is highly 
questionable” whether Article 23 and the ICC sentencing regime complies “with a reasonably 
understood nulla poena principle.”281  Under the ICC legal framework, nulla poena is made 
dependent on the quality of provisions found in other articles of the Statute, and in some cases 
even dependent on the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence (ICC RPE). This reverse 
dependency is an awkward and unfamiliar position for a fundamental principle of criminal law, 
which is normally independent of subsequent rules and demands that other rules within the 
system comply with it.  Put differently, fundamental principles of the system, such as nulla 
poena sine lege, contain norms and values that subsequent rules within the system must satisfy. 
The dependency of the ICC’s nulla poena sine lege provision on other articles of the Statute 
may limit its effectiveness in achieving the goals associated with the maxim, particularly those 
that pertain to its “positive justice” function. 
While Article 23 limits the form and severity of the punishment to those penalties 
enumerated in the Statute, it cannot be said that it likewise limits the factors, especially 
aggravating circumstances, that judges may rely on to increase the severity of a sentence.  Its 
effectiveness to limit judicial discretion to the factors enumerated in the Rome Statute or the 
ICC RPE is weakened by open-ended language in other articles and rules. This highlights the 
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reverse dependency problem. For example, Article 78 instructs judges to “take into account 
such factors as the gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted 
person.”282  The language suggests that the enumeration of factors here is not exhaustive.  
Article 78 further states that the determination of the sentence should also be in accordance 
with the ICC RPE.  Rule 145, however, contains a non-exhaustive list of aggravating factors.283  
Thus, in determining a sentence, judges may take into account “other circumstances” not found 
in the Statute or ICC RPE.284  This opening in the Statute has been criticized as being contrary 
to nulla poena.285 
Prior to the adoption of Rule 145, the potential scope of Article 23 was a matter of 
interpretation for the judges.  The threshold issue would have been whether the language “in 
accordance with this Statute” requires that the factors impacting the sentence be enumerated in 
the Statute or the RPE, or whether it is permissible for the Statute or ICC RPE to allow 
consideration of factors not enumerated.  Rule 145(2)(b)(vi) seems to lay this issue to bed.  
However, can it be argued that the court has the authority, or even the obligation, to ensure that 
rules adopted by the Assembly of State Parties (APS), as part of the ICC RPE, do not conflict 
with the fundamental principles laid down in the Statute?  In other words, does the ICC have 
the power of judicial review of provisions adopted in the ICC RPE?  There is room to argue 
that this particular provision of Rule 145 is contrary to the requirements of the Statute pursuant 
to Article 23. The ICC judges arguably have the inherent power to interpret the scope of the 
ICC statute and could determine Rule 145(2)(b)(vi) is incompatible with the Statute.    
Another factor contributing to the peculiar nature of the formulation of nulla poena sine 
lege in Article 23 is the absence of language expressly incorporating the lex praevia principle, 
which is codified in numerous international and regional human rights instruments.  By 
contrast, the ICC’s nulla poena provision in Article 23 does not explicitly address what 
happens when a punishment is authorized by the statute but was not applicable to the actor at 
the time of the commission of act.  From the perspective of normative development of nulla 
poena sine lege in international law, it would have been preferable to explicitly incorporate the 
lex praevia principle in the ICC’s nulla poena article, especially in light of some potentially 
																																																								
282 ICC Statute, supra note 13, art. 78(1) (emphasis added). 
283 International Criminal Court Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-ASP/1/3, Rule 145(2)(b)(vi). 
284 Id. (granting that these “other circumstances” must “by virtue of their nature be similar” to the enumerated 
aggravating factors). 
285 SALVATORE ZAPPALÁ, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 201 (2003).  For 
similar criticism of the ICTY Statute, see BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 15, at 702. 
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adverse statements from the jurisprudence of the ICTY.286  However, from a practical 
standpoint, its absence in Article 23 is not fatal to the operation of the lex praevia principle 
within the general framework of the Statute, provided that the Statute is interpreted consistent 
with Article 15(1) of the ICCPR.  Moreover, it may be argued that the drafters of the Statute 
did not consider this to be a serious omission given that the Statute contains a clear provision 
on the non-retroactive application of the Statute to conduct occurring prior to its entry into 
force.287 
Given that the ICC’s nulla poena sine lege article does not explicitly contain the lex 
praevia principle, namely that a heavier penalty shall not be imposed than the one that was 
applicable at the time the offense was committed,288 the court may have to turn outside its own 
statute for authority to incorporate this principle.289 ICC judges have authority to do so under 
Article 21 – Applicable Law. There are a number of sources that the court can rely upon to 
incorporate the lex praevia principle into its legal framework, including “applicable treaties”290 
and “general principles of law” derived from national laws of legal systems of the world.291  
Although it is hard to imagine that ICC judges would not incorporate lex praevia into the nulla 
poena provision of the Statute, it would nevertheless have been preferable to have included an 
explicit provision to that effect. 
An earlier proposal by Mexico, which was not included in the final text of Article 23, 
offered the following language: “No penalty shall be imposed on a person convicted of a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court, unless such penalty is expressly provided for in the Statute 
and is applicable to the crime in question.”292  However, without explicit reference to 
determining the penalty in accordance with the law applicable “at the time the conduct was 
committed,” the proposal does not address the lex praevia principle, although it does provide 
for a stronger lex certa character which could have possibly required that maximum penalties 
or penalty ranges be specified per crime.  It is not clear why the Working Group on Penalties 
																																																								
286 E.g., Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement, para. 1210 (Nov. 16, 1998) (“The fact that 
the new maximum punishment exceeds the erstwhile maximum does not bring the new law within the principle.”); 
id. para. 1212 (“The fact that the new punishment of the offence is greater than the former punishment does not 
offend the principle.”); see supra Part IV.B. 
287 ICC Statute, supra note 13, art. 24(1).  The ICC Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002.  Id. art. 126. 
288 See supra Parts II.B & III.A.  See generally UDHR, supra note 38, art. 11, para. 2; ICCPR, supra note 38, 
art. 15(1); ECHR, supra note 38, art. 7(1); ACHR, supra note 38, art. 9. 
289 See ICC Statute, supra note 13, art. 21. 
290 See id. art. 21(1)(b).  These may include for example international human rights treaties as well as 
international humanitarian law conventions.  With regard to the latter, Article 75(4)(c) of Additional Protocol I to 
the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 provides that “nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which 
was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed.” 
291 See ICC Statute, supra note 13, art. 21(1)(c). 
292 UN Doc A/CONF.183/C.1/WGP/L.4 (1 July 1998). See further Schabas, supra note 2, at 465.   
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reformulated the proposal into the present language.293  Perhaps it was because the Working 
Group did not have sufficient time to achieve a more comprehensive and integrated sentencing 
framework.  Whether this decision will weaken the nulla poena norm within the ICC 
framework remains uncertain. 
To strengthen the lex praevia character of nulla poena within the ICC framework, one 
could argue that the principle of non-retroactive application of a heavier penalty appears in all 
major human rights treaties.294  This argument, however, is only successful to the extent it is 
accepted that the court is bound by these treaties.  Another approach would be to turn to general 
principles of law or customary international law, as the majority of nations prohibit ex post 
facto application of criminal law.295  A third approach could be to rely on related articles of the 
Statute such as Article 22 and Article 24, although such reliance will also depend upon the 
interpretation of these provisions in accordance with international human rights standards.296   
Article 22 Nullum crimen sine lege makes clear that the applicable law is that which was 
in place at the time the conduct occurred.297  Given the nexus between nullum crimen sine lege 
and nulla poena sine lege,298 the ICC may reasonably rely on Article 22 to incorporate the lex 
praevia principle into Article 23.  Article 24 also has potential to strengthen lex praevia within 
the Statute, depending on the interpretation given to the phrase “the law applicable.”  Article 
24 provides that “[i]n the event of a change in the law applicable to a given case prior to a final 
judgement, the law more favourable to the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted 
shall apply.”299  Strictly speaking, this provision incorporates the lex mitior principle, but it can 
be interpreted so as to include the lex praevia principle of nulla poena sine lege.  The threshold 
question to be resolved is what is meant by “the law applicable to a given case.” The Statute 
itself does not make explicit if “applicable law” refers to the law in force at the time the conduct 
was committed or the law in force at the time the ICC seized jurisdiction of the case.   
																																																								
293 Id. 
294 E.g., ICCPR, supra note 38, art. 15(1) (“Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was 
applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed.”); see supra Part III.A; see also ECHR, supra 
note 38, art. 7(1); ACHR, supra note 38, art. 9; UDHR, supra note 38, art. 11, para. 2. 
295 See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 123. 
296 Article 22 deals with nullum crimen sine lege and therefore speaks to punishability of an act and not the 
punishment itself.  Article 24(1) prohibits imposition of “criminal responsibility” in relation to the temporal 
jurisdiction of the court. 
297 ICC Statute, supra note 13, art. 22(1) (“A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute 
unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.”). 
298 See Robinson, supra note 2, at 396-97 (“The rationales that support precise written rules governing 
assignment of liability and its degree apply as well to criminal sentencing.”). 
299 ICC Statute, supra note 13, art. 24(2). 
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The Čelebići Appeals Chamber stated that “any sentence imposed must always be . . . 
‘founded on the existence of applicable law.’”300  However, the Appeals Chamber did not 
further elaborate on how the “applicable law” should be identified and determined.  Moreover, 
it made no negative judgment against the Trial Chamber’s approach which seemed to suggest 
that when the determination of “applicable law,” for the purposes of determining a penalty, is 
framed in terms of a jurisdictional question, it is permissible to exceed the penalty applicable 
at the time the crime was committed.  In certain instances, this could result in an ex post facto 
increase of the penalty.  On the other hand, an alternative reading of the combined rulings of 
the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber in Čelebići would be that the ICTY has not 
endorsed ex post facto increase of a penalty as such, but rather is saying that nulla poena sine 
lege does not require an international criminal tribunal to be bound by the penalty provisions 
arising from national law so long as the international tribunal is acting in accordance with its 
own statutory provisions, even if those provisions result in an increase in the penalty that 
otherwise would have been applicable were the individual to be tried in the forum of the locus 
delicti.301  It is one thing to say that nulla poena sine lege does not require an international 
criminal court to be strictly limited to penalties arising from national penal codes; it is an 
entirely different matter to suggest that nulla poena sine lege under international law does not 
encompass the lex praevia principle prohibiting retroactive application of penalties.  Put 
simply, regardless of what interpretation the ICTY chooses to give to its national law provision, 
it cannot result in a sweeping ruling that nulla poena sine lege in international law does not 
include the principle of non-retroactivity.  Such a holding would be manifestly against 
international human rights treaties. 
Accordingly, to the extent that the Čelebići Trial Chamber’s ruling suggested this latter 
consequence, it should be rejected as incompatible with international human rights standards 
and fundamental principles of criminal law.  On the other hand, the former proposition arising 
from the combined rulings of the Appeals Chamber and Trial Chamber in Čelebići has 
significance for future cases before the ICC, and maybe also for the interpretation of its nulla 
poena sine lege article.  The upshot of the Čelebići case on the nulla poena sine lege question 
is to preempt any success that the defendant may have in arguing that, where the penalty 
provisions of the ICC are greater than the penalties allowed under national law, the imposition 
of the former would violate the principle of legality.  The ICC can bolster its rejection of such 
																																																								
300 Čelebići Case, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, para. 817 (Feb. 20, 2001). 
301 This would be subject to the limitation that the penalties in the forum of adjudication were foreseeable.  Id. 
at 293 n.1400. 
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an argument by, in addition to references to the relevant articles of its own Statute, recalling 
this analysis of the Čelebići case.302 
A third peculiar aspect of the drafting of Article 23 pertains to its legal construction which 
places “may” and “only” in close proximity: “may be punished only in accordance with this 
Statute.”  It may seem too obvious to argue that the textual and teleological interpretation of 
this language would be that the court may, but is not obligated to (as opposed to “shall”), punish 
a convicted person; however, if it chooses to punish, it can only do so in accordance with the 
Statute.  However as pointed out above, we have witnessed the ICTY reject what leading 
scholars considered to be the appropriate textual and teleological interpretation of its Article 
24.303  Moreover, like the national law provisions of the ad hoc tribunals,304 which followed on 
the heels of a more strongly worded provision regarding applicable penalties,305 Article 23 of 
the ICC Statute also follows the more strongly worded Article 22, which states, inter alia: “A 
person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question 
constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.”306  The “shall 
not . . . unless” formulation is a stronger legal construction than the language of Article 23.  
Additionally, as noted already, Article 22 also explicitly includes the lex praevia principle.  It 
is worth recalling that the national law provision of the ICTY statute also contained unorthodox 
drafting.307  ICTY Article 24 uses “shall” alongside “have recourse to,” creating ambiguity as 
to its character as a strict legal limitation on judicial discretion or as a lesser guiding, but not 
																																																								
302 The ICC Statute does not contain a national law provision like the one found in the statutes of the ad hoc 
Tribunals.  This makes sense in light of the differences in their geographic reach.  Because the ICTR and ICTY’s 
jurisdiction is limited to crimes occurring on the territory of a single (former) state, reference to national laws is 
defendable.  In the context of a permanent international criminal court, with the potential for global territorial 
reach, a national law provision would result in a fragmentation of international sentence.  Some have expressed 
optimism that this will “build on the principle of equality of justice through uniform penalties regime for all 
persons convicted by the Court.”  See Rolf Einar Fife, Applicable Penalties, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVER’S NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 985, 986 (Otto 
Triffterer ed., 1999). 
303 Compare Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, para. 349(June 12, 2002); 
Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Judgment, para. 418 (Oct. 23, 2001); Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case 
Nos. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-Abis, Judgment, para. 21 (Jan. 26, 2000); with BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 15, 
at 692, 700; Schabas, Perverse Effects, supra note 114, at 524-28. 
304 A comparison between ICC Statute, supra note 13, art. 23, and the second sentence of ICTY Statute, supra 
note 12, art. 24(1) (and ICTR Statute, supra note 169, art. 23(1)) seems appropriate as it has been argued that the 
latter was included out of concern for respecting nulla poena sine lege.  See BASSIOUNI AND MANIKAS, supra note 
15, at 692, 700; Schabas, Perverse Effects, supra note 114, at 524-28.  Except for the reference to the applicable 
state, the provisions of ICTY Statute, supra note 12, art. 24(1) and ICTR Statute, supra note 169, art. 23(1) are 
identical: “The penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to imprisonment.  In determining the terms 
of imprisonment, the Trial Chambers shall have recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the 
courts of [the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda].” 
305 Compare the first sentence and the second sentence of ICTY Statute, supra note 12, art. 24(1) (“shall be 
limited to” versus “shall have recourse to”). 
306 ICC Statute supra note 13, art. 22(1).  For a general commentary on this article, see Bruce Broomhall, 
Nullum Crimen Sine Lege, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 
supra note 302, at 447, 452-53. 
307 See supra Part IV.B. 
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binding, provision.308  ICTY judges concluded that the sentencing laws and practice of the 
former Yugoslavia are not binding on them.309  Although it has been argued that this provision 
was included out of concern for respecting the nulla poena sine lege,310 the interpretations of 
the judges have effectively read out this limitation on their discretion.311 
In sum, some improvement has been made in comparison to the statutes of the ad hoc 
tribunals.  Although sparse and not providing satisfactory elucidation of the nulla poena 
principle, Article 23 infuses the ICC sentencing regime with a significant lex scripta quality, 
which may have in turn inspired the state representatives at the drafting table to produce what 
has been characterized as the most progressive international sentencing code.  Moreover, the 
fact that nulla poena sine lege is recognized in its own right under Article 23, separate and 
independent of nullum crimen sine lege (Article 22), should serve to give the norm additional 
weight and embed its position in international criminal law.312 
2. Analysis of Imprisonment Sanctions 
The penalty provision proposed by the International Law Commission in its draft statute 
for an international criminal court was nearly identical to the penalty provisions of the ad hoc 
tribunals (ICTY Article 24 and ICTR Article 23) and relied upon the same general criteria as 
found in the sentencing provisions of the ICC Statute.313  In the view of many delegations, this 
ILC draft provision  
gave rise to a serious problem with regard to its conformity with the principle nulla poena 
sine lege.  It was generally held that there was a need for maximum penalties applicable 
																																																								
308 See also BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 15, at 700. 
309 This position was taken from the outset in the ICTY’s first sentencing judgment.  See Prosecutor v. 
Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Judgement, para. 39 (Nov. 29, 1996).  It has been confirmed and followed 
without deviation, entrenching it deep in the Tribunal’s jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case 
Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, para. 349 (June 12, 2002); Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-
16-A, Judgment, para. 418 (Oct. 23, 2001); Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case Nos. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-Abis, Judgment, 
para. 21 (Jan. 26, 2000). 
310 See BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 15, at 702; Schabas, Perverse Effects, supra note 114, at 525; 
Schabas, supra note 2, at 464. 
311 See supra note 218. 
312 And, hopefully, encourage more scholarship on this subject. 
313 See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth 
Session, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 60, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994), reprinted in [1994] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 
287, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1 (providing that “[i]n imposing sentence, the Trial Chamber should 
take into account such factors as the gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted 
person.”). 
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to various types of crimes to be spelled out.  The view was also expressed that minimum 
penalties should also be made explicit in view of the seriousness of the crimes.314 
With regard to imprisonment sanctions, Articles 23 and 77 work in tandem.  Article 77 
sets out the ICC’s powers regarding the sanction of imprisonment.  It gives the court two 
alternatives: judges must make a choice between imprisonment of not more than thirty years315 
or life imprisonment.  This structure resulted from the insistence of states for clarity as to the 
maximum sentence,316 a recognition of the lex scripta and lex certa attributes of nulla poena.317  
The idea to include a maximum term for a sentence of determinate years originated with France 
and other civil law countries in order to, in the view of one participant,318 “increase legal 
certainty with regard to the range of imprisonment.”319  Consequently, a degree of specificity 
was introduced into international criminal justice that did not exist in the statutes of previous 
international criminal tribunals.320  Under the statutes of the IMT, IMTFE, ICTR and ICTY, a 
person could be sentenced to forty years or fifty years or any other period of time.321  The ICC 
Statute, however, does not provide precise penalties for specific crimes, despite the wide range 
of offenses and modes of participation that the court is called upon to judge.  Thus, the 
sentencing scheme in Article 77 applies to all crimes within the ICC jurisdiction. 
When determining a sentence within this structure, judges must take into account two 
factors: “gravity of the crime” and “the individual circumstances of the convicted person.”322  
In the practice of the ICTY, the “gravity of the crime” emerged as the key factor in 
																																																								
314 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee to the General Assembly on the Establishment of an International Criminal 
Court, 50 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 22) at 36, para. 187, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Ad Hoc 
Committee Report]. 
315 Proposals on the maximum years for a specific term of imprisonment ranged from twenty to forty.  See 
Fife, supra note 302, at 990 n.24. 
316 Id. at 1424; see also Rolf Einar Fife, Penalties, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF 
THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, AND RESULTS 319, 319 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) 
317 Further indicia of this recognition can be found in the support of some countries for the inclusion of 
minimums as well as maximums.  See ICC Prep. Committee’s 1996 Report, supra note 36, at 63; see also 
Compilation of Proposals, supra note 118, at 227-34; Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at its Session Held from 1 to 12 
December 1997, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1997/L.9/Rev.1 (1997); United Nations Diplomatic Conference on the 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, June 15-17, 1998, Report of the 
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, arts. 75-79, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (April 14, 1998). 
318 Rolf Einar Fife (Norway), Chairman of the Working Group on Penalties. 
319 Fife, supra note 302, at 990. 
320 Compare ICC Statute, supra note 13, art. 77, with ICTY Statute, supra note 12, art. 24, and ICTR Statute, 
supra note 169, art. 23. 
321 E.g., General Radislav Krstić was sentenced to forty-six years of imprisonment.  See Prosecutor v. Krstić, 
Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Judgment, para. 726 (Aug. 2, 2001).  On appeal, his sentence was reduced to thirty-
five years.  See Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeal Judgment, 87 (Apr. 19, 2004). 
322 ICC Statute, supra note 9, art. 78(1). 
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sentencing,323 and the ICC’s reliance on it to produce a just sentencing practice should not be 
underestimated.  “Gravity of the crime” appears as the key criterion in two places in the Statute.  
Under Article 77(1)(b), “gravity of the crime” is relied on to determine the appropriateness of 
life imprisonment.  At minimum, the “gravity of the crime” must be “extreme” in order to 
justify life imprisonment.  It appears again in Article 78(1) as a general factor in determining 
the appropriate length of any sentence. 
3. Life Imprisonment 
Article 77(1)(b) provides two general qualifications intended to limit the application of 
life imprisonment.  Life imprisonment should only be imposed “when justified by the extreme 
gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.”  Both criteria 
must be met before an individual can be sentenced to life imprisonment.  There are no crimes 
for which the Statute categorically excludes the applicability of a life sentence.  Consequently, 
even with the intended limitation in Article 77(1)(b), life imprisonment is theoretically 
applicable to all the crimes within the Statute. 
A life imprisonment sentence is, to state the obvious, a severe sanction.324  The drafting 
and negotiation process revealed a notable divide between some states on its propriety.  Several 
European and Latin American countries opposed, in principle, the inclusion of life 
imprisonment within the ICC’s statute, and at minimum, its imposition without the possibility 
of parole.325  Some states viewed life imprisonment as cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
punishment.326  As such, in their view, it violated provisions of international human rights 
treaties.327  Other states disagreed, stressing the importance of including severe penalties within 
the ICC’s power because the penalties under consideration were to be applied to the most 
serious crimes of international concern.328  Accordingly, they supported the inclusion of life 
imprisonment and, in the case of some states, the death penalty, “as a prerequisite for the 
credibility of the International Court and its deterrent functions.”329  Thus, on the question of 
which penalties should be placed under the ICC’s authority, the views among the states ranged 
																																																								
323 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeal Judgment, para.731 (Feb. 20, 2001); 
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeal Judgment, para.182 (Mar. 24, 2000). 
324 For further reading on life imprisonment, see DIRK VAN ZYL SMIT, TAKING LIFE IMPRISONMENT SERIOUSLY 
IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002). 
325 See SCHABAS, supra note 82, at 141; Fife, supra note 302, at 990. 
326 SCHABAS, supra note 82, at 141. 
327 The view that life imprisonment is unacceptable from a human rights perspective remains contentious.  The 
majority of states allow for it.  For further reading, see Schabas, supra note 74, at 461. 
328 Fife, supra note 302, at 986-87. 
329 Id. 
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from those who supported the inclusion of death penalty to those who argued against life 
imprisonment. 
Given this diversity in views, it is perhaps surprising that further efforts were not made in 
the Working Group on Penalties to make appropriate distinctions among the range of crimes 
within the ICC’s jurisdiction as to the applicable penalty for each, or at the very least, to identify 
those crimes for which a life sentence would be excluded.  Instead, a compromise was made 
excluding the death penalty, but allowing for the sanction of life imprisonment which would 
be generally applicable to all crimes and levels of culpability, albeit with the qualification 
found in Article 77(1)(b).  While this clause arguably places a formal limitation on the 
imposition of life imprisonment, its undefined quality has the potential to betray the aim of 
consistent application. 
4. Statutory Provisions Advancing the Nulla Poena  Norm 
The Statute contains several articles which serve to strengthen its compliance with nulla 
poena sine lege.  As illustrations, three of them will be discussed here.  The first is a mandatory 
review procedure; the second pertains to specific rules regarding sentencing in the case of 
multiple convictions; and finally, the third covers sanctions for offenses against the 
administration of justice. 
i. Mandatory Review of Sentences 
The inclusion of a mandatory review mechanism was inspired by concerns regarding the 
ICC’s authority to impose the sanction of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.330  
In the final text of the ICC Statute, however, it was made widely applicable to all imprisonment 
sentences.  The procedure is laid out in Article 110, which places upon the court a legal 
obligation to review the sentence after a specified period of time.331  It provides the convicted 
person with legal certainty that his or her sentence will be reviewed for possible reduction.  
Thus, the Statute gives rise to a right of the accused to a review of his sentence during the 
execution phase.  Significantly, these provisions represent an effort to improve the lex scripta 
and lex certa qualities of international sentencing by extending legal certainty into the 
enforcement stage.  Thus, the ICC Statute extends the reach of the nulla poena sine lege maxim 
to execution of penalties.  In the context of the ICTY, early commentators on the statute 
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331 For a general commentary on this article, see Gerhard A.M. Strijards, Review by the Court Concerning 
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concluded that nulla poena sine lege applies to the execution of sentences, although they did 
not elaborate on how they reached this conclusion.332   
Indeed, a modern approach to nulla poena sine lege, which appreciates that it functions 
more than simply as a principle prohibiting the imposition of a penalty heavier than the one 
applicable at the time the offense was committed, supports the position of these authors.  In its 
first sentencing judgment, the ICTY held that “[t]he principle of nulla poena sine lege must 
permit every accused to be cognisant not only of the possible consequences of conviction for 
an international crime and the penalty but also the conditions under which the penalty is to be 
executed.”333  Interestingly, the Trial Chamber’s rationale for its holding appears to not be 
premised so much on nulla poena’s protectionist function but rather its “quality of justice” 
function: “[T]he Trial Chamber is concerned about reducing the disparities which may result 
from the execution of sentences.”334  On the other hand, where the analysis of nulla poena is 
limited to its lex praevia principle, some commentators have argued that it “applies only to the 
nominal penalty imposed, not to the manner of its enforcement.  Hence, it does not prevent any 
retroactive alteration in the law or practice concerning the parole or conditional release of a 
prisoner.”335  In light of such varying opinions among human rights scholars, it is regrettable 
that the formulation of nulla poena sine lege within the ICC framework did not explicitly codify 
lex praevia into Article 23.336 
Regarding execution of the sentence, a question for future research that is particularly 
pertinent to ICL punishment would be whether nulla poena sine lege extends to where 
imprisonment will be served. International war criminals face the very real prospect that they 
will serve their sentence in a foreign country. This can increase the harshness of the 
punishment.  The convicting person may be unfamiliar with the local language and culture or 
may have zero or little possibility of visits from family and friends, increasing the harshness of 
isolation. These conditions increase the severity of the punishment in a very real sense. 
Likewise, drastically disparate prison conditions among the different countries that execute the 
sentences of ICL tribunals also has a bearing on the severity of the punishment. As explained 
in Chapter One, matters concerning the enforcement of ICL sentences fall outside the scope of 
this study; nevertheless, theses issues deserve further exploration in future studies.  
																																																								
332 E.g., BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 15, at 692. 
333 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, para. 70 (Nov. 29, 1996). 
334 Id. 
335 E.g., D.J. HARRIS, M. O’BOYLE & C. WARBRICK, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
281 (1995); cf. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, para. 70. 
336 See supra Part IV.C(1).  
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ii. Specific Rules for Multiple Convictions 
Particular rules regarding sentencing in cases of multiple convictions are provided for in 
Article 78(3),337 thereby strengthening the lex certa characteristic of the Statute’s sentencing 
provisions.  It contains two mandatory features that are important to compliance with nulla 
poena.  The first pertains to the obligations of the ICC when imposing a sentence for multiple 
convictions.  “When a person has been convicted of more than one crime,” Article 78(3) 
requires the court to first “pronounce a sentence for each crime” individually.  The court “shall” 
then also pronounce a joint sentence “specifying the total period of imprisonment.”  This 
requirement marks an improvement on a fainéant practice that had developed in some trial 
chambers of the ICTY and ICTR to simply provide only a single overall sentence without 
enumerating specific sentences for each conviction.  It has been widely assumed that the RPE 
of the ad hoc tribunals authorized the practice of rendering a single sentence338 at the time it 
was introduced in the Blaškić case.339  Although General Blaškić was convicted of multiple 
crimes, the Trial Chamber did not render multiple sentences, opting instead for the less 
distinctive approach of rendering a single sentence for all crimes.340  To justify its departure 
from the then existing practice of other ICTY trial chambers, the Blaškić Trial Chamber 
curiously turned to Rule 101 and observed that it “does not preclude it from passing a single 
sentence for several crimes.”341  At the time, however, Rule 87(C) did preclude the Trial 
Chamber from passing a single sentence for multiple crimes and it is quite egregious that the 
Trial Chamber did not even mention this Rule.342  Rule 87(C) required the Trial Chamber to 
impose a sentence with respect to each finding of guilt: “If the Trial Chamber finds the accused 
guilty on one or more of the charges contained in the indictment, it shall at the same time 
determine the penalty to be imposed in respect of each finding of guilt.”343  Thus, when the 
Blaškić Trial Chamber introduced the practice of single sentencing, it did so in contravention 
																																																								
337 See Mark Jennings, Determination of the Sentence, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 302, at 999, 999-1004. 
338 This is sometimes referred to as a “global” sentence. 
339 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, paras. 805-07 (Mar. 3, 2000) (noting that “until 
now the ICTY Trial Chambers have rendered Judgements imposing multiple sentences”).  For a commentary on 
the sentencing analysis of the Blaškić Trial Chamber, see Dana, supra note 275.  See United Nations, 
www.un.org/icty (last visited Mar. 3, 2008) (containing a full text of all ICTY judgments cited herein); 4 
ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 477-667 (André Klip & Göran Sluiter 
eds., 2002) (containing a full text of the Blaškić judgment, along with notes and commentary). 
340 Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, para. 807.   
341 Id. at para. 805. 
342 See ICTY RPE, supra note 175, R. 87(C). 
343 Id.  
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of the ICTY RPE.344  Subsequently, following two revisions of the ICTY RPE, the Rules caught 
up to reflect the practice of single sentencing, and Rule 87(C) was amended to allow the 
imposition of single sentences for multiple crimes.345 
The lack of transparency resulting from a single sentence approach undermines the 
criminal justice process. For example, it leaves the Appeals Chamber without any indication 
of how each conviction influenced the overall sentence in the event that one conviction is 
overturned.  Likewise, both the accused and the prosecution are placed at a disadvantage when 
seeking to challenge a sentence on appeal. This is particularly concerning for the accused, 
whose right to an effective appeal is thereby undermined. Accordingly, this first feature of 
Article 78(3), obliging the court to render a sentence for each crime in addition to an overall 
sentence reflecting the total period of imprisonment, strengthens the lex certa principle of nulla 
poena in connection with sentencing before the ICC. 
The second feature places mandatory limitations on the outer ranges of the imprisonment 
period.  Article 78(3) mandates that the total period of imprisonment “shall not exceed 30 
years,” or, alternatively, life imprisonment, provided that the requirements of Article 77(1)(b) 
are satisfied.  At the other end of the spectrum, the total period cannot be less than the highest 
individual sentence imposed.346 
Thus, Article 78(3) strengthens the Statute’s compliance with the nulla poena sine lege 
principle in at least two ways.  First, by providing a sentencing provision dealing directly with 
multiple convictions, state parties to the Rome Treaty have signaled recognition in principle 
that such matters should be addressed in the constitutional framework of an international penal 
court as required by lex scripta, the codification requirement of nulla poena.  By incorporating 
this rule within the Statute itself, the drafters have further protected the value of legal certainty 
by preventing a trial chamber from departing from the rules that an accused can reasonably 
expect to rely on, and subsequently burying its breach under layers of revisions to the rules of 
procedure and evidence.  Here, a clear improvement is evidenced in the ICC Statute over the 
statutes of its predecessor tribunals, which were silent on the issue.  Next, it sets statutorily 
																																																								
344 Not only has the Blaškić Trial Chamber relied on the wrong rule, it has also relied on case law that is not 
on point.  After acknowledging that the practice of ICTY trial chambers has been to render multiple sentences, it 
relied on two ICTR cases to justify its decision to violate the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence and deviate 
from ICTY practice.  The two ICTR cases relied on were not even factually or procedurally similar to qualify 
them as relevant authority since both resulted from guilty pleas by the defendant, which may provide more 
justification for a single sentence.  In any event, a factually and procedurally irrelevant case from another tribunal 
can hardly serve as sufficient grounds for the Blaškić Trial Chamber to ignore its own rules of procedure as well 
as depart from existing practice at the ICTY. 
345 See Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, R. 87(C), 
U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.19 (Dec. 13, 2000). 
346 ICC Statute, supra note 13, art. 78(3). 
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codified limits on the terms of imprisonment in the event of multiple convictions, thereby 
moving towards better fulfillment of lex certa.  To the degree possible given Article 77’s own 
shortcomings on lex certa, Article 78 provides a measure of clarity and predictability in 
sentencing situations involving multiple convictions. 
iii. Legal Authority for Sanctions Relating to Contempt of Court 
The sanctions set forth in Article 77 are applicable only to a “person convicted of a crime 
referred to in article 5 of this Statute.”347  Therefore, it does not empower the court to impose 
sanctions for contempt of court, misconduct, or offenses against the administration of justice, 
which must likewise satisfy nulla poena sine lege pursuant to Article 23.  The ICC’s authority 
and the limitations regarding these sanctions are provided for in Articles 70 and 71.  Article 70 
sets out a range of offenses relating to the obstruction of justice348 and provides a specific 
penalty provision authorizing the ICC to impose a maximum of five years imprisonment.349 
Interestingly, the ICC’s authority to impose sanctions for what can be generally considered 
contempt of court could have easily been left to the judges to develop under the doctrine of 
inherent judicial powers.350  The inclusion of these specific provisions indicates a strict 
approach, by the drafters of the Statue, to nulla poena sine lege in the Article 23.  The judges 
ought to rely on this teleological perspective when determining the general nature of the nulla 
poena norm while developing the ICC sentencing practice. 
5. Shortcomings on Compliance with Nulla Poena Sine Lege 
There can be little doubt that the ICC Statute represents a marked improvement over the 
statutes of its predecessor courts when it comes to provisions on sentencing.  A certain degree 
of respect for the principle of legality, nulla poena sine lege, must be acknowledged within the 
ICC structure.  But does it go far enough?  If criticism were to be entertained, or put differently, 
if areas for improvement through possible future amendments are to be considered, the 
Statute’s primary weakness lies in its satisfaction of the lex certa requirement of nulla poena, 
namely that penalties should be specific and precise, thereby providing a sufficient degree of 
legal certainty.  This shortcoming is typified in two compromising characteristics of the 
																																																								
347 Id. art. 77(1). 
348 Id. art. 70(1)(a)-(f). 
349 Id. art. 70(3) (providing that the court may also impose a fine). 
350 The ICTY and ICTR statutes did not contain provisions dealing directly with contempt of court and its 
corresponding sanctions.  For a commentary on select decisions of the ad hoc Tribunals on contempt of court, see 
Shahram Dana, The Law of Contempt Before the UN ICTR, in 10 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 278 (André Klip & Göran Sluiter eds., 2006); Taru Spronken, Commentary, in 7 
ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, supra, at 225, 225. 
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Statute’s sentencing provisions—generality and ambiguity: “generality” because it lacks 
sufficient distinctions between penalties for the variety of crimes within its jurisdiction, and 
“ambiguity” because it relies on vague sentencing criteria. 
i. The Problem of Generality: All for One and One for All 
The problem of generality appears at two levels.  At the level of application, the “gravity 
of the crime” serves as a determinative criterion both in the specific application of life 
imprisonment351 and also in the general determination of any term of imprisonment.352  At the 
framework level, the ICC Statute contains a single sentencing scheme, with alternative 
maximums, applicable to any and all offenses under its jurisdiction.  In other words, either 
maximum can be applied to all crimes, including inchoate crimes, and all modes of 
participation.  The ICTY and ICTR statutes, which likewise did not provide specific penalties 
for particular crimes or categories of crimes, were criticized for not satisfying nulla poena sine 
lege.  The ICC Statute is likewise open to the same criticism.353  This framework departs from 
the example of most national criminal codes, which establish a precise penalty range for 
individual offenses.  Thus, measured against the practice of states, the ICC sentencing 
provisions lack sufficient precision and specificity. 
This is particularly disconcerting in relation to life imprisonment.  The general 
applicability of the most severe sanction to all crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction 
compromises the lex certa requirement and ultimately, it must be admitted, encroaches on the 
accused’s right to legal certainty.354  It is tempting to justify this failure on the grounds that 
further agreement among states on specific penalties could not be reached.  While it is true that 
states are sharply divided on issues surrounding the death penalty, and even to some extent, the 
propriety of life imprisonment, this explanation is not entirely satisfying. 
First, given the range of crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction and forms of individual 
participation,355 some degree of separation can be made as to the severity of the sanction 
applicable.  At a most basic level, for example, offenses against property and offenses against 
life can be distinguished.  There is a hierarchy of interests protected by international crimes 
																																																								
351 ICC Statute, supra note 13, art. 77(1)(b). 
352 Id. art. 78(1). 
353 See BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 15, at 689. 
354 For example, in the event that an accused pleads guilty to a crime, he has no certainty about the upper limits 
of penalty he will face, and his lawyer cannot provide sufficient legal advice on the matter. 
355 For the purposes of punishability of conduct, the Statute recognizes both completed crimes and inchoate 
crimes.  It further recognizes that individual participation in crimes can take on different forms.  See ICC Statute, 
supra note 13, arts. 25, 28. 
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including the interest of the international community in the existence of groups of people, the 
interest in freedom from terror and persecutory acts, the interest in individual life, the interest 
in bodily integrity, the interest in cultural property, and so on.356  The interests protected are 
distinguishable, as is the mode of participation, the criminal intent, and the harm committed.  
Therefore, appropriate distinctions must likewise be made in applicable penalties.  Second, the 
difference between states on specific philosophical concerns, such as the propriety of the death 
penalty, has been unnaturally stretched into a perceived general disagreement on foundational 
principles and methodologies useful for distinguishing penalties.  All states make general 
distinctions between offenses against property and offenses against a person, between 
commission and attempt, and between different mental states.  Third, reports from the 
preparatory meetings reveal a lot of political jockeying, which was the root of much 
disagreement.357  Many delegates took the position that they could not discuss other sentencing 
matters until the issues surrounding the death penalty were resolved.  This tactic was motivated 
by concerns pertaining to national interests and a firm intent to protect a state’s sovereignty in 
applying particular penalties domestically without prejudice arising from the provisions of the 
ICC.  It had marginal relevance to reaching agreement on distinguishing between various 
offenses in terms of severity and, unfortunately consumed precious time in which issues such 
as hierarchy of crimes, criminal intent, mode of participation, and resulting harm could have 
been discussed in relation to applicable penalties.  In addition to these hindrances, there appears 
to be some cavalier, if not misplaced, confidence that, since we are dealing with the most 
horrible crimes, the most severe penalties will be applied.  The reasoning is attractive; yet, the 
actual practice betrays that presumption.  The practice of the ICTY in particular is littered with 
instances of lenient penalties.358  Thus, the implicit presumption (that we give the harshest 
penalties anyway) behind the indifference towards the need for an advanced sentencing regime 
																																																								
356 The scope of this comment does not permit further elaboration on the question of hierarchy of crimes in 
international law.  Various proposals have been made based on different methodologies for creating a hierarchy.  
For further reading, see Pickard, supra note 21 (advancing a comparative analysis of the same or comparable 
crime in the domestic law of twelve states); Andrea Carcano, Sentencing and the Gravity of the Offense in 
International Criminal Law, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 583 (2002) (proposing a ranking scheme based on combining 
both gravity in abstracto and gravity in concerto); Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes 
in International Criminal Law Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REV. 415 (2001) (proposing a hierarchy of crimes based on 
an abstract assessment of harm combining the substantive elements of the crime with its jurisdictional elements 
in the chapeau). 
357 Schabas, Penalties, supra note 114, at 1533. 
358 E.g., Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39 & 40/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 134 (Feb. 27, 2003) 
(imposing only eleven years imprisonment on a high-ranking leader indicted for genocide and convicted of crimes 
against humanity).  For a critical analysis of undue leniency in sentencing by the ICTY, see Shahram Dana, A 
Turning Point in International Criminal Justice, in 11 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 962, 962 (André Klip & Göran Sluiter eds., 2007); see also Milanka Saponja-Hadzic, 
Hague Deals Reduce Impact, INST. FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING, July 24, 2003, 
http://www.iwpr.net/?p=tri&s=f&o=164725&apc_state=henitri2003 (noting local reactions). 
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is simply unsustainable and can no longer be accepted as a tacit reason for not advancing 
international sentencing law. 
ii. The Problem of Ambiguous Criteria 
The ICC Statute contains two dangerously ambiguous criteria for determining a sentence: 
“gravity of the crime” and “extreme.”  They strongly resemble the language of general 
guidelines or “benchmarks” in standard setting international treaties; yet they are not 
functionally intended as such.  They carry a much weightier role within the ICC sentencing 
framework.  The Statute has elevated these benchmark provisos to the level of legal criteria.  
The question thus arises whether “gravity of the crime” and “extreme” qualify as legal criteria 
and whether they can adequately satisfy nulla poena sine lege.359 
Reliance on the phrase “gravity of the crime” to generate a fair and consistent sentencing 
practice is beset with many difficulties.360  First, the Statute does not rank the gravity of crimes 
within its jurisdiction and contains no gradation among the crimes.  Second, the phrase is not 
defined anywhere in the Statute. Third, the phrase is open to varying interpretations, each being 
legally tenable but leading to different outcomes, and thus resulting in inconsistent sentences. 
The ICC forum is particularly vulnerable to this danger because its judges are drawn from 
diverse legal, political, philosophical, and cultural backgrounds.  From case to case, accused to 
accused, the composition of judges will change dramatically and randomly.  Fourth, despite 
hopes to the contrary,361 the sentencing jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR is not sufficiently 
developed or coherent to provide meaningful, consistent guidance on interpretation and 
																																																								
359 Curiously, these criteria were challenged as being contrary to nulla poena sine lege more than fifty years 
ago, when a 1951 proposal of the International Law Commission for the Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace 
and Security of Mankind employed similar criteria (“gravity of the offense”) for the determination of penalties.  
See Schabas, Perverse Effects, supra note 114, at 523-24. 
   360  See Margaret M. DeGuzman, Harsh Justice for International Crimes, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 17-24 (2014). 
361 See Jennings, supra note 337, at 1436 (asserting that “[t]he sentencing jurisprudence of the ICTY and the 
ICTR will provide the Court with useful guidance on the comparative gravity of the crimes” (emphasis added)).  
Regrettably, his reliance on a brief quote from one ICTR case (Kambanda) is insufficient for such a grand 
assertion.  In broad strokes, the Kambanda case merely states that crimes listed under the category of war crimes 
are not as serious as those under the heading of genocide and crimes against humanity.  Even judges at the ICTR 
consider this inadequate to provide meaningful guidance.  See Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, 
Judgment & Sentence, para. 812 (Feb. 25, 2004) (expressing concern “that the practice of awarding a single 
sentence for the totality of an accused’s conduct makes it difficult to determine the range of sentences for each 
specific crime”).  Moreover, his analysis does not consider case law from the ICTY to support his assertion.  In 
fact, ICTY jurisprudence rejects the hierarchy set out in Kambanda, and thus, far from providing any such “useful 
guidance,” there exists some inconsistency between the ICTY and ICTR rulings.  Other commentators on this 
issue have strong reservations as to whether the case law of the ad hoc tribunals will provide any substantial utility 
on sentencing matters for the ICC.  See Danner, supra note 356, at 501; Pickard, supra note 21, at 137; see, e.g., 
Dirk van Zyl Smit, International Imprisonment, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 357, 367 (2005). 
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application of this concept.362  A major culprit here is the “single” or “global sentencing” 
practice of the ad hoc tribunals in case of multiple convictions which has inhibited the 
maturation of sentencing norms in international criminal justice.363 
The problem of ambiguity also arises in the method of distinguishing between the 
application of life imprisonment sentences and sentences for a fixed period of time not to 
exceed thirty years.  The inclusion of this separation may be viewed as an improvement upon 
the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals which contained no limitation on sentences for a term of 
years.  However, what was gained in terms of legal certainty by the inclusion of a maximum 
for non-life sentences was largely taken away by the statutory criteria for making the 
distinction.  The Statute informs us that the difference between life imprisonment and thirty 
years lies somewhere between “extreme gravity of the crime” and “gravity of the crime.”  The 
notion of “extreme” is an insufficient criterion; it is vague and general at best, and superfluous 
at worst, given that the ICC is intended to deal with the “most serious” crimes in the first 
place.364  Paradoxically, with its optional approach to maximum penalties combined with 
ambiguous criteria for selection, the ICC sentencing structure arguably results in less legal 
certainty.  Furthermore, an accused, who is contemplating pleading guilty to a charge, has no 
legal certainty as to which of the alternative maximum penalties will be applied.  Additionally, 
the challenge of applying these criteria to make necessary distinctions at sentencing is further 
aggravated by the constant rhetoric that the ICC was created to deal with only the most serious 
and gravest of crimes.  This over-inflation comes at the cost of meaningful analysis.  While the 
ICC is intended to deal with only serious crimes committed in grave contexts, all crimes within 
its jurisdiction are not of equal gravity. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
One of the most fundamental rights of an individual is the right to liberty.  Therefore, any 
institution vested with power to deprive persons of their liberty must exercise that power in 
accordance with basic human rights and fundamental principles of criminal law.  Nulla poena 
sine lege is among the chief guardians of this right.   
																																																								
 362 See generally Jens David Ohlin, Towards a Unique Theory of International Criminal Sentencing, in 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: TOWARDS A COHERENT BODY OF LAW 373 – 404 (Göran Sluiter & 
Sergey Vasiliev eds. 2009). 
363 Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, Judgment & Sentence, para. 812 (expressing concern “that the practice 
of awarding a single sentence for the totality of an accused’s conduct makes it difficult to determine the range of 
sentences for each specific crime”). 
364 See ICC Statute, supra note 13, pmbl.  At least one commentator points out that “[t]he curious reference to 
‘extreme gravity of the crime’ may seem out of place, since the Court is designed to try nothing but crimes of 
extreme gravity.”  SCHABAS, supra note 82, at 141. 
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The penalty provisions of the IMT, IMTFE, ICTY, and ICTR attracted criticism in legal 
commentaries for not meeting the requirements of nulla poena sine lege.365  While the 
sentencing practice of modern international tribunals can hardly be characterized as an “abuse 
of power,” the absence of a more complete approach to nulla poena, by both judges and drafters 
of statutes, has harmed the quality of justice rendered by them.366 The sentencing practice gives 
the appearance of an inconsistent body of law, or at least a jurisprudence that provides little 
guidance to the ICC.  Too often, sentences imposed from case to case appear irreconcilable. 
Examining nulla poena sine lege through its underlying legal principles aids our 
understanding of its role and potential contribution to international justice.  The general picture 
that emerges after examining treaties, custom, and general principles of law is that lex scripta, 
lex certa, lex stricta, and lex praevia are part of the international standard for nulla poena sine 
lege. While lex praevia has been explicitly codified in numerous international and regional 
human rights treaties, international courts have held that these provisions represent a nulla 
poena sine lege standard that embodies more than a prohibition of retroactive application of a 
heavier penalty, but also includes the prohibition of analogy in selecting a penalty, the 
requirements of legal certainty, and the obligation to clearly define penalties.367  Furthermore, 
all four legal principles underlying nulla poena sine lege constitute general principles of law 
recognized in the vast majority of world’s legal traditions.368  State practice, in the context of 
their domestic legal systems, evidences strong adherence to these principles.  Moreover, the 
views expressed by states in international forums indicate that these principles also apply to 
international criminal justice. 
Adherence to nulla poena sine lege can serve to achieve the aim of consistency in 
sentencing.  It can also remove, or significantly limit, the influence of arbitrary factors in the 
determination of a penalty.  While the administration of criminal justice has made great 
advances over the past half century, the problem of emotive influences on punishment remains 
even today, both domestically and internationally.369 
																																																								
365 See BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 15, at 689 (claiming that the imprecision of the penalty provisions 
of the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals violates nulla poena sine lege); Fife, supra note 302, at 987-88; Scalia, 
Long-term Sentences in ICL, supra note 170; cf. Schabas, supra note 74, at 469. 
366 Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
683 (2007) (expressing concern regarding low sentences by the ICTY and the systematic inconsistency and 
discrepancy when compared to the length of sentences at the ICTR). 
367 See supra Parts III.A and III.C-D; see also Danzig Decrees, supra note 138; Başkaya v. Turkey, App. Nos. 
23536/94 & 24408/94, Judgment, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 10, para. 36 (1999). 
368 GALLANT, supra note 53, at 243-46; Bassiouni Study, supra note 84. 
 369 The abusive practices that appear to be on the rise in the name of “fighting against terrorism” remind us of 
the dangers of unchecked powers.  In the context of international criminal prosecutions, emotive influences may 
be suspected in the sentencing of Duško Tadić.  See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Sentencing 
Judgment (July 14, 1997).  Although a relatively minor figure according to the Trial Chamber’s own assessment, 
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The time is ripe for international justice to grow out of its adolescence and develop into a 
mature legal system.370  There are positive signs of movement in this direction.  For example, 
the ICC Statute requires the court to first pronounce a sentence for each crime individually 
before rendering an overall sentence in the case of multiple conventions.  This hopefully puts 
a stop to the practice of single sentencing which has inhibited the maturation of international 
sentencing norms.  Likewise, despite the fact that the ICTY and ICTR freely employed the use 
of analogy in their sentencing practice, lex stricta still received positive recognition in 
international law through the Rome Treaty of the ICC. Additionally, early jurisprudence of the 
ICC indicates greater appreciation for the positive justice role of nulla poena.  Notably, the 
ICC recognized that nulla poena in ICL includes the lex certa requirement.371 Furthermore, the 
ICC’s brief mention of the role of nulla poena in atrocity sentencing appear to prioritize the 
principle of legality over the principle of proportionality.372 That is, even if the principle of 
proportionality demands a severe punishment, such a sentence cannot be imposed if it violates 
nulla poena. This is a notably different tone and attitude towards nulla poena then typically 
shown by ICL judges.    
Thus, there are general signs of increasing appreciation that nulla poena sine lege is not 
only a principle associated with negative rights but can also contribute greatly to positive 
justice in punishing atrocities. These developments further bolster the view that the ad hoc 
tribunals’ approach on these matters was not in keeping with the international standard for 
nulla poena sine lege.373 Too often, ICL judges prioritized the way the Nuremberg Tribunal 
did things as a precedent and guide for their rulings, an approach that often ignored or 
marginalized substantial developments in both criminal law and human rights law since the 
Nuremberg trials. As Gallant’s research demonstrates, the Nuremberg position on legality, 
even if good law then, is no longer the law now.374 
																																																								
Tadić had the misfortune of being the first defendant to arrive at the ICTY.  While not suggesting that his twenty-
year sentence was unjust per se, it was harsher treatment than that imposed on others with similar criminal 
culpability who came later and perhaps even more severe than the sentences imposed on other war criminals with 
more blood on their hands. 
370 To achieve this would naturally require progress on other fronts besides international sentencing, for 
example, on matters pertaining to enforcement and police powers.  In the context of international prosecutions, it 
would mean loosening its dependence on state authorities for the execution of basic police powers such as 
investigations, arrests of suspects, and seizure of evidence and assets. 
      371 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-
01/07 (23 May 2014) para. 39. 
      372  Id. 
      373 See also, Silvia D’Ascole, Sentencing in International Criminal Law: The Approach of the Two UN ad 
hoc Tribunals and Future Perspectives for the International Criminal Court, Ph.D. dissertation, European 
University Institute, p. 361 (finding that the law of the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC falls short on respecting nulla 
poena sine lege). 
 374 GALLANT, supra note 53, at 404-406. 
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Although the ICC sentencing provisions mark an improvement over their counterparts in 
the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals to the extent that the ICC Statute contains a clear ceiling on 
sentences for a term of years, the ICC provisions nevertheless continue to carry the 
fundamental weaknesses of the earlier statutes—generality and ambiguity—into the most 
recent code for international criminal justice.  They do not provide penalty ranges or 
maximums for particular crimes or categories of crimes.  This framework falls short of the 
standard present in the laws of most nations that there be a penalty range or clear maximum 
penalty attached to each crime. 
Another weakness of the ICC sentencing provisions is that they rely on ambiguous criteria.  
Sentencing frameworks that rely almost entirely on such criteria without providing penalty 
ranges for separate crimes must be seen as relics of a nascent period in international war crimes 
prosecutions. Reliance on ambiguous and elastic criteria coupled with a lack of penalty ranges 
for individual crimes is an invitation to sentencing chaos and the appearance of injustice. In 
the ICC sentencing provisions, particular concern surrounds the consistent application of life 
imprisonment.  The qualification of “extreme gravity of the crime” is too elastic to satisfy the 
lex certa requirement of nulla poena, especially given the severity of the sanction. 
The enforcement of penalties has been briefly touched upon but, for reasons set out in 
Chapter One (Introduction), a detailed discussion of it is beyond the scope of this study.  Given 
that the ICC and other international criminal tribunals lack their own permanent penitentiary 
systems, an issue worthy of further exploration is the role and relevance of nulla poena sine 
lege to the execution of penalties issued by international criminal courts.  Here again, the nature 
of the discussion will differ depending on whether the analysis is focused only on the negative 
rights dimension of nulla poena sine lege or whether its positive justice role is also 
considered.375 
It is in light of its positive justice role that nulla poena sine lege has much to contribute to 
legitimacy and justice in punishing atrocity perpetrators. What little consideration 
commentators have given to nulla poena has focused on its traditional role, namely its negative 
rights dimension, and in particular on the issue of retroactivity.  If the discussion is to continue 
to be limited to this perspective, then indeed all the fuss over nulla poena is “difficult to 
																																																								
375 For ICC provisions governing enforcement of sentences, see ICC Statute, supra note 13, arts. 103-10. In 
light of the fact that diverse states will carry out the execution of the sentences and that the conditions of 
imprisonment shall be governed by the law of the enforcing state, the ICC and the judges will need to exercise 
oversight to ensure equal treatment of convicted persons when it comes to conditions of detention, parole, or 
pardon. 
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understand” as William Schabas puts it.376  On the other hand, if we broaden our understanding 
of nulla poena to embrace its positive justice function, such as ensuring equality before the 
law, consistency in sentencing, and justice in the distribution of punishment for mass atrocities, 
then we might realize it still has much to offer to international criminal justice. Reimagining 
the role of nulla poena in punishing atrocities opens one of the potential pathways to improving 
ICL sentencing practice.  Another pathway to improving atrocity sentencing lies in reflection 
on ideologies and rationales that in practice have impacting the quantum of punishment.  These 





376 See Schabas, supra note 74. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
IDEOLOGIES & SENTENCING RATIONALES  











punishment	 versus	 the	 aims	 of	 punishment.	 Canvassing	 the	 discourse	 surrounding	
international	 criminal	 courts,	 the	 following	 ambitions	 are	 often	 associated	 with	
international	 criminal	 justice:	 retribution,	 deterrence,	 reconciliation,	 rehabilitation,	
incapacitation,	reparations	to	victims,	general	affirmative	prevention,	expressive	and/or	
didactic	functions,	historical	recording	building	and	preventing	revisionism,	denouncing	
racism,	 religious	 persecution,	 and	 other	 discriminatory	 ideologies,	 restoration,	
crystallizing	international	norms,	public	stigmatization	by	the	international	community,	
establishing	peace,	preventing	war,	disarming	urges	for	revenge,	establishing	a	narrative	
the	 culpability	 is	 individual	 not	 collective,	 vindicating	 international	 law	 prohibitions,	
setting	standards	for	fair	trials,	and	ending	impunity.1		
																																																								
 1 See e.g. Mark Drumbl, Punishment and Sentencing in: THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 93-95 (William Schabas ed., 2016); Margaret M. DeGuzman, Harsh Justice for 
International Crimes, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2014); KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 
VOL. I: FOUNDATIONS AND GENERAL PART 67-73 (2013). WILLIAM SCHABAS, UNIMAGINABLE ATROCITIES: 
JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS AT THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 96 (2012); MARK A. DRUMBL, REIMAGINING 
CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 151 (2012); Ruti Teitel, Symposium: Milošević & Hussein 
on Trial: Perspective on Transnational Justice: Collective Memory, Command Responsibility, and the Political 
Psychology of Leadership: The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 
837, 857 (2005); Jan Nemitz, The Law of Sentencing in International Criminal Law: The Purposes of Sentencing 
and the Applicable Method for the Determination of the Sentence, 4 Y.B. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 87 (2001); 
GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 284 (2000); 
Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 683, 
694-96 (2007); Jonathan A. Bush, Nuremberg: The Modern Law of War and Its Limitations, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 
2070 (1993) (reviewing TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR 
(1992)); Turner, Legal Ethics, supra note 18; Minna Schrag, Lessons Learned from the ICTY Experience, 2 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 427, 428 (2004); Jean Galbraith, The Pace of International Criminal Justice, 31 MICH. J. INT’L 
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Some	of	 these	 functions	mirror	 justifications	and	aims	of	punishment	 found	 in	














L. 79 (2009); Ruti Teitel, The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, 38 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 
837, 857 (2005); Richard A. Wilson, Judging History: The Historical Record of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 27 HUMAN RTS. Q. 908, 908 (2005); Ralph Henham, The Philosophical 
Foundations of International Sentencing, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 64 (2004); Martti Koskenniemi, Between 
Impunity and Show Trials, 6 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UN L. 4 (2002); Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International 
Criminal Law, supra note 20, at 926, 994; Andrew N. Keller, Punishment for Violations of International Criminal 
Law: An Analysis of Sentencing at the ICTY and ICTR, 12 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 53 (2001). 
2 Prosecutor v. Rutaganira, Case No. ICTR-95-1C-T, Judgment, paras. 108-09 (Mar. 14, 2005); 
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgement and Sentence, para. 28 (Sept. 4, 1998). See also 
Pascale Chifflet & Gideon Boas, Sentencing Coherence in International Criminal Law: The Cases of Biljana 
Plavšić and Miroslav Bralo, 23 CRIM. L. F. 135 (2012) Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience 
of Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1313 (2000). See 
Damaska, What is the Point, supra note 40.  
3 Janine Natalya Clark, The Limits of Retributive Justice: Findings of an Empirical Study in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 463, 474-75 (2009). 
4 See further, Prosecutor v. Obrenovic, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 111 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 2003) (finding that “restoring peace,” “establishing a historical 
record,” “countering denials,” and providing victims with “some form of closure” are part of the mandate of 
international criminal tribunals); Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at para. 233 
(Tribunal has the task to contribute to the “restoration and maintenance of peace” and to ensure that serious 
violations of international humanitarian law are “halted and effectively redressed”). 
5 This is especially true when judges rely too much on reconciliation ideology to justify their rulings. See 
Valery Perry, A Survey of Reconciliation Processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Gap Between People and 
Politics, in RECONCILIATION(S): TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES 207, 208 (Joanna R. Quinn 
ed., 2009) (stating that “‘[r]econciliation’ is a word rarely mentioned in good faith in political discourse.”). See 
also Statements on the Rome Conference Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, 105th 
Congress (July 23, 1998) (statements of David J. Scheffer, Ambassador at Large, War Crimes Issues, Head of 
U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal 
Court), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ 
USScheffer_Senate23July98.pdf; Silvia A. Fernandez de Gurmendi, The Role of the International Prosecutor, in 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 175, 181 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999). 
See generally Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice Without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the 
International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 583 (2007). 
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Given	 that	 ICL	 jurisprudence	 presents	 a	 mixture	 of	 sentencing	 rationales	 that	
include	 anything	 from	 traditional	 criminal	 law	 theories	 to	 international	 diplomatic	
objectives	 and	 policy	 goals,	 conflict	 among	 these	 ideologies	 is	 inevitable.6	 Critics	 of	
international	criminal	courts	have	seized	upon	these	incurable	conflicts	to	challenge	the	











do	 international	 judges	 purport	 to	 be	 the	 purpose	 of	 sentencing	 in	 international	
prosecutions?	 	 Can	we	 identify	 trends	or	 shifts	 in	 judicial	narratives	 surrounding	 the	
purpose	 of	 ICL?	 Part	 3	 examines	 more	 closely	 the	 influence	 of	 deterrence	 and	
reconciliation.	 	 Do	 these	 consequentialist	 ideologies	 result	 in	 distorted	 outcomes	 in	
punishment?	A	distortion	of	the	sentence	may	be	observed	in	different	ways:	the	legal	
principles	applied	may	not	be	 in	 line	with	ICL	sentencing	 jurisprudence	generally;	 the	
sentencing	 outcome	 may	 not	 measure	 up	 to	 the	 judicial	 narrative	 concerning	 the	
perpetrator’s	 culpability;	 and/or	 the	 sentence	 itself	 may	 constitute	 an	 outlier	 when	
compared	to	sentences	in	other	cases	of	similar	crimes.		Part	4	offers	original	normative	




6 Chifflet & Boas, Sentencing Coherence in ICL (2012), supra note 2 at 139 (describing the conflicting 
proffered rationales as “a patchwork of sentencing principles”). 
7 Referring to the ICTR and the ICTY, which were established by U.N. Security Council Resolutions 
955 and 827, respectively. See S.C. Res. 955, para. 1, 49th Year, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); S.C. Res. 
827, para. 2, 48th Year, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).  
 104 
II.   SENTENCING OBJECTIVES ADVANCED BY  
    INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 
	
A. DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK: PAUCITY OF POSITIVE LAW 
Fifty	 years	 after	 the	 International	Military	 Tribunal	 for	 the	 Far	 East,	 sitting	 in	
Tokyo,	punished	military	and	political	leaders	of	the	Empire	of	Japan,	three	judges	from	
France,	Costa	Rica,	and	Egypt	gathered	 in	The	Hague	to	 issue	the	 first	sentence	by	an	













International	 Tribunals	 has	 been	 to	 turn	 to	 these	 provisions	 in	 their	 respective	
constitutive	 Resolutions	 to	 formulate	 objectives	 for	 international	 sentencing.10	 This	
methodology	 assumes	 that	 the	 conditions	 required	 to	 trigger	 the	 Security	 Council’s	
powers	 under	 Chapter	 VII	 of	 the	 U.N.	 Charter	 would	 suffice	 for	 developing	 the	
																																																								
8 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgement, para. 57 (Nov. 29, 1996). See 
also Uwe Ewald, “Predictably Irrational” – International Sentencing and its Discourse against the Backdrop of 
Preliminary Empirical Findings on ICTY Sentencing Practices, 10 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 365, 379 (2010) (“The 
rather thin normative framework provided by the sentencing provisions of the Statute and Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence of the ICTY does not offer a consistent philosophical approach to international sentencing.”). 
9 While there is a natural overlap between the justification for international prosecutions and the object 
and purpose of international sentencing, they cannot be assumed to be identical. See H. L. A. HART, Prolegomenon 
to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 1 (2d ed. 2008). See also Margaret M. 
DeGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the International Criminal Court, 33 MICH. J. INT'L 
L. 265, 288-89 (2012) (making a distinction between justifications for the establishment of the International 
Criminal Court and rationales to guide case selection). 
10 E.g. Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 38, at paras. 753-54; Prosecutor v. 
Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-T, Judgment and Sentence, para. 588 (28 April 2005), 
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justification	 and	purpose	of	 punishment	 of	 atrocity	 crimes.11	 It	 also	 assumes	 that	 the	
reasons	supporting	the	creation	of	international	criminal	justice	mechanisms	are	one	and	
the	 same	 as	 the	 rationales	 to	 guide	 its	 sentencing	 practice.	 In	 connection	 with	
establishing	the	ICTY,	Security	Council	Resolution	808	states:	
Determined to put an end to such crimes and to take effective measures to bring 
to justice the persons who are responsible for them, 
Convinced that in the particular circumstances of the former Yugoslavia the 
establishment of an international tribunal would enable this aim to be achieved 
and would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace.12 
	
Likewise,	Security	Council	Resolution	955,	establishing	the	ICTR,	states:		
Determined to put an end to such crimes and to take effective measures to bring 
to justice the persons who are responsible for them, 
Convinced that in the particular circumstances of Rwanda, the prosecution of 
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
would enable this aim to be achieved and would contribute to the process of 




bring	 to	 justice”	 the	perpetrators.	Furthermore,	 the	Resolutions	proclaim	 the	Security	
Council’s	 conviction	 that	 international	 prosecutions	 “would	 enable	 this	 aim	 to	 be	
achieved.”	 Presumably,	 “this	 aim”	 refers	 to	 what	 was	 mentioned	 in	 the	 previous	
paragraph:	 “to	 put	 an	 end	 to	 such	 crimes”	 and	 “to	 bring	 to	 justice	 the	 persons”	





goals	 of	 reconciliation	 could	 also	 be	 squared	 with	 the	 text	 of	 their	 constitutive	
resolutions.	 	 The	 Security	 Council	 resolutions	 contained	 standard	 language	 used	 to	
																																																								
11  Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 38, at paras. 753-54. 
12 S.C. Res. 808, 48th Year, S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993). See also S.C. Res. 827, supra note 34.  
13 S.C. Res. 955, supra note 34, at paras. 1-2. 
14 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Sentencing Judgment, at paras. 7-9 (stating that “retribution and 
deterrence serving as the primary purposes of sentence”); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, 











There	 exists,	 however,	 an	 important	 difference	 between	 Resolution	 827	
establishing	 the	 ICTY	 and	Resolution	955	 establishing	 the	 ICTR.	 	The	 former	 is	 silent	
regarding	reconciliation,	while	the	latter	explicitly	mentions	“national	reconciliation”	as	




resolutions.	For	example,	 Judge	Inés	Monica	Weinberg	de	Roca	refers	 to	 the	“identical	
formulation”	of	resolutions	establishing	the	ad	hoc	Tribunals.18			
	Regarding	the	Special	Court	 for	Sierra	Loene,	 the	preamble	of	Security	Council	
Resolution	 1315	 also	 explicitly	 mentions	 “national	 reconciliation”	 and	 provides	
important	context.		It	“recogniz[es]	that	.	.	.	a	credible	system	of	justice	and	accountability	
.	 .	 .	 would	 contribute	 to	 the	 process	 of	 national	 reconciliation.”19	 	 Thus,	 if	 preamble	
provisions	are	to	be	our	guide,	the	argument	for	incorporating	reconciliation	goals	as	a	
sentencing	rationale	has	textual	support	in	the	context	of	the	ICTR	and	the	SCSL,	but	not	
so	 for	 the	ICTY.	 	This	may	be	explained	by	considering	that	Rwanda	and	Sierra	Leone	
remained	territorially	intact	and	whole	after	the	civil	war,	but	Yugoslavia	fractured	into	
multiple	 independent	states.	 	Even	within	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina	(arguably	the	most	
ethnically	diverse	among	the	entities	of	 the	 former	Yugoslavia),	 the	country	 is	divided	
																																																								
15 S.C. Res. 827, supra note 34. 
16 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43, at para. 58; Prosecutor v. 
Plavšić, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 36, at para. 79.  
17 S.C. Res. 955, supra note 34, at paras. 1-2. 
18 See Inés Monica Weinberg de Roca & Christopher M. Rassi, Sentencing and Incarceration in the Ad 
Hoc Tribunals, 44 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (2008). 
19 Security Council, S/RES/1315 (2000), 14 August 2000; Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-
01-T, Sentencing Judgment para. 12 (30 May 2012). 
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between	 two	 distinct	 constitutional	 and	 legal	 entities:	 the	 Federation	 of	 Bosnia	 and	
Herzegovina	and	Republika	Srpska,	the	latter	consisting	almost	entirely	of	Serbs.		
A	 notable	 departure	 from	 conceiving	 penological	 rationales	 and	 ideologies	 in	
preambular	 provisions	 is	 the	 ICC’s	 first	 sentencing	 judgment.20	 The	 Lubanga	 Trial	
Chamber	made	no	 reference	or	mention	of	 retribution,	deterrence	or	 reconciliation.21		
The	 judges	 recalled	 similar	 preamble	 provisions,	 but	 declined	 to	 box	 the	 goals	 of	
international	sentencing	 into	the	taxonomy	of	national	criminal	law	penology.	 	 	 In	 the	
ICC’s	 second	 sentencing	 judgment,	 a	 different	 panel	 of	 three	 judges	 conceived	 the	
Preamble	provisions	as	advancing	the	goal	of	deterrence.22		The	Katanga	Trial	Chamber	
also	stated	that	“the	role	of	the	sentence	is	two-fold:	…	punishment	…	and	…	deterrence.”23	
While	 there	 is	 no	 explicit	 reference	 to	 retribution,	 the	 judges	 discuss	 the	 role	 of	
“punishment”	 in	 the	same	 language	that	other	ICC	 judges	conceive	retribution:	as	“the	
expression	 of	 society’s	 condemnation	 of	 the	 criminal	 act	 and	 of	 the	 person	 who	
committed	it.”24	
A	 third	 and	 fourth	 panel	 of	 ICC	 judges,	 in	 the	 Bemba	 and	 Al-Mahdi	 cases,	






Thus,	 twelve	 ICC	 judges	 examining	 the	 same	 Preamble	 text	 reached	 varying	
understandings	of	the	role	of	punishment	for	international	crimes.		Trial	Chamber	I	made	
																																																								
20 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2901, Decision on Sentence 
pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, paras. 92-99 (July 10, 2012).  For an analysis of the trial see Kai Ambos, The 
First Judgment of the International Criminal court (Prosecutor v. Lubanga): A Comprehensive Analysis of the 
Legal Issues, 12 Int’l Cr. L. Rev. 115, 138-39 (2012); Diane Marie Amann, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, 106 Am. J. 
Int’l L. 809, 812 (2012). 
21 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2901, Decision on Sentence 
pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute (July 10, 2012). 
22 Prosecutor v. Katanga, Decision on Sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/07, 
(23 May 2014) at para. 37 [hereafter Katanga Trial Sentence]. 
23 Id. at para. 38 (emphasis added). 
24 Id. 
25 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on Sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute, 
ICC-01/05-01/08, (21 June 2016) para. 10; Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ICC-01/12-01/15 
(27 September 2016), para 67. 
26 Preamble, ICC Statute. 
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no	mention	of	retribution,	deterrence,	or	any	other	ideological	rationale;27	Trial	Chamber	
II	 identified	 deterrence	 applying	 a	 textual	 interpretation	 of	 the	 Preamble,	 but	 also	
employed	a	teleological	interpretive	methodology	to	incorporate	expressivism	into	the	




when	 deciding	 the	 fair	 and	 appropriate	 quantum	 of	 punishment.30	 These	 judgments	
suggest	that	ICC	judges	follow	divergent	schools	of	thought	when	it	comes	to	considering	
what	 ideologies	 should	 appropriately	 influence	 the	 sentence,	 even	 though	 they	 are	
reaching	their	positions	by	examining	the	same	text.			
The	Special	Court	for	Sierra	Leone	(SCLS)	primarily	turns	to	sentencing	rationales	
from	 domestic	 law,	 rather	 than	 international	 policy	 goals,	 to	 identify	 appropriate	
sentencing	 goals.31	 	 SCSL	 consistently	 identified	 retribution	 and	 deterrence	 as	 the	
primary	goals	of	ICL	punishment.32		The	SCSL	judges	also	recognized	that	judges	at	other	
international	 criminal	 tribunals	 (ICTs)	 have	 accepted	 other	 objectives,	 such	 as	
reconciliation,	 historical	 recording	 building,	 stigmatization,	 and	 international	 norm	
building,	 but	 they	 did	 not	 hold	 those	 objectives	 as	 relevant	 considerations	 for	
determining	the	quantum	of	punishment	appropriate	for	atrocity	crimes.33			
In	 sum,	 when	 the	 international	 community	 resuscitated	 international	
prosecutions	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 mass	 atrocity	 in	 the	 1990s,	 international	 judges	 were	
working	 on	 a	 blank	 canvass	 with	 wide	 discretion	 to	 formulate	 the	 ideology	 behind	
international	 punishment	 and	 its	 justifications,	 purposes,	 aims,	 and	 objectives.	 	 They	
would	 frequently	 invoke	 the	preamble	of	 their	 constitutive	 legal	 instrument	 to	 justify	
advancing	particular	penological	or	ideological	goals.		They	embraced	punitive	criminal	
																																																								
27 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2901, Decision on Sentence 
pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute (July 10, 2012). 
28 Katanga Trial Sentence at para. 38. 
29 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on Sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute, 
ICC-01/05-01/08, (21 June 2016) para. 10; Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ICC-01/12-01/15 
(27 September 2016), para 67. 
30 Prosecutor v. Katanga, Decision on Sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/07, 
(23 May 2014); Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ICC-01/12-01/15 (27 September 2016). 
31 Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Sentencing Judgment para. 12 (April 8, 2009). 
32 E.g., CDF Appeal Judgment para. 532; Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Sentencing 
Judgment para. 13 (30 May 2012); RUF Trial Sentencing para. 13; CDF Trial Sentencing para. 26; AFRC Trial 
Sentencing para. 15. 









judges	 did	 not	 consider	 themselves	 limited	 to	 these	 rationales.	 They	 exercised	 wide	
discretion	 to	 reach	 beyond	 these	 two	 primary	 purposes	 to	 justify	 their	 sentencing	
outcomes.		For	example,	the	Blaškić	Trial	Chamber	added	rehabilitation	and	protection	of	
society	to	the	primary	purposes	of	ICL	sentencing,	but	it	did	so	without	explanation	or	
analysis.35	 These	 “four	 parameters”	 –	 retribution,	 deterrence,	 rehabilitation,	 and	
protection	 of	 society	 –	 mirror	 sentencing	 rationales	 found	 at	 the	 national	 level.36	




be	 a	 safeguard	 for	 a	 nascent	 international	 justice	 system.	 Broad	 and	 ambitious	 social	
engineering	 in	 the	wake	of	mass	atrocities	 is	wisely	 left	 to	other	social	processes	and	
institutions.	 As	 the	 sentencing	 jurisprudence	 developed	 among	 the	 country	 specific	
																																																								
34 See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 35, at paras. 7-9 (stating that “retribution 
and deterrence serving as the primary purposes of sentence”); Prosecutor v. Furundžija, supra note 38, at para. 
288; Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment and Sentence, para. 455 (Dec. 6, 1999); and 
Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S, Sentence, para. 20 (Feb. 5, 1999). 
35 See Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, para. 761 (Mar. 3, 2000). 
36 Id. 
37 See, e.g. David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of 
International Criminal Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 569, 575-77 (Samantha Besson & John 
Tasioulas eds., 2010); DeGuzman Choosing to Prosecute (2012) supra note 9, at 301-12; Damaska, What is the 
Point, supra note 40, at 339-40; MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 149 
(2007); Robert Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the National Law 
Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43 Stanford J. Int’l L. 39, 50-51 (2007); Diane Marie 
Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, 2 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 93, 116 (2002); Nemitz, The Law 
of Sentencing in International Criminal Law, supra note 25. 
38 See e.g. Andrew Woods, Moral Judgments & International Crimes: The Disutility of Desert, 52 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 633, 654-656 (2012). 
39 See, e.g., Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 610. 
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international	 tribunals,	 the	 law	 of	 atrocity	 sentencing	 settled	 on	 retribution	 and	
deterrence	as	the	primary	rationales	of	ICL	punishment.40		
However,	as	analyzed	in	detail	above,	the	ICC’s	initial	sentencing	judgments	were	
less	 unequivocal	 about	 the	 role	 of	 retribution	 and	 deterrence	 in	 ICL	 sentencing.	 In	 a	
curious	 development,	 the	 first	 ICC	 sentencing	 judgment	 did	 not	 mention	 either	
retribution	or	deterrence,	departing	from	the	established	practice	of	earlier	tribunals.41	
In	 the	 ICC’s	 second	 sentencing	 judgment,	 judges	 mentioned	 deterrence,	 but	 not	
retribution,	as	the	goal	of	atrocity	sentencing.42	The	two	subsequent	ICC	trial	sentencing	
judgments	 considered	 both	 retribution	 and	 deterrence	 as	 appropriate	 purposes	 of	
punishment	 for	 atrocity	 trials,	 returning	 to	 the	 approach	 of	 the	 approach	 of	 earlier	
tribunals.43	
Overall,	 ICL	 sentencing	 jurisprudence	 is	 remarkably	 enthusiastic	 about	 the	
deterrent	capacity	of	international	criminal	courts.44	So	too	is	the	ICC,	with	all	but	one	of	
																																																								
40 See Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Judgment, IT-95-5/18 (24 March 2016) at para. 6025; Prosecutor v. Taylor, 
Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Sentencing Judgment para. 13 (30 May 2012); CDF Appeal Judgment para. 532; RUF 
Trial Sentencing para. 13; Kambanda Trial Judgement, para. 28; Rutaganda Trial Judgement, para. 456; 
Prosecutor v. Popović, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Trial Judgment, para. 2128 (June 10, 2010); Prosecutor v. Marques 
et al., 09/2000, East Timor Serious Crimes Special Panel (11 December 2001), at para. 979; ECCC, Kaing Appeal 
Judgment, para. 380; Prosecutor v. Lukić, Case No. IT-05-87 Trial Judgment, para. 1049 (July 20, 2009); 
Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Trial Judgement, para. 1144 (Feb. 26, 2009); Prosecutor v. 
Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Trial Judgment Vol. 3, paras. 1144-45 (Feb. 26, 2009); Prosecutor v Delić, 
Case No 1T-04-83-T, Trial Judgment, para. 559 (Sept. 15, 2008); Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No IT-98-29/1-
T, Trial Judgment, para. 987 (Dec. 12, 2007); Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. 95-11-T, Trial Judgment, para. 484 
(June 12, 2007); Prosecutor v Zelenović, Case No IT-96-23/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 31 (Apr. 4, 2007); 
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No IT-00-39&40-T, Trial Judgment, para. 1134 (Sept. 27, 2006); Prosecutor v. Orić, 
Case No 1T-03-68-T, Trial Judgment, para. 718 (June 30, 2006); Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No 1T-03-66-T, Trial 
Judgment, para. 723 (Nov. 30, 2005); Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No IT-01-42-T, Trial Judgment, para. 458 (Jan. 
31, 2005); Prosecutor v Blagojević, Case No IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgment, para. 817 (Jan. 17, 2005); Prosecutor 
v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Judgment, paras. 900-02 (July 31, 2003); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. 
IT-96-23-T Trial Judgment, para. 838 (Feb. 22, 2001); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No IT-95-14-T, Trial 
Judgment, para. 762 (Mar. 3, 2000); Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No IT-94-1-Tbis-R117, Sentencing Judgment, 
paras. 7-9 (Nov. 11, 1999); Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Judgment, para. 402 (Mar. 22, 
2006); Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Judgement, para. 806 (Feb. 20, 2001); Prosecutor v. 
Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeal Judgment, para. 185 (Mar. 24, 2000). 
41 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, Case 
No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2901, (July 10, 2012). For an excellent analysis of this trial see Kai Ambos, The First 
Judgment of the International Criminal court (Prosecutor v. Lubanga): A Comprehensive Analysis of the Legal 
Issues, 12 INT’L CR. L. REV. 115, 138-39 (2012); Diane Marie Amann, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, 106 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 809, 812 (2012). 
42 Katanga Trial Sentence at para. 38. 
43 Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ICC-01/12-01/15 (27 September 2016), para 67; 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on Sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute, ICC-01/05-
01/08, (21 June 2016) para. 10. 
44 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on Sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute, 
ICC-01/05-01/08, (21 June 2016) para. 10; Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Judgment, IT-95-5/18 (24 March 2016) at 
para. 6025; Prosecutor v. Marques et al., 09/2000, East Timor Serious Crimes Special Panel (11 December 2001), 
at para. 979.   
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its	 trial	 sentencing	 judgments	 explicitly	 embracing	 deterrence	 ideology.	 Moreover,	
international	 judges	 consistently	 affirm	 that	 the	 goal	 of	 deterrence	 is	 an	 appropriate	
influence	 on	 the	 quantum	of	 the	 sentence,	 revealing	 a	 consequentialist	orientation	 to	
punishing	 atrocities.45	 ICL	 judges	 claim	 to	 give	 weight	 to	 the	 goal	 of	 deterrence	 in	
determining	the	severity	of	a	sentence.		In	international	criminal	justice,	both	general	and	
specific	deterrence	are,	in	principle,	accepted	as	relevant	sentencing	considerations.	Trial	
Chambers	 recognize	 that	 both	 specific	 and	 general	 deterrence	 have	 “an	 important	
function	 in	 principle”	 and	 serve	 “an	 important	 goal	 of	 sentencing.”46	 However,	 the	




enough	 “to	 ensure	 that	 those	who	would	 consider	 committing	 similar	 crimes	will	 be	
dissuaded	from	doing	so.”48	Specific	deterrence,	on	the	other	hand,	“refers	to	the	specific	
effect	 of	 the	 sentence	 upon	 the	 accused”	 sitting	 in	 judgment	 before	 the	 court.49	 The	
“sentence	 should	 be	 adequate	 to	 discourage	 an	 accused	 from	 recidivism.”50	 In	 other	





45 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Case No. IT-02-61-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 142 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar 30, 2004) (concluding that the “[f]undamental principles taken into 
consideration when imposing a sentence are deterrence and retribution”); Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-
A & IT-94-1-A bis, Appeal Sentencing Judgment, para. 48 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 26, 
2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-asj000126e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-
14/1-A, Appeals Judgment, para. 185 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acjug/en/ale-asj000324e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Appeals Sentencing 
Judgment, supra note 60, at paras. 45-46. 
46 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at para. 134. 
47 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeal Sentencing Judgment, supra note 62, at para. 48. 
48 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on Sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute, 
ICC-01/05-01/08, (21 June 2016) para. 10; Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Trial Sentencing Judgment, 
(18 December 2003) para. 136 (“The sentence imposed must also be sufficient in order to dissuade others from 
committing the same crime); Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Judgment, IT-95-5/18 (24 March 2016) at para. 6026; 
Prosecutor v. Todorović, Case No. IT 95-9/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 30 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia July 31, 2001). 
49 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 48, at para. 135. 
50 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2A, Appeals Sentencing Judgment, para. 45 (4 Feburary 2005); 
Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Judgment, IT-95-5/18 (24 March 2016) at para. 6026. 
51 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 48, at para. 134. 
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its	penal	provisions.”52		The	high	water	mark	for	general	deterrence	was	established	by	
Judge	 Wolfgang	 Schomburg	 when	 he	 stated	 that	 general	 deterrence	 may	 act	 as	 an	
aggravating	factor:	“I	also	fully	accept	…	the	special	emphasis	on	general	deterrence	as	
an	 aggravating	 factor	 in	 finding	 the	 appropriate	 sentence,	 in	 particular	when	 it	 is	 to	




Regarding	 specific	 deterrence,	 some	 trial	 chambers	 have	 applied	 the	 term	
“individual”	 deterrence	when	 embracing	 this	penological	 goal.55	Other	 trial	 chambers	
rejected	 the	 applicability	 of	 specific	 deterrence	 in	 international	 criminal	 justice.	 For	
example,	although	the	Trial	Chamber	in	the	Dragan	Nikolić	case	recognized	that	specific	





assuming	 the	 circumstances	 that	 provided	 an	 opportunity	 for	 these	 crimes	 to	 be	
committed,	namely	war,	will	not	be	present	when	the	accused	is	released.	
As	 for	 the	 retributive	 theory	of	punishment,	while	 there	are	variant	 schools	of	
thought,	generally	 speaking	 retribution	asserts	 that	one	who	 freely	 chose	to	victimize	
another	deserves	to	be	punished	accordingly.58		The	moral	desert	of	an	offender	is	both	a	
necessary	and	sufficient	reason	to	punish	him	or	her.59		Punishment	is	an	imperative,	but	
must	 also	 be	 legally	 sanctioned	 so	 as	 to	 distinguish	 retribution	 from	 revenge.	 The	
retributive	 theory	prohibits	punishment	of	 the	 innocent	and	 limits	punishment	of	 the	
																																																								
52 Babić Trial Judgement, para. 45. 
53 Prosecutor v. Blaksić, Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg, Appeals Judgment, IT-95-14-A (29 
July 2004). 
54 Id. 
55 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, at paras. 134-35. 
56 Id. at para. 134. 
57 Id. at para. 135. 
58 See generally H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 234-235 (Oxford 1968). 
59 Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in: RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE 




ICL	 jurisprudence	conceives	retribution	“as	an	expression	of	 the	outrage	of	 the	
international	community	at	the	crimes	committed.”61	The	judges,	however,	are	quick	to	
point	out	that	retribution	“is	not	to	be	interpreted	as	desire	for	revenge	or	vengeance.”62	
As	 the	Karadzic	Trial	Chamber	explained,	 “retribution,	unlike	vengeance,	 requires	 the	
imposition	of	a	just	and	appropriate	punishment,	and	nothing	more.”63	 	At	the	ICC,	the	
first	two	trial	sentencing	judgments	do	not	explicitly	mention	retribution;	the	next	two	
sentencing	 judgments	 do.	 As	 noted	 above,	 international	 judges	 in	 the	 Katanga	 case	
explicitly	adopted	“punishment”	as	the	role	of	sentencing	at	the	ICC.	Their	word	selection	
here	 is	 curious.	 	 They	 identify	 the	 role	 of	 sentencing	 as	 “punishment”	 rather	 than	




role	 of	 sentencing”	 at	 the	 ICC	 is	 “punishment”	 and	 they	 define	 “punishment”	 as	 “the	








they	 generally	 orientate	 deterrence	 ideology	 towards	 general	 deterrence.	 The	
																																																								
60 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 105 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge 1996). 
61 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Judgment, IT-95-5/18 (24 March 2016) at para. 6026; Prosecutor v. 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on Sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute, ICC-01/05-01/08, (21 June 
2016) para. 10 (“Retribution is not to be understood as fulfilling a desire for revenge, but as an expression of the 
international community’s condemnation of the crimes.”) 
62 Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Judgment, IT-95-5/18 (24 March 2016) at para. 6026. 
63 Id. 
64 Katanga Trial Sentence at para. 38 (emphasis added). 





C. THE LIP SERVICE TO REHABILITATION 
One	 sentencing	 purpose	 proffered	 by	 international	 criminal	 tribunals	 that	
appears	 to	 have	 no	 impact	 on	 sentencing	 allocations	 is	 rehabilitation.	 International	
human	 rights	 treaties	 encourage	 rehabilitation	 considerations	 in	 national	 penology.68	
While	the	focus	of	these	treaties	appears	to	be	on	the	administration	of	prisons	and	the	
manner	 of	 enforcement	 of	 a	 sentence,69	 the	 ICL	 judges	 purported	 to	 consider	 such	
provisions	when	determining	the	length	of	the	sentence	itself.70		
In	 the	 early	 sentencing	 jurisprudence	 of	 international	 tribunals,	 some	 trial	
chambers	 stated	 that	 rehabilitation	 was	 among	 the	 principles	 guiding	 its	 sentencing	
allocations	and	limited	the	parameters	of	international	sentencing.71	However,	it	is	fair	
to	say	that	rehabilitation	was	never	highly	significant72	in	the	determination	of	a	sentence	
and	 did	 not	 act	 as	 a	 meaningful	 “parameter”	 to	 limit	 the	 sentence.	 This	 was	 made	
apparent	in	the	Trial	Chamber’s	judgment	of	General	Blaškić.73		Despite	acknowledging	
rehabilitation	as	one	of	the	“parameters”	guiding	its	determination	of	General	Blaškić’s	
sentence,	 and	 despite	 its	 own	 factual	 finding	 supporting	 a	 strong	 prognosis	 for	 his	




66 Discussed in detail in Section IV-A below. 
67 For an excellent discussion of the scholarship on retribution in the context of punishing atrocity 
crimes see DeGuzman Harsh Justice (2014), supra note 1, at 10-15. 
68 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 10(3), Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. (“The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of 
prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation”); U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 
cmt., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.3 (1992); American Convention on Human Rights, art. 5(6), Nov. 21, 
1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143. 
69 See, e.g., MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, 241-54 (Kehl am 
Rheine ed., 2d rev. ed. 2005). 
70 Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Appeals Judgment, paras. 805-06 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-aj010220.pdf. 
71 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment paras. 761 and 765 (Mar. 3, 2000) (discussing 
rehabilitation). 
72 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT 96-22-Tbis, Sentencing Judgment, para. 66 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 5, 1998). 
73 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Judgment, supra note 71, at para. 762. 
74 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Judgment, supra note 71, at para. 762. See Shahram Dana, Revisiting the Blaškić 
Sentence: Some Reflections on the Sentencing Jurisprudence of the ICTY, 4 INT’L CR. L. REV. 321 (2004), for a 








Chamber	 subsequently	 issued	 the	 same	 caution	 against	 rehabilitation.76	 It	 held	 that	
“although	 rehabilitation	 (in	 accordance	 with	 international	 human	 rights	 standards)	
should	 be	 considered	 as	 a	 relevant	 factor,	 it	 is	 not	one	which	 should	 be	 given	 undue	
weight.”77	
The	Special	Court	 for	Sierra	Leone	 (SCSL)	went	one	 step	 further.	 It	 completely	
rejected	 rehabilitation	 as	 a	 relevant	 factor	 in	 atrocity	 sentencing.	 78	 The	 SCSL	 in	 its	
maiden	sentencing	judgment	acknowledged	that	the	past	jurisprudence	of	the	ICTR	and	
ICTY	 regularly	 identified	 rehabilitation	 as	 a	 factor.79	 	However,	 the	 SCSL	 immediately	
moved	away	from	this	position,	holding	that	rehabilitation	is	more	appropriate	as	a	goal	
in	 relation	 to	 ordinary	 criminality	 in	 the	 domestic	 context	 and	 less	 relevant	 as	 a	
sentencing	factor	in	international	criminal	trials.80		Subsequent	judgments	followed	the	
same	 general	 approach	 toward	 rehabilitation,81	 although	 one	 SCSL	 trial	 chamber	
presented	a	confused	treatment	of	it	in	the	Civil	Defense	Forces	(CDF)	case.			






75 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeal Sentencing Judgment, supra note 62, at para. 48. 
76 See Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, para. 806 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001). 
77 Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, para. 806 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001). 
   78 E.g., RUF Sentencing Judgmentparas.14–16. 
   79 AFRC Sentencing Judgment para. 14. 
   80 Id. para. 17. 
   81 See RUF Sentencing Judgment para. 16. 
82 The Civil Defence Forces (CDF) fought against the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) during the conflict in Sierra Leone. The CDF defendants contended 
throughout the trial that they were simply attempting to restore democracy and power to the democratically elected 
President Kabbah, whose government was overthrown by the AFRC in 1997. See CDF Trial Judgment, paras 2 
& 11. 
 83 Id. para. 1. 
 84 Id. 
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attempting	 to	 restore	 democracy	 and	 power	 to	 the	 democratically	 elected	 President	
Kabbah.85		Norman	died	before	sentencing;	the	other	two	defendants	were	sentenced	to	
six	and	eight	years	of	imprisonment.86			
In	 seeking	 to	 rationalize	 these	 low	 sentences,	 the	 CDF	 trial	 judges	 started	 by	
elevating	the	role	of	rehabilitation	atrocity	sentencing	to	the	same	 level	as	retribution	
and	 deterrence.	 They	 repositioned	 rehabilitation	 as	 one	 of	 the	 main	 purposes	 of	
international	criminal	justice.87		Oddly,	two	paragraphs	later	in	the	judgment,	the	judges	
provided	 the	 pro	 forma	 SCSL	 view	 on	 rehabilitation:	 namely	 that	 it	 “is	 of	 greater	
importance	in	domestic	jurisdictions	than	in	International	Criminal	Tribunals.”88		Thus,	









CDF	 defendants	 as	 national	 heroes.	 Moreover,	 the	 CDF	 Trial	 Chamber’s	 restorative	
orientation	limited	the	influence	of	the	gravity	of	the	crime	in	its	sentencing	allocations.	
Although	 the	 judges	 are	 not	 explicit	 about	 this,	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 deduce	 that	 their	




reasoning	 and	 justification.	 Ultimately,	 restorative	 ideology	 exerted	 an	 enormous	
downward	force	on	the	 final	sentence:	 the	CDF	defendants	were	sentenced	to	six	and	
eight	 years	while	 the	 average	 sentence	 for	 opponents	 of	 the	 government	 is	 forty-six	
years.90	 	However,	 the	SCSL	Appeals	Chamber	 firmly	disavowed	 this	 attempt	 to	place	
																																																								
 85 Id. para. 11. 
 86 See Tables 1–4, supra at 
 87 CDF Sentencing Judgment para. 26 (treating rehabilitation as a “primary” consideration in sentencing along 
with retribution and deterrence). 
 88 Id. para. 28. 
 89 Id.paras.26–31. 












D. THE RISE OF JUDICIAL IDEALISM: ENTER RECONCILIATION & SOCIAL ENGINEERING 
The	 U.N.	 Security	 Council	 resolution	 establishing	 the	 ICTY	 does	 not	 mention	
“reconciliation”	 as	 such.	 Neither	 does	 the	 ICTY	 Statute	 or	 its	 Rules	 of	 Procedure	 and	
Evidence	 (RPE).	 	 Furthermore,	 reconciliation	 ideology	 is	 virtually	 absent	 in	 the	 early	
practice	of	the	ad	hoc	Tribunals.94	Even	in	the	first	cases	involving	guilty	pleas	and	plea	
bargains,	international	judges	did	not	justify	sentencing	discounts	in	terms	of	promoting	
reconciliation.95	 The	practice	 of	 justifying	 plea	deals	 in	 terms	 of	 reconciliation	gained	
traction	in	judicial	narratives	only	much	later.		
Their	refrainment,	however,	should	not	be	confused	with	unawareness.	From	the	
start,	 the	 judges	were	aware	of	 the	potential	 contribution	 that	atrocity	 trials	 and	 just	
punishments	 could	 make	 towards	 reconciliation	 in	 a	 post-conflict	 society.96	 In	 the	




   91 CDF Appeal Judgment para. 489. 
   92 See CDF Appeal Judgment. 
93 Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ICC-01/12-01/15 (27 Sept. 2016), para 67. 
94 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 41; Prosecutor v. Erdemović, 
Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43; Prosecutor v. Tadić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 35; Prosecutor v. 
Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-S, Sentencing Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 13, 2001). 
95 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43; Prosecutor v. Kambanda, 
Judgment and Sentence, supra note 41; Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Sententing Judgment, supra note 84. 
96 See President of the Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 1st Ann. Rep. of the Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia in Accordance with Article 34 of Security Council Resolution 25704 annex 
(1993), transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General, paras. 14-18, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1007 (Aug. 29, 1994) 
[hereinafter Note of Secretary-General: Rep. of ICTY]; See also Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age, supra note 23 (discussing reconciliation through judicial adjudication).  
97 Id.  
 118 
judges	at	the	ad	hoc	Tribunals	were	mindful	of	the	reconciliatory	potential	of	their	work,	
but	 did	 not	 consider	 it	 as	 a	 differential	 principle	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 allocating	
punishment.98		
This	 is	most	 likely	because	reconciliation	 is	 largely	unmeasured,	slow	building,	
and	 aspirational.99	 Successful	 reconciliation	 requires	 the	 mobilization	 of	 diverse	
elements	of	social	and	legal	order.	 Justice	through	criminal	prosecution	of	violators	of	
community	norms	 is	merely	one	 step	 towards	 that	goal.	Although	reconciliation	 is	 an	
important	goal,100	the	first	generation	of	international	criminal	law	judges	understood	it	
could	not	be	captured	by	legalism	or	transformed	into	an	operational	rule	or	principle.101	
The	 very	 nature	 of	 mass	 atrocities	 problematizes	 achieving	 grand	 ambitions	 like	
reconciliation	 because	 the	 widespread	 participation	 in	 atrocity	 crimes	 creates	 deep	
complicity	that	is	not	easily	overcome	through	the	narrow	lens	of	judicially	constructed	
narratives	 via	 international	 criminal	 justice	mechanisms.	 Legalism	 has	 its	 limits.	 The	




Despite	 these	 limitations,	 several	 years	 later,	 Judge	 Cassese	 returned	 to	 the	
Security	 Council	 and	 confidently	 stated	 that	 the	 Tribunals	 were	 establishing	 an	
unassailable	“historical	record	.	.	.	thereby	preventing	historical	revisionism.”102	Among	




98 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43, at paras. 57-66 (discussing factors 
influencing sentence allocation but not treating reconciliation as a sentencing factor). See also Wald, The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age, supra note 23, at 117. 
99 See Perry, A Survey of Reconciliation, supra note 26, at 207, 208 (Joanna R. Quinn ed., 2009). 
100 See Note of Secretary-General: Rep. of ICTY, supra note 86, at para. 16. 
101 See Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age, supra note 
23, at 117 (concluding that “‘adjudication’ by ICTY of who started, prolonged, or ended the war and why in the 
context of criminal proceedings without the states themselves having input is basically unfair, or at least does not 
contribute to future reconciliation”). See also Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43; 
Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 41; Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Sentencing Judgment, 
supra note 84.  
102 ICTY President’s Fifth Annual Report, supra note 20, para. 296. 
103 ICTY President’s Fifth Annual Report, supra note 20, para. 296. However, the factual accuracy of the 
historical record established by international tribunals has been challenged. See NANCY COMBS, FACT-FINDING 









probative	 but	 legally	 excluded	 for	 other	 reasons.	 Thus,	 understandably,	 many	
international	 judges,	 like	 Judge	Wald,	were	hesitant	 to	act	 as	arbiters	of	history	or	 to	
develop	official	narratives	of	 the	historical	context	 leading	to	the	conflict	 that	could	in	
turn	serve	as	a	platform	for	reconciliation.106	These	judges	recognized	that	this	objective	
should	not	dominate	the	proceedings,	and	should	not	be	considered	as	first	and	foremost	





goals,	 including	 reconciliation	 and	 building	 a	 full	 truthful	 account	 of	what	 happened,	
require	a	matrix	of	social	and	spiritual	institutions	working	together	to	rebuild	the	fabric	
of	 society	 post-atrocity.	 When	 other	 institutions	 and	 agents	 of	 society	 share	 this	
responsibility,	international	criminal	justice	can	play	a	modest	but	important	role.		
Reconciliation	 subsequently	 gained	 traction	 in	 the	 ICL	 jurisprudence	when	 an	
increasing	 number	 of	 convictions	were	 secured	 by	 plea	 bargains.	However,	with	 plea	
bargains,	the	historical	narrative	of	“what	happened”	was	no	longer	constructed	in	open	
and	 public	 courts	 by	 documentation	 and	 witnesses	 to	 the	 atrocities,	 as	 was	 done	 at	
																																																								
104 ICTY President’s Fifth Annual Report, supra note 20, at para. 296 (emphasis added). 
105 See, Patricia Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes of Age: 
Some Observations on the Day-to-Day Dilemmas of an International Court, 5 WASH. U. J. LAW & POL’Y 87, 116-
17 (2001). 
106 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgment, para. 88 (Nov. 16, 1998) 
(stating that the “Trial Chamber does not consider it necessary to enter into a lengthy discussion of the political 
and historical background to these events, nor a general analysis of the conflict”).  
107 Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 52, at para. 135 (noting that the “Tribunal 
is not the final arbiter of historical facts. That is for historians.”). 
108 NANCY COMBS, FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS: THE UNCERTAIN EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS (2010). 
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Nuremburg,109	 but	 behind	 closed	 doors	 in	 negotiations	 between	 perpetrators	 and	
international	lawyers.110		It	is	a	negotiated	partial	record,	not	a	full	historical	record	that	
Cassese	 imaged.	 In	 sentencing	 judgments	 following	 a	 guilty	 plea	 or	 plea	 bargain,	
reconciliation	became	a	useful	 ideology	 to	 legitimize	plea	deals	and	 justify	sentencing	
discounts.111	 While	 some	 actors	 within	 the	 system	 view	 sentencing	 reductions	 as	 a	
normal	outcome	of	plea	bargains,112	local	populations,	especially	where	plea	bargaining	
is	 foreign	 to	 the	 domestic	 legal	 culture,	 view	 the	 sentencing	 reduction	 as	 political	
favoritism	 to	 a	 particular	 ethnic	 group,	 unwillingness	 of	 elites	 to	 hold	 other	 elites	
accountable,	 failure	 to	 acknowledge	 the	 suffering	 and	 injustice	 inflicted	 on	 victim	





was	 that	 Security	 Council	 Resolution	 827,	 establishing	 the	 ICTY,	 did	 not	 position	
reconciliation	 as	 a	 teleological	 imperative.114	 In	 fact,	 the	 resolution	 does	 not	 even	




the	 Tribunal’s	 mandate	 and	 institutional	 capacity.	 They	 attempted	 to	 situate	 the	
Tribunal’s	 role	 in	 promoting	 reconciliation	 within	 Resolution	 827’s	 reference	 to	
																																																								
109 Notwithstanding the fact that the “role of criminal tribunals as arbiters of historical truth has been 
contested since the first serious efforts of international justice, at Nuremberg and Tokyo.” See SCHABAS, 
UNIMAGINABLE ATROCITIES, supra note 17, at 157. 
110 For concerns that plea-bargaining distorts the historical record, see COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS, supra 
note 37, at 67, 207.  
111 See Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 36; Prosecutor v. Bralo, Case No. IT-
95-17-A, Judgment on Sentencing Appeal (Apr. 2, 2007); Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Sentencing 
Judgment (Dec. 18, 2003); Prosecutor v. Bralo, Case No. IT-95-17-S, Sentencing Judgment (Dec. 7, 2005). 
112 Tribunal lawyers from civil law countries were initially concerned about the practice of plea-
bargaining. See Nancy A. Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of International Crimes, 
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 139-41, 53 (2002) (reporting that judges and lawyers from civil law countries were 
uncomfortable with plea bargaining at international tribunals).  
113 Cf. Stephanos Bibas & William W. Burke-White, International Idealism Meets Domestic-Criminal-
Procedure Realism, 59 DUKE L.J. 637, 658–60 (2010).  
114 See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 34. 
115 See Clark, The Limits of Retributive Justice, supra note 3, at 465 (challenging the merits of 
reconciliation and historical record building as goals of international criminal justice mechanisms). 
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“contribute	 to	 the	 restoration	 and	 maintenance	 of	 peace.”116	 Unfortunately,	 this	
methodology	 suffers	 from	over	 dependence	 on	 the	 unlikely	 assumption	 that,	 by	 such	
preambular	statements,	the	Security	Council	intended	to	articulate	a	philosophy	to	guide	
atrocity	 sentencing	 and	 insufficient	weight	 given	 to	 the	more	obvious	 and	 immediate	












justification	 for	 the	 increasing	practice	of	plea-bargaining.	Nevertheless,	 the	notion	of	
reconciliation	 now	 appears	 frequently,	 but	 largely	 perfunctory,	 in	 sentencing	
judgments.117	While	the	Tribunals	have	clarified	how	concepts	such	as	“retribution”	and	
“deterrence”	are	 to	be	understood	 in	 the	 context	of	 international	 criminal	 justice,	 the	
notion	 of	 “reconciliation”	 has	 remained	 undefined.	 Moreover,	 Tribunal	 judges	 have	
struggled	 to	 coherently	 develop	 and	 integrate	 this	 goal	 in	 their	 decision-making	 and	




among	 ICTY	 judges	 is	 to	 cursorily	 identify	 “promoting	 reconciliation”	 as	 part	 of	 the	
Tribunal’s	 mandate.	 Consequently,	 romanticism	 about	 international	 tribunals	
																																																								
116 S.C. Res. 827, supra note 34, at 1. 
117 Prosecutor v. Babic, Case No. IT-03-72-S, Sentencing Judgment (June 29, 2004); Prosecutor v. 
Banovic, Case No. IT-02-65/1-S, Sentencing Judgment (Oct. 28, 2003); Prosecutor v. Mrda, Case No. IT-02-59-
S (Mar. 31, 2004). 
118 See Kamatali, The Challenge of Linking International Criminal Justice, supra note 40, at 121-24, for 
arguments on how the ICTR’s approach to jurisprudential issues regarding genocide can undermine Rwandan 
reconciliation. 
 122 
“promoting	 reconciliation”	 persists,	 even	 though	 it	 remains	 elusive	 conceptually	 and	





reconciliation	 as	 a	 goal	 of	 international	 criminal	 justice.	 	 They	 avoid	 incorporating	 or	
making	any	reference	to	reconciliation.		Likewise,	the	first	ICC	sentencing	judgment	did	
not	 consider	 contribution	 to	 reconciliation	as	a	 relevant	 sentencing	 factor	 for	atrocity	
trials.120	However,	subsequent	ICC	judgments	accept	contribution	to	reconciliation	as	a	
possible	 sentencing	 consideration,121	 but	 not	 one	 that	 should	 overshadow	 punitive	
goals.122	
	
E. EXPRESSIVISM, GENERAL AFFIRMATIVE PREVENTION, AND THE DIDACTIC FUNCTION 
An	important	step	in	the	evolution	of	the	global	legal	order	is	the	crystallization	of	
norms	underpinning	international	law	as	more	than	mere	soft	law	provisions,	but	more	
as	 binding	 law	 backed	 by	 punishment	 for	 violations,	 especially	 norms	 embedded	 in	
human	 rights	 treaties,	 international	 humanitarian	 law	 conventions,	 and	 the	 Genocide	
Convention.	 International	 criminal	 justice	 mechanisms	 contribute	 to	 building	 norms,	
values,	 and	 interests	 protected	 by	 international	 law	 and	 embedding	 them	 in	 the	
consciousness	 and	 culture	 of	 national	 and	 international	 actors.123	 In	 the	 context	 of	
atrocity	trials,	this	translates	into	building	awareness	of	the	distinction	between	legal	and	
criminal	 conduct	 during	 war	 or	 armed	 conflict,	 whether	 international	 or	 non-
international	in	character.	124		
																																																								
119 See Clark, The Limits of Retributive Justice, supra note 3, at 465 (challenging the merits of 
reconciliation and historical record building as goals of international criminal justice mechanisms). 
120 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2901, Decision on Sentence 
pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute (July 10, 2012).   
121  Prosecutor v. Katanga, Decision on Sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/07, 
(23 May 2014); Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ICC-01/12-01/15 (27 September 2016). 
122  Katanga Trial Sentence para. 38. 
123	See,	e.g.,	Prosecutor	v.	Nikolić,	Trial	Sentencing	Judgment,	supra	note	58,	at	para.	139;	Amann,	
Group	Mentality,	Expressivism,	and	Genocide,	supra	note	55,	at	95,	118-19,	127,	132.	
124 Damaska, What is the Point, supra note 40, at 347. Related to didactic function is the expressive 
function. See MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, supra note 55, at 173-76; Luban, Fairness to Rightness, supra note 
55, at 569, 576-77; Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, supra note 55, at 95; deGuzman 
Choosing to Prosecute (2012) supra note 9; Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment, supra 
note 37, at 70-71. 
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These	 goals	 are	 shared	 by	 supporters	 of	 the	 expressive,	 didactic,	 or	 general	
affirmative	prevention	 function	of	punishment	 for	atrocity	 crimes.125	These	 rationales	





internalization,	 ultimately	 contributing	 to	 general	 affirmative	 prevention.	With	minor	
variations,	scholars	from	various	disciplines	refer	to	this	function	as	“general	affirmative	
prevention”,	 the	“didactic”	 function,	or	 the	“expressive”	 function	of	 ICL	punishment.127		
For	some,	it	is	the	preferred	sentencing	rationale	for	punishing	atrocities.128	
At	 first	blush,	 this	aim	may	appear	rather	simplistic.	After	all,	 the	 line	between	
legal	and	criminal	conduct	is	rather	obvious	when	considering	murder,	rape,	torture,	and	
other	such	crimes	that	occur	in	the	context	of	armed	conflict.	However,	crimes	committed	
in	 these	 situations	 are	 often	 precipitated	 by	 direct	 and	 implicit	 indoctrination	 that	
dehumanizes	 the	 victim.	 Coupled	with	 the	 awareness	 that	war	 crimes	 historically	 go	
unpunished,	 these	 forces	 converge	 to	 disease	 belligerents	 with	 a	 “culture	 of	 inverse	
morality”129	where	killing,	raping,	and	terrorizing	civilians	becomes	an	accepted	part	of	
the	warfare	 itself.	An	 individual’s	 inner	 sense	of	morality	and	repulsion	 towards	 such	
brutality	is	overridden	by	peer	pressure	from	immediate	comrades	and	superiors,	and	
reinforced	by	 inflammatory	rhetoric	of	national	 leaders.130	The	perversity	can	reach	 a	
point	 where,	 far	 from	 being	 considered	 wrongful,	 violence	 against	 “the	 other”	 is	
considered	a	righteous	deed.131	Thus,	an	educational	or	didactic	function	as	an	objective	
																																																								
125 Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, supra note 55, at 95, 118-19, 127, 132; Robert 
Sloane, Sentencing for the “Crime of Crimes”: The Evolving 'Common Law' of Sentencing of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 713, 733-34 (2007); Nemitz, The Law of Sentencing in 
International Criminal Law, supra note 25. 
126 LARRY MAY & SHANNON FYFE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: A NORMATIVE DEFENSE, p. 
61 (2017). 
127 Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 68, at 7; Damaska, What is the Point, supra note 40, at 334-
35, 339, 345; Nemitz, The Law of Sentencing in International Criminal Law, supra note 25; Sloane, The 
Expressive Capacity of International Punishment, supra note 37, at 70-71.  
128 See, MAY & FYFE, A NORMATIVE DEFENSE (2017), supra note 126, p. 61; Sloane, The Expressive 
Capacity of International Punishment, supra note 37.   
129 See Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 68, at 7, 10, 12. 
130 For a comprehensive study of the relationship between inflammatory/hate speech and atrocity crimes 
see, Gregory S. Gordon, ATROCITY SPEECH LAW: FOUNDATION, FRAGMENTATION, FRUITION (2017). 
131 See generally, Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 68. 
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of	 sentencing	 is	 particularly	 significant	 in	 punishing	 atrocities.132	 It	 approaches	 the	
notion	of	deterrence	from	a	positive	perspective	of	crime	prevention.133	In	addition	to	
building	 awareness	 of	 international	 law,	 atrocity	 sentencing	 may	 also	 help	 reinforce	
specific	 values	 that	 the	 international	 community	 seeks	 to	 advance	 such	 as	 tolerance,	




what	 is	 expressed	 by	 a	 particular	 source.”134	 	 He	 doubts	 whether	 atrocity	 trials	 can	
influence	the	moral	assessment	of	actors	who	believe	their	acts	of	violence	are	morally	
correct	 or	 necessary.135	 	 This	 invites	 contemplation	 of	 the	 challenges	 of	 sustaining	
morality	in	war,	and	how	that	bears	upon	the	goal	of	expressivism.	The	evils	that	inhere	











German	 Judge	 Wolfgang	 Schomburg,	 an	 influential	 personality	 in	 shaping	 atrocity	
sentencing.	 In	 both	 trial	 and	 appeals	 chambers,	 when	 the	 panel	 of	 judges	 included	
Schomburg	(often	as	presiding	judge),	the	sentencing	judgments	include	discussions	of	
																																																								
132 See Tom J. Farer, Restraining the Barbarians: Can International Criminal Law Help?, 22 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 90, 91-92 (2000); Jelena Pejic, Creating a Permanent International Criminal Court: The Obstacles to 
Independence and Effectiveness, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 292 (1998).  
133 See, MAY & FYFE, A NORMATIVE DEFENSE (2017), supra note 126, p. 61-62. 
134 Id. at 63. 
135 Id. 
136 For an outstanding discussion on how jus in bello provides moral guidance to combatants even if 
they are fighting for an unjust cause or on the side that has unlawfully used force see ADIL AHMAD HAQUE, LAW 
AND MORALITY AT WAR 43-49, 78-83, and 193-195 (2017).   
137 David Luban, Julie R. O’Sullivan & David P. Stewart, International and Transnational Criminal Law. 
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general	affirmative	prevention	as	one	of	the	purposes	of	sentencing	for	atrocity	crimes.138	









affirmative	 prevention	 even	 gained	 traction	 as	 one	 of	 the	 main	 purposes	 of	 ICL	
sentence.142	For	example,	when	sentencing	former	Liberian	President	Charles	Taylor,	the	
SCSL	opined	that	general	affirmative	prevention	is	one	of	the	main	purposes	of	punishing	
atrocities,	 adding	 that	 “[s]entencing	 is	 intended	 to	 convey	 the	 message	 that	 globally	
accepted	 laws	and	 rules	have	 to	be	obeyed	by	everybody.143	 	 Likewise,	 scholars	 from	
various	 disciplines	 have	 embraced	 the	 “general	 affirmative	 prevention”	 function	 of	
international	criminal	prosecutions.144			
Moreover,	 anecdotal	 illustrations	 of	 expressivism	 and	 the	 didactic	 function	 at	
work	can	be	drawn	from	the	experience	of	international	criminal	justice.		As	a	study	of	
ten	post-atrocity	situations	observed,	“when	the	[ICC]	Pre-Trial	Chamber	authorized	the	
Prosecutor	 to	 open	 investigations	 into	 the	Kenya	 situation,	 the	 government	 of	 Kenya	
publicly	 committed	 itself	 to	 undertaking	 extensive	 constitutional	 and	 institutional	
																																																								
138 See, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Judgment, IT-95-14-A (29 July 2004), para. 678; Prosecutor v. Nikolić, 
Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, paras. 139-40; Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial 
Judgment, para. 901-902, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003); Prosecutor v. Deronjić, 
Sentencing Judgment, supra note 52, at para. 149. 
139 CDF Trial Sentencingparas.28 and 30; AFRC Trial Sentencing Judgment para. 16; Taylor Trial 
Sentencing para. 16; AFRC Trial Sentencing para. 16; RUF Trial Sentencing para. 15. 
140 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at para. 139. Other trial chambers 
have also followed this approach. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 52, at para. 
149. 
141 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Judgment, IT-95-14-A (29 July 2004), para. 678; CDF Trial Sentencing para. 
28; AFRC Trial Sentencing Judgment para. 16; Taylor Trial Sentencing para. 16. 
142 Taylor Trial Sentencing para. 16; Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, 
at para. 139 
143 Taylor Trial Sentencing para. 16. 
144 Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 68, at 7; Damaska, What is the Point, supra note 40, at 334-
35, 339, 345; Nemitz, The Law of Sentencing in International Criminal Law, supra note 25; Sloane, The 
Expressive Capacity of International Punishment, supra note 37, at 70-71.  
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reforms,	 including	 attempts	 to	 create	 a	 special	 division	 within	 the	 High	 Court	 with	
jurisdiction	over	international	crimes.”145	














functions	of	 international	 criminal	 justice	mechanisms	with	principles	 that	 can	 in	 fact	
guide	 sentencing.	 	 Likewise,	 in	 the	 sentencing	 discourse	 itself,	 the	 justification	 for	
punishment	and	the	aims	of	punishment	should	be	kept	distinct.				




factors	 that	 inform	 the	 appropriate	 quantum	 of	 punishment.	 The	 “culture	 of	 inverse	
																																																								
145 Evelyne Asaala, The Deterrent Effect of the International Criminal Court: A Kenyan Perspective, 
in: TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK: THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, 
Jennifer Schense & Linda Carter (eds.), p. 252 (2016). 
146 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at para. 123 (ruling that “the 
individual guilt of an accused limits the range of the sentence”). 
147 Id. 
148 CDF Trial Sentencingparas.28 and 30; AFRC Trial Sentencing Judgment para. 16; Taylor Trial 
Sentencing para. 16; RUF Trial Sentencing para. 15; CDF Appeals Judgment para. 532; Prosecutor v. Dragan 
Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgment para. 40 (18 December 2003); Prosecutor v. Mitar 
Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Appeal Judgment para. 177 (25 February 2004); Prosecutor v. Naser Orić, 
Case No. IT-03-68-T, Trial Judgment para. 772 (30 June 2006). 
149 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at para. 123 (ruling that “the 




atrocity	 crimes	 sufficiently	weakens	 the	 individual’s	moral	 resistance	 against	 calls	 to	
criminality	in	the	face	of	orders	from	their	leaders	or	pressures	from	their	fellow	soldiers.		
	
III.  BETWEEN PUNITIVE AND RESTORATIVE APPROACHES 
	 As	reconciliation	ideology	gained	traction	in	the	jurisprudence,	it	challenged	the	
tribunal’s	 rhetoric	 that	 retribution	 and	 deterrence	 are	 the	 primary	 goals	 of	 atrocity	
sentencing.151	Consequently,	inconsistency,	indeterminacy,	and	confusion	persisted	from	





Several	 scholars,	 like	 Mark	 Drumbl,	 Jan	 Nemitz,	 and	 Mirjan	 Damaska,	 have	
observed	 that	 under-theorization	 and	 lack	 of	 clarity	 regarding	 the	 purpose	 of	
international	 criminal	 prosecutions	 has	 undermined	 the	 court’s	 integrity	 and	





deterrence,	 that	 is,	 between	 deontological	 and	 consequentialist	 approaches	 to	
																																																								
150 Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 68, at 10. 
151 Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeal Judgment, para. 402 (Mar. 22, 2006); Prosecutor 
v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Judgment, para. 806 (Feb. 20, 2001); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case 
No. IT-94-14/1-A, Appellate Judgment, para. 185 (Mar. 24, 2000); Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-
87-T, Trial Judgment Vol. 3, paras. 1144-45 (Feb. 26, 2009).  
152	ANDREW	ASHWORTH	&	ANDREW	VON	HIRSCH,	PRINCIPLED	SENTENCING:	READINGS	ON	THEORY	AND	POLICY	
167	 (Andrew	Ashworth	 et	 al.	 eds.,	 3d	 ed.	 2009)	 (arguing	 that	 identifying	 a	 priority	 among	 sentencing	
rationales	is	essential	to	achieving	consistency	and	justice).	
153 See Damaska, What is the Point, supra note 40, at 330 (arguing that “current views on the objectives 
international criminal courts are in disarray”); Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 593; Nemitz, The 
Law of Sentencing in International Criminal Law, supra note 25. 
154  Nemitz, The Law of Sentencing in International Criminal Law, supra note 25. 
155 See supra Section II-D. 






Closer	 examination	 of	 the	 sentencing	 jurisprudence,	 however,	 challenges	 the	
theory	 that	 the	 tribunals	 vacillate	 between	 retribution	 and	 deterrence.	 The	 main	










that	 the	 trial	 judgment	 potentially	 offered	 for	 the	 retribution-deterrence	 vacillation	
argument	has	been	overruled	by	the	Appeals	Chamber.		
International	 judges	 do	 not	 meaningfully	 vacillate	 between	 retribution	 and	
deterrence	 ideologies.	 If	 they	 do,	 it	 is	 relatively	minor.	 Across	 the	 general	 sentencing	
jurisprudence,	 international	 criminal	 tribunals	 generally	 position	 deterrence	 and	
retribution	on	equal	 footing.162	 	Accordingly,	 I	 augment	Drumbl’s	vacillation	 thesis	by	
																																																								
157 Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 560-61. 
158 Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 560-62. 
159 Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 560 et seq. 
160 Prosecutor v. Delalić, Appeals Judgment, supra note 118, at para. 799 (emphasis added). 
161 Prosecutor v. Delalić, Appeals Judgment, supra note 118, at para. 801 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadić, 
Appeal Sentencing Judgment, supra note 62, at para. 48 (holding that deterrence “must not be accorded undue 
prominence in the overall assessment of the sentences to be imposed on persons convicted by the International 
Tribunal”). See also Prosecutor v. Alekovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Judgment, para. 185. (Mar. 24, 
2000); Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 90 (Dec. 2, 2003). 
162 See Prosecutor v. Popović, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Trial Judgment, para. 2128 (Jun. 10, 2010); 
Prosecutor v. Lukić, Case No. IT-05-87, Trial Judgment Vol. 3, paras. 1141, 1145-46 (July 20, 2009); Prosecutor 
v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Trial Judgment Vol.3, para. 1144 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2009); Prosecutor v. Delić, Case No. IT-04-83-T, Trial Judgment, para. 559 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 15, 2008); Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-T, Trial Judgment, para. 
987 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec.12, 2007); Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Trial 
Judgment, para. 484 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007); Prosecutor v. Zelenović, Case 
No. IT-96-23/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 31 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 4, 2007); 
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Trial Judgment, para. 1134 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2006); Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Trial Judgment, para. 718 (June 30, 2006); 
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they	 treat	 them	 as	 “equally	 important.”164	 Thus,	 to	 argue	 that	 international	 judges	
vacillate	between	retribution	and	deterrence	requires	us	to	focus	on	one	or	two	outlier	
judgments	and	ignore	the	bulk	of	the	jurisprudence.		





punishment	 in	 a	 similar	 direction;	 reconciliation,	 however,	 being	 restorative	 in	
orientation,	will	frequently	exert	a	conflicting	influence	on	the	sentence	when	compared	
to	punitive	approaches.	








Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Trial Judgment, para. 723 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Nov. 30, 2005); Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case Trial Judgment, supra note 104, at para. 458; Prosecutor v. Blagojević, 
Case No. IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgment, para. 817 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 17, 2005); 
Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 52, at paras. 142-50; Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-
97-24-T, Trial Judgment, paras. 900-02 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003); Prosecutor 
v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT 96-23/1-A, Trial Judgment, para. 838 (Feb. 22, 2001); Prosecutor v. Delalić, 
Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appellate Judgment, para. 806 (Feb. 20, 2001); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Appellate 
Judgment, supra note 118, at para. 185; Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgment, para. 762 
(Mar. 3, 2000); Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Judgment, para. 848 (Jan. 14, 2000); 
Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43, at paras. 58, 64; Prosecutor v. Tadić, Sentencing 
Judgment, supra note 35, at paras. 7-9. 
163 Prosecutor v. Simić, Case No. IT-95-9/2-S, Sentencing Judgment para. 33 (Oct. 17, 2002) (stating 
that “The Trial Chamber is cognisant of the jurisprudence of the Tribunal, which supports deterrence and 
retribution as the main general sentencing factors.”). See also supra note 40. 
164 Prosecutor v. Delić, Case No. IT-04-83-T, Trial Judgment, para. 559 (Sep. 15, 2008); Prosecutor v. 
Delalić, Appeals Judgment, supra note 118, at para. 806. Prosecutor v. Ntabakuze, Case No. ICTR-98-41A-A, 





sentence	 has	 considerably	 increased	 indeterminacy	 and	 confusion	 in	 international	
penology.		
The	Special	Court	for	Sierra	Leone	(SCSL)	avoids	this	overreach	and	temptation	to	
play	 a	 role	 in	 diplomatic	 and	 political	 restorative	 objectives,	 such	 as	 reconciliation,	





crimes.166	 	 Second,	 the	 SCSL	 judges	 deliberately	distance	 themselves	 from	 restorative	
ideologies	 such	 as	 rehabilitation	 and	 reconciliation.167	 Likewise,	 they	 saw	 little	
justification	 in	 getting	 entangled	 with	 objectives	 purportedly	 unique	 to	 ICL,	 such	 as	
historical	 record	 building,	 the	 didactic	 and	 expressive	 functions,	 and	 reconciliation	
ideology	when	determining	 sentencing	 allocations.168	 For	 example,	 they	 acknowledge	
rehabilitation	as	a	factor	in	domestic	criminal	justice,	but	the	SCSL	judges	consistently	
articulate	why	it	is	inapplicable	to	international	criminal	law.		Third,	the	SCSL	has	rejected	
a	 number	 of	 mitigating	 factors	 that	 do	 not	 fit	 within	 a	 punitive	 framework	 for	 ICL	
punishment,	including	family	circumstance,	age,	and	others.		Finally,	the	actual	sentences	





165 See generally Shahram Dana, The Sentencing Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 42 GEORGIA J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 615 (2014). 
  166 CDF Appeal Judgment para. 532; RUF Sentencing Judgment para. 13; Taylor Sentencing Judgment 
para. 13; see also supra Part IV.A.1. 
  167 CDF Appeal Judgment para. 532; RUF Sentencing Judgment para.13; Taylor Sentencing Judgment para. 
13; see also supra Part IV.A.1. 
   168 See Shahram Dana, The Sentencing Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 42 GEORGIA J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 615 (2014). 
  169 The nine convicted defendants were sentenced to terms of imprisonment as follows: Fofana received 15 
years; Kondewa 20; Gbao 25; Kallon 40; Kamara 45; Brima, Kanu and Taylor got 50 years each; Sesay received 





penalties,	 and	 prioritizing	 the	 punitive	 approach	 over	 a	 restorative	 model	 toward	
transitional	justice,	may	help	explain	why	the	SCSL	enjoys	greater	social	legitimacy	than	








IV.  PROBLEMATIC ENTANGLEMENT WITH DETERRENCE AND RECONCILIATION 
	
The	 opening	 of	 this	 chapter	 acknowledged	 that	 many	 objectives	 have	 been	
proffered	 as	 goals	 of	 international	 prosecutions,	 and	 even	 as	 goals	 of	 atrocity	
sentencing.173	This	overburdening	of	ICL	has	complicated	the	task	of	international	judges.	
It	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 Chapter	 to	 address	 all	 of	 these	 aspirations,	 especially	
considering	 that	 many	 of	 them	 are	 better	 understood	 as	 broader	 objectives	 of	
international	atrocity	trials	or	proceedings	rather	than	principles	that	can	meaningfully	
guide	sentencing	determinations.	Therefore,	the	following	sections	address	deterrence	
and	 reconciliation	 because,	 among	 the	 consequentialist	 aspirations,	 they	 appear	
frequently	in	the	sentencing	judgments.	
A	 common	 criticism	 of	 ICL	 sentencing	 is	 that	 the	 proffered	 rationales	 for	
punishment	are	ill	suited	to	atrocity	crimes	and	that	they	do	not	in	fact	guide	sentencing	
																																																								
  170 See generally Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass 
Atrocity, 99 NW. U.L. REV. 539, 560–61 (2005); MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007). 
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   173  See, supra Section I. Introduction. See also Zoe Pearson, Non-governmental Organizations and the 
International Criminal Court: Changing Landscapes of International Law, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 243, 271-81 
(2006). See generally Vojin Dimitrijevic & Marko Milanovic, Human Rights before International Criminal 




from	 diverse	 countries,	 cultures,	 and	 legal	 systems,	 enjoy	 wide	 discretion	 in	
sentencing.174	This	is	also	true	for	the	International	Criminal	Court.175	Compared	to	its	
predecessors,	the	ICC	statute	is	more	detailed,	more	rigid,	and	more	exacting	in	nearly	
every	 aspect	 of	 the	 court’s	 functioning,	 except	 sentencing.176	 The	 wide	 discretion	 in	














and	 have	 repeated	 their	 skepticism	 in	 the	 context	 of	 international	 criminal	 justice.178	




174 Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et al., Judgment and Sentence, ICTR-98-42-T (24 June 2011), para. 
6188. 
175 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 77 (b)(1), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544. 
176 Philippe Kirsch, The International Criminal Court: From Rome to Kampala, 43 J. MARSHALL L. Rev. 
515, 519 (2010); Shahram Dana, Law, Justice & Politics: A Reckoning of the International Criminal Court, 43 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. xxiii, xxvi-xxvii (2010). See further Chapter 2: Reimagining Nulla Poena Sine Lege, Section 
IV(C).  
177 Jan Nemitz, The Law of Sentencing in International Criminal Law: The Purposes of Sentencing and 
the Applicable Method for the Determination of the Sentence, 4 Y.B. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 87 (2001). 
178 See, e.g., Jan Klabbers, Just Revenge? The Deterrence Argument in International Criminal Law, 12 
FIN. Y.B. INT’L L., 249-67 (2001) (disagreeing that human rights violators can be deterred); Drumbl, Collective 
Violence, supra note 29, at 609-10 (2005) (claiming that there is little or no evidence that punishment deters 
perpetrators of mass atrocities); Farer, Restraining the Barbarians, supra note 109, at 92 (questioning a straight-
forward extrapolation of experience with enforcement via criminal sanctions at the national level to enforcement 
at the international level). 
179 Id.; See also, Mark Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda, 75 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1221, 1255 (2000). 
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focuses	not	only	on	“the	intensity	of	certainty,	celerity,	and	proportionality	of	punishment	
but	rather	the	 individual’s	perception	of	 these	elements.”180	 	Given	the	 long	history	of	
impunity	 for	 atrocity	 crimes,	 perhaps	 it	 is	 too	 early	 to	 judge	 whether	 international	
criminal	justice	can	have	an	effective	deterrent	quality.181	Jennifer	Schense	argued	that	
the	 Nuremberg	 trials	 “had	 their	 greatest	 impact	 several	 generations	 after	 their	
conclusion.”182	
	 The	establishment	of	a	permanent	international	criminal	court	can	contribute	to	
increasing	 the	 probability	 that	 those	 bearing	 the	 greatest	 responsibility	 for	 mass	
atrocities	will	 be	 punished.	 International	 criminal	 law	 has	 long	 lacked	 the	 necessary	
enforcement	 mechanisms	 to	 offer	 relative	 certainty	 of	 punishment	 for	 violations	 of	
human	 rights	 and	 international	 humanitarian	 law.183	 Moreover,	 with	 the	 current	
international	 criminal	 justice	 system	 remaining	 dreadfully	 dependent	 on	 voluntary	
cooperation	 of	 states,	 questions	 still	 remain	whether	 the	 international	 system,	 in	 its	
present	form,	can	sustain	a	credible	threat	of	certain	punishment	so	as	to	deter	potential	
violators.		




that	 proposition,	 although	 I	 will	 synthesize	 the	 arguments	 of	 ICL	 scholars	 on	 this	






180 Dawn Rothe, Commentary in: Andre Klip & Göran Sluiter, 20 Annotated Leading Cases of 
International Criminal Tribunals 497, 501 (2010). 
181 Jennifer Schense & Linda Carter (eds.), TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK: THE DETERRENT 
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fully felt.”); Drumbl, Collective Violence, supra note 29, at 608 (noting that international criminal law “is still 
relatively young” and “in a nascent stage”). 
182 Jennifer Schense & Linda Carter (eds.), TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK: THE DETERRENT 
EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 1 (2016) 
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Farer	 claims	 that	 “[b]elief	 about	 the	 potential	 efficacy	 of	 penal	 sanctions	 as	
vehicles	for	enforcing	international	law	is	a	fairly	straightforward	extrapolation	from	the	









A	 vocal	 proponent	 of	 the	 deterrent	 capacity	 of	 international	 criminal	 justice,	
Payam	Akhavan,	argues	that	mass	atrocities	are	the	product	of	“elite-induced”	violence	
aimed	 at	 the	 acquisition	 or	 preservation	 of	 power.189	 Leaders	 are	 making	 calculated	
choices	and	trade-offs	and	engaging	in	an	immoral	cost-benefit	analysis.	Akhavan	makes	
a	compelling	case	that	political	power	gained	through	fomenting	ethnic	hatred	resulting	
in	 mass	 violence	 can	 be	 discouraged.	 Threat	 of	 punishment	 and	 international	
stigmatization	 “can	 increase	 the	 costs	 of	 a	 policy	 that	 is	 criminal	 under	 international	
law.”190	 According	 to	 Akhavan,	 this	 can	 in	 turn	 impact	 the	 calculations	 of	 leaders	
contemplating	 engagement	 in	 criminal	 policies	 such	 as	 ethnic	 cleansing,	 genocide,	 or	
																																																								
185 Farer, Restraining the Barbarians, supra note 109, at 92. 
186 I define “state crimes” as any action that violates international criminal law, and/or a states’ own 
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CRIMINAL COURT (2006). 
187 Dawn Rothe, Commentary, supra note 203, at 501. 
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Others	 are	 much	more	 skeptical	 about	 the	 deterrent	 capacity	 of	 international	
prosecutions,	raising	both	theoretical	and	pragmatic	challenges.194		Some	critics	focus	on	
arguments	 challenging	 the	 applicability	 of	 theories	 of	 rational	 choice	 to	 collective	




because	 they	 act	 mainly	 for	 political	 reasons.	 Because	 they	 willfully	 engage	 in	 mass	
murder	 for	 political	motives,	 Klabbers	 considers	 them	 undeterrable.	 	 This	 argument,	
however,	has	attracted	criticism	for	assuming	that	political	motivations	are	necessarily	
beyond	 deterrence.	 As	 Isaac	 Ehrlich	 observes,	 “willful	 engagement	 in	 even	 the	 most	
reprehensible	violations	of	legal	and	moral	codes	does	not	preclude	an	ability	to	make	
self-serving	 choices.”197	 Missing	 from	 this	 debate	 is	 a	 contextual	 consideration	 of	




192 Kathryn Sikkink and Hunjoon Kim, Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights 
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210 (2000). 




as	 a	 condition	 of	 a	 peace	 agreement.	 	 Even	 ICC	 investigations	 absent	 successful	
prosecution	can	impact	behavior	of	would	be	human	right	violators.		In	March	2010,	the	
ICC	Prosecutor	opened	a	criminal	investigation	of	alleged	crimes	against	humanity	into	
election	 related	 violence	 in	Kenya	 in	 2007	 and	 2008,	 eventually	 charging	 six	persons	
including	current	Kenya	President	Uhuru	Kenyatta.	While	the	ICC	investigations	were	on-
going,	 Kenya	 held	 its	 2013	 presidential	 election	 which	 was	 reported	 to	 be	 a	 largely	
peaceful	election,	unlike	prior	experiences.198	This	happened	despite	the	collapse	of	the	
case	 against	 Kenyatta	 and	 others.	 	 The	 ICC	 investigations	 into	 past	 election	 related	
violence	correlated	temporally	with	generally	peaceful	elections	in	2013.		Dr.	Alex	Vines,	
who	served	 in	 various	 capacities	with	 the	United	Nations	 and	 other	 organizations	on	
human	rights	and	 international	 security	matters	 in	Africa,	 attributes	Kenya’s	peaceful	
















198 CNN, “Vote counting begins after largely peaceful election in Kenya” by Faith Karimi & Nema 
Elbagir, 4 March 2013. 
199 Dr. Alex Vines, “Does the international criminal court help to end conflict or exacerbate it?” The 
Guardian (22 February 2016).  Others are less positive about the ICC’s impact in Kenya. See, Mahmood Mamdani, 
Kenya 2013: The ICC election, Al-Jazeera, 15 March 2013. 
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deterrence	 ideology	 on	 the	 sentencing	 decisions	 of	 ICL	 judges.	 	 Before	 doing	 so,	 a	
preliminary	 observation	 is	 offered	 from	 a	 pragmatic	 perspective.	 As	 noted	 above,	






greatest	 responsibility	 for	 the	 atrocities,	 were	 at	 that	 time	 beyond	 the	 reach	 of	 the	
ICTY.202	 Nor	 was	 there	 any	 prospect	 that	 these	 individuals	 would	 ever	 see	 trial	 and	
punishment	at	the	ICTY.	The	most	senior	ranking	accused	in	the	custody	of	the	ICTY	in	
the	early	days	was	Tihomir	Blaškić,	who	had	just	been	made	a	colonel	at	the	time	of	the	






these	 proceeding	 was	 general	 deterrence,	 focused	 on	 reducing	 the	 probability	 of	
deviance	in	the	general	population.”203	
	
2. Divergent Impact of Deterrence Ideology in ICL Sentencing 
ICL	 jurisprudence	 consistently	 holds	 that	 deterrence	 is	 one	 of	 the	 primary	
objectives	 in	 international	 sentencing.204	Early	 sentencing	 judgments	even	considered	
																																																								
201 Croat is First to be Convicted by Balkan War Crimes Panel, N.Y TIMES, June 1, 1996, 
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influence	on	 their	determination	of	 the	 severity	of	 a	 sentence.206	Whether	 the	goal	of	
deterrence	 meaningfully	 influences	 ICL	 sentences	 in	 practice	 can	 be	 challenged;	




the	 length	 of	 Dragan	 Nikolić’s	 sentence.	 The	 deterrence	 orientation	 of	 these	 judges	
follows	 the	 approach	 of	 earlier	 cases.208	 For	 example,	 both	 the	 Blaškić	 case	 and	 the	
Todorović	case	express	the	view	that	the	goal	of	deterrence	may	legitimately	influence	








consideration when imposing a sentence are deterrence and retribution”). For cases from the ICTR, see Prosecutor 
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206 See further, Prosecutor v. Todorović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at para. 30 (citing 
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Notwithstanding	 the	 overt	 gesture	 towards	 the	 deterrence	 as	 a	 primary	 and	
influential	consideration,	do	ICL	judges	in	fact	give	significant	weight	to	deterrence	when	
determining	 the	 actual	 quantum	 of	 punishment?	 In	 other	 words,	 do	 ICL	 sentencing	





Mikaeli Muhimana was a businessman and the conseiller of the Gishyita secteur during 
the Rwandan genocide.211 The Trial Chamber found that he “occupied a position of influence 
in the community.” Instead of using his position to protect the defenseless, he enabled and 
actively participated in the attacks against Tutsi civilians.  He reportedly armed civilians, 
gendarmes, and communal police with the aim of exterminating Tutsi civilians.212 Muhimana 
was a serial rapist who killed his rape victims in the most gruesome and brutal manner.213 He 
was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Trial Chamber found a host of aggravating factors 
such as his position of influence,214 the fact that the victims were seeking refuge,215 the young 
age (fifteen years old) of one of the rape victims,216 presence of others during the rapes,217 
intentionally increasing the suffering of the victim,218 public humiliation,219 savagery,220 and 
the fact that the victim was pregnant.221 Some of these aggravating factors could arguably be 
characterized as factors pertaining to the gravity of the offense.  
The Trial Chamber found that the defendant’s “status” in the society where he lived 
constituted an aggravating factor.222 In Muhimana case, however, the Defense should have 
challenged the Prosecutor’s submission that his “status” constitutes an aggravating factor. 
																																																								
211 Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Judgment and Sentence, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-T (28 April 2005). paras. 
3, 4, 596, and 604.     
212 Trial International, Mikaeli Muhimana (7 June 2016) available at https://trialinternational.org/latest-
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213 Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-1B-T, Judgment and Sentence, paras. 606-15 (Apr. 28, 
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the woman, the assailants accompanying Muhimana then cut off her arms and stuck sharpened sticks into them.” 
214 Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Judgment and Sentence, supra note 211, at para. 604. 
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217  Id. at para. 609. 
218  Id. at para. 610.  
219  Id. at para. 611.  
220  Id. at para. 612. 
221  Id. at para. 612.  
222  Id. at paras. 595-96.  
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Neither the Trial Chamber nor the Prosecutor explain how Muhimana’s “status” aggravates his 
criminality. The Prosecution only submits that “his close associations with senior civil servants 
and prominent business people, and his popularity . . . further enhanced his ‘status’.”223 The 
Trial Chamber accepted this argument and aggravated his sentence because of his “status.”224 
However, while his associations and popularity may have enhanced his “status,” the Trial 
Chamber does not explain how it enhances his culpability in relation to his crimes. The 
Muhimana Trial Chamber found no mitigating circumstances,225 and the Defense surprisingly 
made no submissions on this point.226 
Generally speaking, persons in positions of public authority who abuse their positions 
and the powers entrusted to them to commit or enable mass atrocities merit greater punishment 
because such perpetrations are more dangerous in that they cast a wider net of harm and 
destruction. While ICL jurisprudence recognizes these principles by holding “superior 
position” or “abuse of authority” as aggravating factors, it would be incorrect to interpret this 
as increasing punishment based on “status” alone.  It is not mere “status” that warrants greater 
punishment; it is about using the power and authority that flows from that status or senior 
position to enable groups to perpetrate atrocities.   When a senior government official uses his 
or her superior position and power to enable the commission of atrocities, an increase in 
punishment is deserved. Aggravating the punishment in these circumstances can be also 
justified because the senior public official breached a sacred trust by abusing their position and 
resources at their disposal to victimize those to whom they owed a duty to protect. These factors 
have a direct impact on their criminality.  
Thus, the ICTR Trial Chamber’s discussion (and the Prosecutor’s argumentation) of 
this issue in terms of “status” is unfortunate, but its intuition is correct.  The ICTR Trial 
Chamber viewed Muhimana as an influential person and middle to high-level public official 
who used his influence and authority to enable groups of actors to commit crimes against 
humanity.  Enabling atrocities deserves severe punishment and the Trial Chamber sentenced 
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of	 the	 non-Serb	 towns	 and	 villages	 in	 the	municipality	 of	 Bosanski	 Samac.230	He	was	
convicted	of	persecution	as	a	crime	against	humanity.	Todorović	was	the	Chief	of	Police	
in	Bosanski	 Samac	 and	 also	 a	member	 of	 the	 Serb	 Crisis	 Staff.231	 The	Todorović	Trial	
Chamber	considered	“his	abuse	of	such	a	superior	position”	and	the	“particular	cruelty”	
and	“duration”	of	the	beatings	as	an	aggravating	factor.232	As	mitigating	factors,	the	Trial	
Chamber	 held	 that	 Todorović’s	 guilty	 plea,	 expression	 of	 remorse,	 and	 substantial	
cooperation	with	the	Prosecution	merited	reduction	in	the	penalty.233	For	his	crimes,	the	









explanation	and	 in	comparison	to	the	average	 length	of	 ICTY	sentence	(approximately	
seventeen	years).		The	Todorović	trial	judges	ruled	that	“while	the	Chamber	recognises	
the	importance	of	deterrence	as	a	general	consideration	in	sentencing,	it	will	not	treat	
deterrence	as	a	distinct	 factor	 in	determining	sentence	 in	this	case.”235	 In	essence,	 the	
Todorović	Trial	 Chamber	 took	 the	 position	 that	 it	 was	 free	 to	 ignore	 deterrence	 as	 a	
consideration	 when	 fixing	 its	 penalty,	 despite	 the	 pronouncements	 of	 the	 Appeals	
Chamber.	Moreover,	it	gives	no	explanation	for	why	it	chooses	to	not	factor	deterrence	
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rationale	 into	 its	sentence	 in	this	case,	as	all	other	trial	chambers	had	done.	The	Trial	
Chamber	may	 have	 a	 good	 reason	 for	 not	 giving	much	weight	 to	 deterrence,	 but	 this	
reason	is	not	made	transparent.	The	lack	of	transparency,	in	turn,	can	lead	to	criticism	
that	the	Tribunal’s	sentencing	practice	is	unjust	and	arbitrary.	Such	criticism	calls	into	
question	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 international	 sentencing	 and	 undermines	 its	 expressive	
capacity.	 Subsequent	 sections	 of	 this	 chapter	 will	 explain	 why	 the	 judges	 were	






to	appear	before	the	ICTY.237	At	 the	start	of	his	 trial,	 the	Tribunal	had	a	meager	eight	
alleged	war	criminals	in	its	custody.	War	criminals	to	prosecute	were	hard	to	come	by	
and	the	dockets	were	empty	despite	the	fact	that	the	Office	of	the	Prosecutor	(OTP)	had	
publically	 issued	 indictments	 for	 seventy-five	 individuals.238	 Among	 those	 in	 custody,	
Blaškić	 was	 not	 only	 the	 highest-ranking	 defendant,	 but	 also	 the	 only	 one	 of	 any	
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240 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 267. The trial lasted more than two 
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241 See ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, VOLUME IV: THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 1999-2000, 659-66. (André Klip & Göran 
Sluiter eds., 2002), for further analysis of General Blaškić’s criminal responsibility. 
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criminal	 acts	 were	 charged	 as	 both.242	 I	 have	 elsewhere	 criticized	 the	 Blaškić	 Trial	
Chamber’s	 analysis	 of	 modes	 of	 liability,243	 which	 was	 subsequently	 overturned	 on	
appeal	in	large	part.244		






order	 to	 achieve	 this	 objective,	 deterrence	 became	 “the	most	 important	 factor	 in	 the	
assessment	of	appropriate	sentences	for	violations	of	international	humanitarian	law.”249	
Thus,	 the	 international	 judges	 here	 are	 clearly	 adopting	 a	 consequentialist	 approach	
towards	General	Blaškić’s	punishment.	The	result	was	forty-five	years	of	imprisonment;	
the	 most	 senior	 figure	 in	 the	 court’s	 custody	 received	 the	 highest	 punishment	 ever	
imposed	by	the	ICTY	at	that	time.250	
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note 151, at paras. 267-70.   
244 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 502. 
245 The Trial Chamber was composed of Judge Claude Jorda (Presiding), Judge Almiro Rodrigues, and 
Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen.  
246 Id. at para. 761. 
247 Id. at para. 762. 
248 Id. 
249 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 761 (quoting Prosecutor v. Delalić 
“Čelebići”, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998)). 
Moreover, the Blaškić Trial Chamber considered both specific deterrence and general deterrence as relevant 
factors in allocating a punishment: “Apart from the fact that the accused should be sufficiently deterred by 
appropriate sentence from ever contemplating taking part in such crimes again, persons in similar situations in the 
future should similarly be deterred from resorting to such crimes.” Id. (quoting the Čelebići Trial Judgment at 
para. 1234). 
250 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment (July 21, 2000), (sentenced to 10 years); 
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Appeals Judgment, supra note 118, at para. 191 (sentenced to 7 years); Prosecutor v. 
Tadić, Appeal Sentencing Judgment, supra note 62, at para. 76 (3) (sentenced to 20 years); Prosecutor v. Jelisić, 
Case No. IT-95-10-A, Judgment, para. (7) (July 5, 2001), (sentenced to 40 years); Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case 
No. IT-95-16-A, Appeal Judgment, paras. 439, 466 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 23, 2001), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/acjug/en/kup-aj011023e.pdf (Josipovic and Santic were sentenced to 12 
and 18 years, respectively); Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, paras. 1, 3 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tjug/en/kup-tj000114e.pdf 
(The Trial Chamber acquitted Papic. The Kupreskic brothers were sentenced to 6, 8 and 10 years, but all three 
were acquitted on appeal). See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No IT-95-16-A, Appeal Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 23, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/acjug/en/kup-aj011023e.pdf. 
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The influence of deterrence in increasing Blaškić’s punishment is demonstrated not 
only by court’s consequentialist reasoning and lengthy sentence, but also by its treatment of 
aggravating and mitigating factors, especially its marginalization of mitigating factors relevant 
to individualizing the sentence.251 In the Trial Chamber’s own words, in light of the deterrent 
“mission of the Tribunal, it is appropriate to attribute a lesser significance to the specific 
personal circumstances.”252 From the perspective of the Trial Chamber’s deterrence ideology, 
this reasoning makes perfect sense. It is a logical extension of its ideology because such factors 
are less relevant to the goal of deterrence. The Blaškić Trial Chamber’s treatment of “personal 
factors” and “rehabilitation” only serve to underscore its deterrence orientation towards 
punishing atrocities. The court’s own findings strongly indicate that Blaškić is well suited for 
rehabilitation: he had no prior criminal record;253 assisted victims;254 was a dutiful and 
professional soldier,255 and demonstrated “exemplary behaviour” throughout the entire trial.256 
After a detailed accounting and analysis, the Trial Chamber concluded that it was “evident” 
that Blaškić’s “character is reformable.”257 Furthermore, on principle, the Trial Chamber stated 
that rehabilitation is a factor “to be taken into account in fixing the length of the sentence”258 
Then, completely against the grain of their explicit reasoning, judges abruptly did the opposite 
of the principles and finding they just laid out and declared that these factors will not be taken 
into account and are “non-existent” for the purposes of fixing Blaškić’s sentencing.259 
What is objectionable about the Blaškić judgment authored by Judge Claudia Jorda 
(France) is not its rejection of rehabilitation, but the oblivious disconnect between its narrative 
and its actual sentencing outcome. Judge Jorda states that rehabilitation is one of the parameters 
of ICL sentencing, presents a compelling narrative about Blaškić’s rehabilitative character, but 
then states none of this will be considered when punishing him. Given this detailed analysis, 
we would have expected the judges to provide a similarly detailed explanation of why it is 
rejecting its own analysis. Instead, in a single line, the Trial Chamber summarily concluded 
																																																								
251 In one way or another, the Blaškić Trial Chamber found reason to reject the following mitigating 
factors: voluntary surrender (Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 776); remorse (Id. at 
para. 775); lack of direct participation in the crime (Id. at para. 768); duress (Id. at para. 769); material context of 
armed conflict, i.e. disorder ensuing from a state of armed conflict (Id. at para. 770); and co-operation with the 
Prosecutor (Id. at para. 774). 
252 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 765. 
253 Id. at para. 780. 
254 Id. at para. 781. 
255 Id. at paras. 765, 780. 
256 Id. at paras. 765, 780. 
257 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 781. 
258 Id. at para. 761. 
259 Id. at para. 782. 
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that factors indicative of Blaškić’s reformability were “non-existent when determining the 
sentence.”260 By the time the Trial Chamber reaches the end of its analysis, it appears to 
experience amnesia vis-à-vis its own principles guiding the parameters of an appropriate 
punishment. Thus, although the Trial Chamber sets-out “four parameters”,261 it appears to be 
only seriously interested in deterrence. Nevertheless, despite the criticisms that may be levied 
against the Blaškić Trial Judgment,262 it must be noted in its favor that, unlike the Todorović 
Trial Chamber, once the Blaškić Trial Chamber commits to deterrence, it remains faithful to 
its espoused ideology and reflects that ideology in its sentence. It takes the position that 
sentences must reflect the object of Tribunal’s mandate. It identifies deterrence as the main 
objective, and it imposes a sentence commensurate with that objective. 
In	sum,	both	the	Todorović	and	Blaškić	trial	chambers	overtly	state	that	deterrence	
is	one	of	the	primary	goals	of	punishing	atrocities	and	as	such	may	influence	the	sentence.	
However,	 the	 sentencing	 outcome	 in	 the	 Todorović	 case	 reveals	 that	 the	 goal	 of	
deterrence	 did	 not	 have	 a	 meaningful	 impact	 on	 the	 punishment;	 whereas	 it	 had	 a	
substantial	 influence	on	Blaškić’s	 sentence.	The	potential	 appearance	of	 inconsistency	
here	 is	 further	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 Todorović	 Trial	 Chamber’s	 admission,	 without	
explanation,	 that	 it	opted	to	not	consider	the	goal	of	deterrence	at	all	when	punishing	
Todorović.	Why	was	Blaškić	not	so	fortunate	to	benefit	from	a	suspension	of	the	penalty	




3. Reflections on Deterrence & International Criminal Justice 
To further examine the role and relevance of deterrence to international sentencing, it 
may be helpful to place perpetrators of atrocities crimes in two broad categories of offenders: 
low-level perpetrators and high-level perpetrators. Mass conflict is the theater for mass 
atrocities.  Genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes usually occur in the context of 
protracted mass violence or armed conflict.  Therefore, I argue that responsibility for enabling 
																																																								
260 Id. at para. 782 (emphasis added). The Trial Chamber gave two reasons to justify its positions here: 
the “serious” nature of the case and the fact that “many accused share these personal factors” Id. at para. 782. 
261 They are retribution, protection of society, rehabilitation and deterrence. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial 
Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 761. 
262 For example, it has departed in both ideology and practice from the general sentencing jurisprudence 
of the ICTY and ICTR that treat “gravity” of the crime as the primary factor in determining a sentence. Dana, 
Revisiting the Blaškić, supra note 74, at 330-32.  
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mass conflict must be accounted for when pursuing deterrence and determining what impact it 
should have on the severity of the sentence. In a holistic study of international, domestic, and 
foreign prosecutions, Kathryn Sikkink and Hun Joon Kim of the Griffith Asian Institute at 
Griffith University found that “prosecution processes and convictions of high-level state 
officials appear to have a stronger deterrence effect when compared with prosecutions and 
convictions of low-level officials.”263  Thus, in the context of atrocity crimes, deterrence is 
arguably better suited to punishment of high-level perpetrators. 
Their findings push back against Jan Klabber’s assumption that human rights violators 
are undeterrable and support Payam Akhavan’s position that high-level political and military 
officials are not free of self-serving motives and that the model of the “rational calculating” 
actor applies to them. As noted above by Dawn Rothe, deterrence can be effectively applied to 
the powerful actors who enable atrocities. Thus, from a utilitarian perspective, punishment can 
have a deterrent effect by tipping the scales on the cost-benefit analysis264 so that “crime does 
not pay.” According to Akhavan, high-level leaders, responsible for instigating circumstances 
that lead to atrocity crimes, deliberately and calculatedly promulgated doctrine of racial and 
religious hatred or extreme nationalism and cynically propagated such divisive currencies to 
ascend to political power. Punishment of such persons can demonstrate that there is a real cost, 
in terms of a severe penalty, for those that seek to gain political power through tactics that 
endanger the stability of society. The punishment must outweigh any political gains. 
Conversely, contextual considerations, such as a culture of inverse morality as noted by other 
authors and discussed above, challenges the appropriateness and effectiveness of deterrence in 
relation to low-level perpetrators or those that were not enablers of the conflict.265 Although as 
discussed above, the didactic function of ICL or “affirmative general prevention” can play a 
role in preventing such a culture from taking root.266   
Therefore, leaders bearing the greatest responsibility for atrocity crimes or enablers of 
the conflict are appropriate targets of deterrence ideology punitively swelling their punishment. 
Criminology research shows that “social location and position strongly influence 
deterrence.”267  I argue that understanding the weight given (or not given) to deterrence through 
																																																								
263 Kathryn Sikkink and Hun Joon Kim, The Justice Cascade: The Origins and Effectiveness of 
Prosecutions of Human Rights Violations, 9 ANNUAL REV. LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, 269, 281 (2013). 
264 See generally, Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 189, at 8. 
265 See Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 189, at 7. Kathryn Sikkink and Hun Joon Kim, The Justice 
Cascade: The Origins and Effectiveness of Prosecutions of Human Rights Violations, 9 ANNUAL REV. LAW AND 
SOCIAL SCIENCE, 269, 281 (2013). 
266 Nemitz, The Law of Sentencing in International Criminal Law, supra note 25, at 90, 110-11. 
267 Dawn Rothe, Commentary, supra note 203, at 501. 
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the lens of the enabler factor helps explain sentencing outcomes.268  The enabler factor explains 
why the goal of deterrence results in a more punitive punishment for some perpetrators but not 
others.  It can explain not only sentencing outcomes but also the choices and rulings the judges 
made to justify those outcomes. Enablers of atrocity crimes are more likely to be among those 
making calculated decisions to deliberately engage in gross violations of human rights in order 
to achieve their goals or ambitions. As many experts have argued, the rational choice model 
can be applied to these actors.269  On the other hand, as discussed above many non-enablers, 
mid-level and low-level perpetrators, commit their crimes in a context where firmness of moral 
resistance to wrongdoing has been considerable weakened by widespread, systemic, or state-
induced atrocity crimes.  A person of ordinary firmness may be unable to resist the tide of 
systemic criminality unleased by enablers.  In such contexts, where the behavior ICL seeks to 
deter is no longer the deviant behavior but has in reality become the widespread behavior, 
deterrence has little hope of gaining traction.  In such situations, it may be appropriate to de-
emphasize deterrence ideology in favor of rehabilitation.   To be certain, it is quite possible 
that some non-enablers are outside this context and can be effectively deterred.  This would 
need to be resolved by a factual interrogation of the conduct and character of the perpetrator.  
Even	if	one	disagrees	with	this	approach,	it	may	explain	what	the	Tribunals	are	
doing.	As	demonstrated	above,	 some	 trial	 chambers	 took	a	 consequentialist	 approach	
towards	punishment	of	human	right	violators,	focusing	on	deterrence.	While	the	rhetoric	
on	deterrence	 is	bold	and	broad,	 the	practice	 reveals	a	more	subtle	and	sophisticated	




trial	 chambers	 declared	 the	 objective	 of	 deterrence	 to	 be	 a	 factor	 in	 their	 sentencing	
allocations.	The	Blaškić	Trial	Chamber	in	particular	appears	wholly	fixated	on	deterrence,	
but	 a	 closer	 reading	 reveals	 that	 its	 reactionary	 consequentialism	 is	 induced	 by	 the	





268 The enabler factor is presented and discussed in detail in Chapter Four. 
269 See supra note 193 for support of the deterrence capacity of atrocity trials. 
270 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Trial Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 808. 
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Moreover, regarding the influence of general deterrence on punishment in ICL, with a 
few exceptions, the sentencing practice indicates that the objective of general deterrence will 
increase the sentence of a high-ranking perpetrator, but generally has little effect on the 
sentence of rank and file soldiers, unless they demonstrated notorious cruelty or exceptional 
brutality. This explains to some extent why Todorović received a very low sentence. Boiler 
plate rhetoric aside, international judges do not actually seem to be very convinced that 
deterrence is relevant or effective in the case of mid or low-level perpetrators. A more cynical 
view attributes Todorović’s low punishment to the embarrassing situation the ICTY found 
itself in when the United Nations sanctioned peacekeeping force, S-FOR,271 refused to comply 
with the Court’s order to turn over documents relevant to his arrest and transfer to The 
Hague.272 This perspective, however, does not entirely account for how low the Trial Chamber 
went with Todorović’s sentence because the judges could have given a higher sentence and 
still remained within the scope and terms of the plea agreement.  
In sum, international judges gesture towards deterrence as a universal influencer of the 
quantum of the sentence.273 This rhetoric unfortunately obfuscates an actual sentencing practice 
that features appropriate and important granularity. The general sentencing jurisprudence 
reveals that the goal of deterrence has little impact on increasing the penalty of low-level war 
criminals. Deterrence plays a more significant role in enhancing the penalty for a high-level 
perpetrator or those that had significant power or influence or enabled atrocities. This nuance 
in the sentencing practice resonates with expert findings that rank and file common persons 
cannot be easily deterred when surrounded by the chaos of systematic criminality during 
																																																								
271 S-FOR stands for “Stabilization Force” which was led by NATO but established by United Nations 
Security Council pursuant to Resolution 1088 on December 12, 1996. 
272 Combs, Copping a Plea, supra note 112, at 118-22; See discussion infra Section II(B)(2). 
273 See Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Judgment, para. 441 (Nov. 30, 2006); Prosecutor v. 
Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, paras. 891, 900, 902 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 
31, 2003); Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 36, at para. 24; Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case 
No. IT-00-39-A, Judgment, paras. 775-77 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 17, 2009); Prosecutor 
v. Blaškić, Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 761; Prosecutor v. Delić, Case No. 1T-04-83-T, Trial Judgment, 
para. 559 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept 15, 2008); Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-
05-87-T, Judgment, para. 1144 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2009); Prosecutor v. Lukić, 
Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Trial Judgment, para. 1049 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2009); 
Prosecutor v. Popović, Case No. IT-05-88-T, Trial Judgment, para. 2128 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia June 10, 2010); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment, para. 
838 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001); Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, 
Trial Judgment, para. 817 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 17, 2005); Prosecutor v. Strugar, Trial 
Judgment, supra note 104, at para. 458; Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. 1T-03-66-T, Trial Judgment, para. 723 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia November. 30, 2005); Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. 1T-03-68-T, 
Trial Judgment, para. 718 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 30, 2006); Prosecutor v. Tadić, 
Sentencing Judgment, supra note 35, at paras. 7-9; Prosecutor v Kupreški, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Judgment, 
para. 848 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000). 
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war.274 Instead, the goal of deterrence should focus ICL’s punitive sting for leaders who used 
their power and influence to enable systemic criminality and criminal policies. 
 
B. RECONCILIATION 
One	unresolved	 question	 regarding	 the	 role	of	 international	 atrocity	 trials	 and	
punishment	is	to	what	extent	the	ICC	and	other	international	criminal	justice	mechanisms	
should	 allow	 reconciliation	 ideology	 to	 influence	 its	 decision-making.	 Prioritizing	
reconciliation	 (a	 restorative	 focus)	over	 retribution	and	deterrence	 (punitive	 focuses)	
may	 alter	 decisions	 by	 the	 ICC	 Prosecutor	 at	 the	 front	 end,	 for	 example	 in	 case	 and	
situation	 selection,	 as	well	 as	 decisions	 by	 judges	 at	 the	 back	 end,	 for	 example	when	
sentencing.275	 This	 section	 examines	 the	 impact	 of	 reconciliation	 ideology	 on	 ICL	
sentencing.	 What	 influence	 does	 the	 goal	 of	 reconciliation	 have	 on	 the	 quantum	 of	
punishment?		In	examining	this	question,	the	research	methodology	in	this	study	took	
into	account	 the	possibility	 that	 the	 influence	of	 reconciliation	 ideology	may	not	have	
been	uniform	over	the	duration	of	the	operation	of	international	criminal	tribunals.		Thus,	
this	 section	 also	 explores	 trends	 over	 time	 regarding	 the	 impact	 of	 reconciliation	
ideology.			
Additionally,	this	section	scrutinizes	the	interconnectivity	between	reconciliation	
ideology	 and	 other	 sentencing	 factors.	 	 Has	 infusing	 reconciliation	 ideology	 into	 ICL	
sentencing	 influenced	 how	other	 sentencing	 factors	 are	 treated	 and	weighed?	 	What	





entanglement	 with	 reconciliation	 ideology	 and	 explore	 possible	 solutions,	 we	 may	
																																																								
274 However, this is by no means universal. In both the Yugoslav and Rwandan atrocities, there are a 
number of examples of great human moral courage resisting systematic criminality. See Bernard Muna, The ICTR 
Must Achieve Justice for Rwandans, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1481 (1998). 
275 See WILLIAM SCHABAS, UNIMAGINABLE ATROCITIES: JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS AT THE WAR 
CRIMES TRIBUNALS, 162-64 (2012) (discussing the tension between ICTY judges and the Prosecutor regarding 





1. Early Practice: Reconciliation Ideology Has No Influence on Sentencing.  




As	a	preliminary	matter,	 it	should	be	noted	that	guilty	pleas	at	 international	 tribunals	
come	 in	 two	 varieties:	bargained-for	 guilty	 pleas	 and	non-bargained	 guilty	 pleas.	 The	
former	 consists	 of	 situations	 where	 the	 defense	 engages	 in	 negotiations	 with	 the	









276 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43; Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. 
IT-96-22-A, Appeals Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997). 
277 Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment (Dec. 14, 1999); Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. 
IT-95-10-A, Appeals Judgment (July 5, 2001). 
278 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 84. 
279 Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S, Sentencing Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Feb. 27, 2003). 
280 Prosecutor v. Bralo, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94; Prosecutor v. Bralo, Judgment on 
Sentencing Appeal, supra note 94. 
281 Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94; Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2, 
Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 4, 2005). 
282 See COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS, supra note 37. 
283 Prosecutor v. Obrenović, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 111 (Dec. 10, 2003); 
Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Trial Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at para. 233; Prosectuor v. Mrða, Case No. IT-
02-59-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 78 (Mar. 31, 2004); Prosecutor v. Jokic, Case No. IT-01-42/1-S, Sentencing 
Judgment, para. 76 (Mar. 18, 2004); Prosecutor v. Rajic, Case No. IT-95-12-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 146 
(May 8, 2006). 
284 An illustrative example is the case of Dražan Erdemović and his immediate plea of guilt at his initial 
appearance. See Erdemović, Dražen, HAGUE J. PORTAL, http://www.haguejusticeportal.net (last visited Oct. 13, 
2013). See also Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43.  
285 To avoid importing baggage from domestic law, the ICC Statute abandons the terminology of civil law and 
common law traditions for proceedings involving “admission of guilt”.  See, ICC Statute, Article 64(8)(a) and 
Article 65. For an interpretation of these articles on “admission of guilt” see, Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Judgment 
















very	 severe	 prison	 sentence	 resulting	 from	 his	 guilty	 plea	 to	 very	 serious	 crimes,	
including	 multiple	 murders	 committed	 in	 the	 most	 chilling	 and	 wicked	manner.	 The	
tension	 between	 the	 ICTY	 judges	 and	 the	 Prosecutor	was	 plainly	 evident	 during	 the	





was	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 crime	 of	 genocide	 carries	 too	much	 significance	 to	 be	 dropped	
simply	because	the	accused	has	accepted	responsibility	for	other	crimes.	The	Jelisić	case	
demonstrates	 the	OTP’s	unwillingness	 to	provide	 the	accused	with	any	concession	by	
way	of	charge	or	penalty	reduction	for	his	guilty	plea.	As	noted	above,	however,	it	would	
be	 incorrect	 to	 characterize	 Jelisić’s	 guilty	 plea	 as	 a	 plea	 bargain.	 Jelisić	 sua	 sponte	
																																																								
286 Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, para. 11 (Dec. 14, 1999) (pleading guilty on 
October 29,1998); Prosecutor v. Todorović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at para. 5 (pleading guilty on 
December 13, 2000); Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Sententing Judgment, supra note 84, at paras. 12-15 (pleading guilty 
on September 19, 2001; September 19, 2001; and September 4, 2001, respectively). As explained above, the 
Erdemović case is not included among these cases because Erdemović pled guilty at his initial appearance.  
287 See also Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43. 
288 Press Release, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, "Brcko" Indictment: Goran Jelisić Pleads 














orchestrated	 by	 S-FOR	 in	which	 he	was	 hooded,	 beaten,	 kidnapped,	 and	 taken	 to	 the	
boarder	of	Bosnia	Herzegovina	to	be	subsequently	transferred	by	S-FOR	to	the	ICTY.292		















290 Press Release, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Decision on Todorovic's Motion For 
Judicial Assistance, XT/ P.I.S./ 636-e (Oct. 20, 2000), www.icty.org/sid/7811. 
291 See, Combs, Copping a Plea, supra note 112, at 118. 
292 Id. at 118-19. See also Susan Lamb, Illegal Arrest and the Jurisdiction of the ICTY, in ESSAYS ON 
ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 27-35 (Richard 
May et al. eds., 2001) (discussing the events surrounding Todorovic’s arrest and transfer to the ICTY). 
293 See Combs, Copping a Plea, supra note 112, at 119. 
294 Id. 
295 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defense Motion on Jurisdiction (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 10, 1995). 
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	 With	his	motion	threatening	the	legitimacy	of	the	ICTY	if	NATO	were	to	continue	
to	 disobey	 the	 ICTY	 order,	 Todorović	 gained	 leverage	 in	 his	 negotiations	 with	 the	
Prosecutor.	 NATO,	 the	 U.S.,	 and	 other	 states	 appealed	 the	 decision	 and	 the	 Appeals	










	 The	 Sikirica	 case	 involved	 three	 defendants:	 Duško	 Sikirica,	 Damir	 Došen	 and	
Dragan	 Kolundžija.300	 All	 three	 were	 charged	 with	 crimes	 against	 humanity	 and	
violations	of	the	laws	and	customs	of	war.	Additionally,	Sikirica	was	also	charged	with	
genocide.	The	defendants	all	entered	a	plea	of	not	guilty	and	the	case	proceeded	to	trial.301	







296 See Prosecutor v. Simic, Simic, Tadic, Todorovic, and Zaric, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Judicial 
Supplements, Decision on (1) Application by Stevan Todorovic to re-open the Decision of 27 July 1999, (2) 
Motion by ICRC to Re-Open Scheduling Order of 18 November 1999, and (3) Conditions for Access to Material 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2000). 
297 Count 1 of the indictment. Prosecutor v. Todorović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at para. 5. 
298 Prosecutor v. Todorović, Case No. IT-95-9/1, Decision on the Prosecution Motion to Withdraw 
Counts of the Indictment and Defence Motion to Withdraw Pending Motions, para. 1 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001); Prosecutor v. Todorović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at para. 5. 
299 Prosecutor v. Todorović, Decision on the Prosecution Motion to Withdraw Counts of the Indictment 
and Defence Motion to Withdraw Pending Motions, supra note 244, at para. 2; Prosecutor v. Todorović, 
Sentencing Judgment, supra note 58, at para. 4. 
300 Sikirica was the most senior ranking of the three. 
301 See William Schabas, Commentary, in ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNALS, VOLUME VIII: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 2001-2002 







Erdemović	 case	 –	 he	 immediately	 and	 comprehensively	 accepted	 responsibility	 to	 the	
entire	 indictment	 against	 him.	 The	 Erdemović	 case	 challenges	 the	 ICTY’s	 current	
ideological	 narrative	 constructed	 around	 reconciliation.	 Extant	 sentencing	 judgments	






hearing,	 expressed	 genuine	 remorse,	 and	 fully	 cooperated	 with	 the	 Prosecution	 in	
bringing	to	light	what	happened.	Although	in	subsequent	cases,	notably	the	Plavšić	case,	
these	 factors	 are	 considered	 relevant	 to	 determining	 the	 accused’s	 contribution	 to	
reconciliation	and	thus	also	a	reduction	in	punishment,	the	Erdemović	Trial	Chamber	did	
not	 consider	 contribution	 to	 reconciliation	 per	 se	 as	 a	 sentencing	 factor.	 In	 fact,	





the	Plavšić	 case	 and	 their	unbridled	 enthusiasm	 about	 how	her	 narrowly	 crafted	 and	
limited	 admission	 will	 have	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 reconciliation	 in	 the	 former	
Yugoslavia.	The	notion	of	 reconciliation	overwhelms	 the	analysis	of	 sentencing	 in	 the	
Plavšić	case,	but	is	non-existent	in	Erdemović.	Yet,	the	latter	did	not	bargain	his	plea,	made	
no	demands	for	charge	reduction,	made	no	effort	to	limit	the	factual	basis	of	his	admission	
(i.e.	 he	 did	 not	 limit	 the	 historical	 record),	 and	 did	 not	 insist	 on	 first	 obtaining	 the	
																																																								
302 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Sententing Judgment, supra note 84, at para. 24.  
303 Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 43, at para. 58. In comparison, in the 
Plavšić case, the concept of reconciliation appears no less than 27 times in the sentencing judgment. Prosecutor 





gained	 traction,	 paradoxically,	 in	 cases	 where	 the	 accused	 bargained	 for	 a	 less	







sentencing	 and	 that	 the	 Prosecution	 was	 unwilling	 to	 bargain	 away	 the	 charge	 of	
genocide.	The	Plavšić	case	reversed	the	trajectory	on	both	matters.	It	was	the	first	time	
the	Prosecutor	willingly	dropped	charges	of	genocide	against	an	accused	in	return	for	her	
guilty	 plea.	Moreover,	 it	marked	 the	 coming	 of	 age	 of	 reconciliation,	 as	 it	 proved	 an	
influential	force	in	mitigating	Biljana	Plavšić’s	sentence.	
	
2. The Coming of Age of Reconciliation Ideology.  
Generally,	 sentencing	 discounts	 for	 guilty	 pleas	 are	 justified	on	 the	 grounds	of	
their	 functional	 utility,	 namely	 that	 plea	 bargains	 can	 result	 in	 efficiency	 benefits	 by	
saving	costs	and	Tribunal	resources	related	to	investigation,	counsel	fees,	trial	costs,	etc.	
The	Plavšić	Trial	Chamber,	however,	offered	more	than	a	functional	justification	for	plea	
bargains	 that	 result	 in	 large	 sentencing	 reductions	 by	 arguing	 that	 they	 substantially	
contribute	 to	 the	 Tribunal’s	 presumed	 mandate.	 The	 judges	 characterized	 Plavšić’s	
negotiated	and	carefully	contrived	guilty	plea	as	a	genuine	expression	of	remorse	and	a	
meaningful	 contribution	 to	 a	 historical	 record	 that	 significantly	 advanced	 the	 goal	 of	
reconciliation,	 rather	 than	 a	 self-interested	 maneuver	 that	 resulted	 in	 limiting	 her	
criminal	liability	and	punishment.305	Both	scholars	and	ICL	practitioners	have	criticized	
																																																								
304 Janine Natalya Clark, Plea-Bargaining at the ICTY: Guilty Pleas and Reconciliation, 20 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 415, 416 (2009) (arguing that reconciliation is “seriously undermined” by plea-bargaining and reduced prison 
sentences). 
305 Id. at para. 70. 
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the	 “overinflated	 significance”	 that	 the	 judges	 “attributed	 to	 her	 remorse	 and	 post-
conflict	activities.”306	
The	 Plavšić	 case	 marks	 a	 turning	 point	 in	 the	 ICTY’s	 legacy.	 The	 rise	 of	
reconciliation	 ideology	as	a	 justification	 for	 the	practice	of	plea	bargaining307	and	as	a	









remaining	 crimes,	 except	 persecution	 as	 a	 crime	 against	 humanity.	 In	 return,	 Plavšić	
would	plead	guilty	to	one	count	for	the	crime	of	persecution.311		
	 She	was	 the	 first	 defendant	 for	whom	 the	 Prosecution	willingly	withdrew	 the	
genocide	charges	 from	the	 indictment	 in	exchange	 for	a	plea.	 Ironically,	 this	 first	 time	
willingness	to	bargain	away	the	crime	of	genocide	was	inspired	by	a	defendant	who	was	
																																																								
              306 Chifflet & Boas, Sentencing Coherence in ICL (2012), supra note 2 at 149. 
307 See Damaska, What is the Point, supra note 40, at 341 (concluding that the only viable justification 
for plea bargaining is efficiency), for a critique of various justifications for plea-bargaining. 
308 Prosecutor v. Simić, Case No. IT-95-9-2-S, Sentencing Judgment, paras. 9-16 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 17 2002) (pleading guilty on May 13, 2002); Prosecutor v. Obrenović, Case No. IT-
02-60/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, paras. 10, 12-21 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 21, 2003) 
(pleading guilty on May 21, 2003); Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolić, Case No IT-02-60/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, 
para. 12 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 2, 2003) (pleading guilty on May 7, 2003); Prosecutor 
v. Mrda, Case No. IT-02-59-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 5 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 
31, 2004) (pleading guilty on July 24, 2003); Prosecutor v. Jokić, Case No. IT-01-42/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, 
paras. 7-14 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 18, 2004) (pleading guilty on Aug. 27, 2003); 
Prosecutor v. Banović, Case No. IT-02-65-1-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 13 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Oct. 28, 2003) (pleading guilty on June 26, 2003); Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-
S, Sentencing Judgment, paras. 5, 14 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 18, 2003) (pleading guilty 
on Sept. 4, 2003); Prosecutor v. Češić, Case No. IT-95-10/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 4 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 11, 2004) (pleading guilty on Oct. 8, 2003); Prosecutor v. Deronjić, Sentencing 
Judgment, supra note 52, at paras. 18-19 (pleading guilty on Sept. 30, 2003); Prosecutor v. Babić, Case No. IT-
03-72-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 10 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 29, 2004) (pleading 
guilty on Jan. 27, 2004); Miroslav Bralo, Case No. IT-95-17-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 3 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 7, 2005) (pleading guilty on July 19, 2005). 
309 See Nancy Amoury Combs, Procuring Guilty Pleas for International Crimes: The Limited Influence 
of Sentencing Discounts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 69, 93 (2006). 
310 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Indictment, Case No. IT-00-40-I (3 April 2000) para. 19. The counts were: 
Count 1(Genocide) and Count 2 (Complicity in Genocide). 
311 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Plea Agreement, Case No. IT-00-39&40-PT (30 September 2002). 
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international	 community	 rightfully	expected	an	accounting	 for	Del	Ponte’s	decision	to	
drop	genocide	 from	the	indictment.	However,	she	offered	no	explanation	 in	the	public	
forum	of	an	international	courtroom.	Nor	did	the	judges	press	her	for	one.	If	there	was	a	
good	 reason	 for	 the	 compromise,	 it	 did	 not	 appear	 in	 the	 Court’s	 official	 records	 or	
sentencing	judgment,	and	thus	omitted	from	the	judicial	historical	record.		
	 If	 the	 judges	 genuinely	 believe	 that	 the	 goal	 of	 reconciliation	 is	 central	 to	 the	
Tribunal’s	 mandate,	 that	 International	 Tribunals	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 contribute	 to	




circumstances	 resulting	 in	 a	 factual	 record	 narrower	 than	 the	 original	 indictment	
undermines	 reconciliation	 and	 truth	 finding.	 Rather	 than	 address	 difficult	 questions	
about	 responsibility	 and	 punishment	 that	 are	 crucial	 to	 the	 goal	 of	 reconciliation,	
international	 sentencing	 judgments	 idealize	 reconciliation	 as	 vague	 aspirations	of	 ICL	










312 In her published memoirs, Del Ponte describes Plavšić as a “close associate” of the notorious Radovan 
Karadzic and Momcilo Krajisnik. Del Ponte further claims that Plavšić “participated at the highest political levels 
in the campaign to dismember Bosnia and Herzegovina and ethnically cleanse large swaths of its territory.” See 
CARLA DEL PONTE, MADAME PROSECUTOR: CONFRONTATIONS WITH HUMANITY’S WORST CRIMINALS AND THE 
CULTURE OF IMPUNITY 160 (2008). 
313 See CARLA DEL PONTE, MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 312, at 161. 
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Chamber	 appears	 to	 go	 beyond	 this	 and	 treat	 reconciliation	 itself	 as	 an	 independent	
mitigating	factor.		
The	problem	with	treating	reconciliation	as	an	independent	ground	for	sentence	
mitigation	 lies	 in	 the	 limitations	 of	 criminal	 justice	 legalism.	 Reconciliation	 is	 better	
understood	 as	 a	 slow	rebuilding	 process,	 not	an	 event.	While	 judicial	 institutions	 are	
quite	capable	of	determining	whether,	say,	a	war	criminal	“voluntarily	surrendered,”	they	
are	not	particularly	apt	at	predicting	future	events.	Whether	the	accused	has	“contributed	
to	 reconciliation”	 is	 usually	 difficult	 to	measure	with	 legal	 certainty.	 It	 cannot	 be	 put	





murdered	 family	 members	 have	 been	 hidden	 or	 buried.	 But	 the	 contribution	 to	
reconciliation	of	gestures,	such	as	a	general	apology,	on	which	the	Plavšić	Trial	Chamber	
relied,	is	highly	speculative.	These	apologies	are	often	devoid	of	personal	acceptance	of	
responsibility.	 They	 simply	 recognize	 that	 suffering	 and	 harm	 occurred	 and	 express	









public	 statement	 that	 the	 judge	used	 to	 justify	mitigating	her	penalty	 to	eleven	years’	
imprisonment.315	 Barely	 two	 years	 after	 her	 public	 remorse	 and	 apology	 in	 the	
courtroom	of	the	ICTY,	she	denied	all	responsibility	for	her	role	in	the	atrocities	to	the	
																																																								
314 While aggravating circumstance must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, mitigating circumstance 
need only be proved on a balance of probabilities. See Prosecutor v. Milan Simić, Case No. IT-95-9/2-S, 
Sentencing Judgment, paras. 39-40 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 17, 2002). 
315 Interview by Banja Luka ATV with Biljana Plavšić (Mar. 11, 2005), 
http://www.atvbl.com/home.php?id=billjanaintervju. An unofficial translation into English by the ICTY Outreach 
Office in Sarajevo is available on file with the author. 
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viewing	 general	 public	 back	 in	 the	 former	 Yugoslavia.	With	 thousands,	 if	 not	 tens	 of	
thousands,	of	persons	whose	lives	she	victimized	watching,	she	emphatically	claimed:	(1)	
she	only	pled	guilty	because	witnesses	that	would	establish	her	innocence	were	afraid	to	
come	 forward;	 (2)	 smug	 international	 judges	 sitting	 in	 The	Hague	 far	 away	 from	 the	
realities	of	the	conflict	could	not	comprehend	that	a	high	ranking	person	in	her	position,	
removed	from	the	battlefield,	may	not	know	what	 is	going	on	at	 the	ground	 level;	 (3)	
Western	 powers,	 creators	 and	 backers	of	 the	 tribunal,	 refused	 to	 accept	 that	 the	 real	
culprits	of	the	conflict	where	the	Bosnians	that	wanted	independence	in	the	first	place.316	
To	the	victims,	her	statements	most	likely	came	across	as:	(1)	I	am	not	responsible;	(2)	
the	 Bosnian	 Serb	 leadership	 is	 not	 responsible;	 and	 (3)	 the	 victims	 got	 what	 they	
deserved.	Perhaps	Del	Ponte	and	the	international	judges	had	no	reason	to	suspect	that	
Plavšić	would	so	 fantastically	and	publically	unravel	 the	 foundations	of	her	mitigated	
sentence.	Nevertheless,	the	experience	illustrated	why	the	ICC	should	not	entangle	with	
consequentialist	aspirations.	At	least,	judges	should	not	allow	the	goal	of	reconciliation	





3. Interconnectivity: Reconciliation Ideology & Sentencing Factors.  
a. Failure to Link Lack of Cooperation to Sentencing Discounts based on Purported 
Contribution to Reconciliation.  
	
The	 sentencing	 law	 of	 international	 criminal	 courts	 and	 tribunals	 recognize	
cooperation	with	the	Prosecutor	or	Court	as	a	mitigation	factor.318	It	is	the	only	mitigating	
factor	 explicitly	 provided	 in	 the	 Rules	 of	 Procedure	 and	 Evidence	 for	 the	 ICTY	 and	
ICTR.319	Plavšić	firmly	refused	to	cooperate	with	the	ICTY	or	the	Office	of	the	Prosecutor,	
despite	 several	 interventions	 by	 Del	 Ponte	 and	 her	 team	 to	 get	 Plavšić	 to	 reverse	
course.320	When	Del	Ponte	tried	to	include	in	the	plea	agreement	a	condition	that	Plavšić	
																																																								
316 See id. 
317 Prosecutor v. Katanga, Decision on Sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/07, 
(23 May 2014); Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ICC-01/12-01/15 (27 September 2016). 
318 INT’L CRIM CT. R. P. & EVID. 145 (2)(a)(iii) (2003); INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
R. P. & EVID. 101 (2009). 
319 Id. 








Karadzić,	 Krajišnik,	 and	 Mladić.322	 Del	 Ponte	 would	 later	 claim	 in	 her	 memoirs	 that	
Plavšić	had	deceived	her	into	thinking	that	she	would	cooperate.323		
Her	purported	“contribution	to	reconciliation”	should	have	been	assessed	in	light	
of	 her	 staunch	 refusal	 and	 failure	 to	 cooperate	 with	 the	 ICTY	 investigation	 of	 the	




an	 aggravating	 factor.324	 The	 international	 sentencing	 jurisprudence	 correctly	 rejects	
such	an	approach.325	However,	failure	to	cooperate	with	international	justice	is	relevant	













321 See id. at 161. 
322 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Hearing Transcript, IT-00-39&40/1-S (17 December 2002) p. 610. 
323 CARLA DEL PONTE, MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 312, at 161. 
324 Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Judgment, supra note 151, at para. 774. See Dana, Revisiting the Blaškić, supra 
note 74, at 327.  
325 See Dana, Revisiting the Blaškić, supra note 74, at 328. 
326 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 36, at para. 77 (emphasis by Trial Chamber).  
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Helsinki	Board	in	Sandzak	at	the	time	of	Plavšić’s	sentencing,	also	drew	attention	to	her	
failure	 to	 “bring	 into	 question	 the	 state	 policy	 that	 led	 towards	 the	 extinction	 of	 the	





Prosecutor’s	 assessment	 seems	 to	 better	 capture	 the	 extent	 of	 her	 contribution	 to	
reconciliation.	The	OTP	recommended	a	prison	term	of	 fifteen	to	twenty-five	years.330	
The	Trial	Chamber	sentenced	her	to	eleven	years.331	This	was	not	the	first	time	a	trial	
chamber	 imposed	a	sentence	 lower	than	the	Prosecutor’s	recommendation,	but	 it	was	
the	first	time	the	Prosecutor	did	not	appeal	a	sentence	below	its	recommended	range.	
b. Superior Position Results in Paradoxical Boost for Mitigation.  
	
The	 goal	 of	 reconciliation	 exerts	 an	 unexpected	 effect	 on	 the	 role	 of	 “superior	
position”	as	a	sentencing	factor.		ICL	judgments	have	long	held	that	the	superior	position	
of	the	accused	is	a	factor	that	aggravates	the	accused’s	punishment.		In	the	Plavšić	case,	
however,	 the	 ICTY	 used	 her	 superior	 position	 to	 lower	 her	 sentence,	 as	 the	 judges	
enthusiastically	embraced	reconciliation	 ideology.	 	Apparently,	 the	Trial	Chamber	was	
guided	in	this	direction	by	the	Prosecutor	who	amplified	the	mitigating	value	of	Plavšić’s	
contribution	 to	 “reconciliation”	 and	 “expressions	 of	 remorse”	 based	 on	 her	 superior	
position	 as	 a	 high-ranking	 and	 high-profiled	 member	 of	 the	 Bosnian	 Serb	 war	
leadership.332		
The	 Trial	 Chamber	 noted:	 “[t]he	 Prosecution	 states	 that	 this	 expression	 of	
remorse	 is	noteworthy	since	 it	 is	offered	 from	a	person	who	 formerly	held	a	 leadership	
position,	 and	 that	 it	 ‘merits	 judicial	 consideration.’”333	Thus,	 the	Plavšić	Trial	Chamber	
																																																								
327 See Milanka Saponja-Hadzic, Hague Deals Reduce Impact, INST. OF WAR & PEACE REPORTING (July 
24, 2003), http://iwpr.net/report-news/hague-deals-reduce-impact.  
328 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 36, at paras. 66-81. In the Trial Chamber’s 
own assessment, “these circumstances make a formidable body of mitigation”. Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing 
Judgement, supra note 36, at para. 110.  
329 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 36, at para. 130. 
330 Id. at para. 128. 
331 Id. at para. 132. 
332 Id. at para. 70. 








cases.	 In	 some	 cases,	 it	 appears	 that	 both	 the	 Prosecutor	 and	 the	 judges	 award	 less	
sentencing	reduction	for	low-level	defendants	who	contribute	to	reconciliation.335	Citing	




4. The Perverse Effects of Reconciliation Ideology on Sentencing Outcomes 
As	noted	above,	 reconciliation	was	not	a	 significant	 factor	 in	 sentencing	 in	 the	
early	practice	of	the	ICTY.	However,	since	the	Plavšić	Sentencing	Judgment,	it	has	received	
frequent	consideration	by	trial	chambers	when	addressing	sentencing.	In	the	Plavšić	case,	





of	 “contribution	 towards	 reconciliation.”	 Caution	 here	 is	 justified	 on	 both	 moral	 and	
practical	basis.	The	Plavšić	case	illustrates	why.		
During	Plavšić’s	sentencing	hearing,	I	observed,	first	hand,	defense	counsel	argue	
to	 the	 judges	 that	 her	 remorse	 and	 acceptance	 of	 responsibility	 provided	 a	 more	
significant	contribution	to	reconciliation	than	had	the	same	come	from	a	lower	ranking	
																																																								
334 Id. at para. 70. 
335 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bralo, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94. This case is discussed in detail 
below. 
336 Prosecutor v. Obrenović, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, para. 110 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 2003). 
337 See Nancy A. Combs, Procuring Guilty Pleas for International Crimes, supra note 253, at 98; Mark 
B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 683, 688-9, 
n.21 (2007). See also Daria Sito-Sucic, Muslim Victims Outraged, Say Plavšić Sentence Low, REUTERS, Feb. 27, 
2003; Amra Kebo, Regional Report: Plavsic Sentence Divides Bosnia, INST. OF WAR & PEACE REPORTING (Feb. 




–	 admission	 of	 responsibility.”338	 Never	 mind	 that	 her	 limited	 acceptance	 of	
responsibility	was	 known	 to	 the	 judges	 or	 that	 her	 remorse	 proved	 to	 be	 ostensible.	
Nonetheless,	all	this	coming	from	the	Defense	was	largely	expected.	The	real	surprise	was	
that	Chief	Prosecutor	Carla	de	Ponte,	in	a	rare	court	appearance	at	a	sentencing	hearing,	
made	 the	 same	 argument	 but	 even	more	 emphatically.339	 She	 argued	 that	 as	 a	 high-
ranking	 figure	 and	 former	 leader,	 her	 remorse	 and	 contribution	 to	 reconciliation	 is	
particular	 noteworthy	 and	 merits	 special	 consideration.340	 Thus,	 in	 advancing	 a	
framework	 for	 how	 reconciliation	 should	 influence	 sentencing	 allocations,	 the	 Chief	




Because	 the	Trial	 Chamber	 accepted	 the	 goal	 of	 reconciliation	 as	 a	 relevant	 factor	 in	
punishing	atrocities,	it	was	able	to	justify	substantial	reduction	of	prison	time.		
Accordingly,	 greater	 contributions	 to	 reconciliation	 merit	 greater	 reduction	 in	
punishment.	Unfortunately,	 ICTY	 judges	and	the	Chief	Prosecutor	appear	to	weigh	the	
value	 of	 an	 accused’s	 contribution	 to	 reconciliation	 based	 largely	 on	 his	 or	 her	 rank.	
Under	 their	 approach,	 high-ranking	 offenders,	 who	 accept	 responsibility	 for	 their	
wrongdoings,	 deserve	 more	 sentencing	 reduction	 than	 low-level	 individuals	 merely	







338 See Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1, Sentencing Hearing Transcript, para. 649 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17, 2002). 
339 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 36, at para. 70. 
340 Id. 
341 Superior position is an aggravating factor in the ICTY jurisprudence. 
342 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bralo, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94, at para. 95; Prosecutor v. Nikolić, 
Case No. IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgment, § X (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 18, 2003), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragan_nikolic/tjug/en/nik-sj031218e.pdf. 
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Therefore,	 the	 logical	 conclusion	 of	 the	 reconciliation	 ideology	 adopted	 by	 the	
Plavšić	 Trial	 Chamber	 is	 that	 less	 culpable	 and	 lower	 ranking	 perpetrators	 will	 not	
receive	the	same	degree	of	mitigation,	resulting	in	higher	penalties.	If	so,	this	would	be	
elitism	 at	 its	 worst	 and	 consequentialism	 at	 its	 most	 perverse.	 In	 order	 to	 test	 this	
hypothesis,	I	examined	the	ICTY	sentencing	judgments	to	identify	cases	similar	to	Plavšić.	
Two	 cases	 –	 the	 prosecutions	 of	Miroslav	 Bralo	 and	 Dragon	 Nikolić	 –	 shared	 several	
factors	 in	common	with	the	Plavšić	 case.343	Both	involved	a	plea	of	guilt,	admission	to	
crimes	against	humanity,	underlying	 crimes	 that	 included	killings	and	murder,	 and	 in	
both	cases,	the	trial	judges	found	reconciliation	to	be	a	mitigation	factor	in	sentencing.	
In	the	Bralo	case,	a	Croatian	defendant	–	a	relatively	minor	figure	in	the	conflict	–	
was	 initially	 only	 charged	 with	 war	 crimes.344	 Because	 of	 his	 complete	 self-effacing	





guilty	 to	 all	 charges.346	 The	 trial	 judges	 considered	 his	 unexpurgated	 acceptance	 of	
criminal	responsibility	as	an	unequivocal	sign	of	sincere	remorse	and	willingness	to	be	
held	accountable.347	
As	 noted	 above,	 the	 process	 leading	 to	 an	 accused’s	 admission	 to	 his	 or	 her	
participation	 in	atrocity	 crimes	and	ethnic	violence	 impacts	 the	goal	of	 reconciliation.	
Plavšić	and	Bralo	stand	in	sharp	contrast.	The	former	machinated	to	limit	and	diffuse	the	
scope	and	gravity	of	her	crimes,	successfully	minimizing	her	criminal	responsibility.	Her	
plea	 deal	 included	 charge	 reduction	 with	 the	 removal	 of	 genocide	 from	 the	 record,	
thereby	altering	the	narrative	of	 the	conflict	and	degree	of	victimization.	Bralo,	on	the	
other	hand,	 showed	unabridged	 acknowledgement	 of	his	moral	 blameworthiness	 and	
took	 full	 responsibility	 for	 his	 wrongful	 conduct.	 While	 Plavšić	 bargained	 down	 her	
responsibility,	Bralo	accepted	responsibility	beyond	the	initial	charges	against	him.	
																																																								
343 Examining these cases allows the opportunity to look at both variants of guilty pleas: an unconditional guilty 
plea and a bargained-for guilty plea. 
344 Press Release, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Indictment against Miroslav Bralo Made 
Public, JL/P.I.S./902-e, (Oct. 13, 2004), http://www.icty.org/sid/8352.  
345 Prosecutor v. Bralo, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94, at para. 62. 
346 Id. at paras. 5-6. 
347 Id. at para. 60. 
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Working	from	the	contested	premise	that	reconciliation	is	an	appropriate	goal	of	
sentencing	 for	 international	 crimes,	 Bralo’s	 contribution	 to	 reconciliation	 arguably	
merits	greater	mitigation.348	The	Trial	Chamber	found	that	Bralo	apologized	to	victims	in	
person	 and	 through	 personalized	 letters,	 identified	 previously	 unknown	 locations	 of	
mass	graves	allowing	 survivors	 to	 carry	out	 funerals	 for	 their	departed	 loved	ones	 in	
accordance	with	their	religion	and	customs,	in	some	cases	exhuming	the	body	from	the	
mass	grave	himself,	and	participated	in	de-mining	operations.349	This	may	be	understood	
as	 direct	 reconciliatory	 acts.	 It	 is	 more	 tangible	 to	 individual	 victims	 than	 Plavšić’s	
prescribed	 general	 apology.	 Although	 the	 Tribunal	 held	 that	 Bralo	 contributed	 to	
reconciliation,350	 it	 did	 not	 afford	 Bralo’s	 acts	 as	 much	 weight	 in	 mitigation	 as	 was	
awarded	 to	 Plavšić.	 Has	 the	 ICTY’s	 reconciliation	 ideology	 turned	 the	 significance	 of	




her	 sentencing,	 she	 was	 the	 highest-ranking	 figure	 on	 any	 side	 of	 the	 conflict	 to	 be	
punished	by	the	ICTY.354	Bralo	was	a	relatively	low	ranking	figure,	a	Croatian	foot	soldier	
in	a	notorious	military	unit	with	little	or	no	command	authority.355	Dragon	Nikolić,	also	a	
relatively	 low	 level	 perpetrator,	 was	 sentenced	 to	 23	 twenty-three	 years	 of	
imprisonment.356		
																																																								
348 Id. at para. 72.  
349 Id. at paras. 66-71. 
350 Prosecutor v. Bralo, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94, para. 71.  
              351 In the opinion of many commentators, her unacceptably lenient punishment fails to give a true 
impression of the gravity of her crimes. See Chifflet & Boas, Sentencing Coherence in ICL (2012), supra note 2 
at 149 (stating that Plavšić’s “11 year prison sentence belies the seriousness of the heinous crimes she helped 
perpetrate”). 
352 Id. at para. 95. 
353 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 36, at para. 10. See also Nancy A. Combs, 
International Decisions: Prosecutor v. Plavs̆ić, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 929, 930 (2003) ("From 1990 through 1992, 
Plavs̆ić was the Serbian representative to the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
serving for a time as the acting co-president of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and later as a 
member of the collective and expanded Presidencies of the Republika Srpska. Known as the ‘Serbian Iron Lady’ 
as a result of her hard-line nationalism and rabidly anti-Muslim views, Plavs̆ić was a close ally of Radovan 
Karadz̆ić."); CARLA DEL PONTE, MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 312, at 160-61. 
354 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 36, at para. 10; Combs, International 
Decisions, supra note 295, at 930; CARLA DEL PONTE, MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 312, at 160. When 
Plavs̆ić was sentenced, the other senior figures who bore the greatest responsibility for the atrocities were either 
not in custody or their trials were ongoing. 
355 Prosecutor v. Bralo, Judgment on Sentencing Appeal, supra note 94, at para. 2. 
356 Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, Appeals Sentencing Judgment, supra note 60, at paras. 2, 4. 
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Plavšić’s	 low	 sentence	 compared	 to	 higher	 penalties	 for	 Bralo	 and	 Nikolić	 is	
inconsistent	 with	 the	 Tribunal’s	 sentencing	 practice	 and	 legal	 rulings	 that	 superior	




factor,	 if	 not	 the	 most	 significant.	 The	 trial	 judges	 found	 that	 Bralo	 and	 Nikolić	
substantially	 cooperated	 with	 the	 Prosecutor,	 a	 mitigating	 factor	 that	 was	 absent	 in	
Plavšić’s	case.	Still,	both	were	punished	more	severely	than	Plavšić.	Compounding	the	
disparity,	 one	 could	 reasonably	 conclude	 that	 cooperation	 with	 the	 Court	 or	 the	
Prosecutor	 itself	 constitutes	 “contribution	 towards	 reconciliation.”	 Likewise,	 it	 would	














were	 no	 mitigating	 factors,	 it	 would	 have	 imposed	 a	 prison	 sentence	 of	 twenty-five	
years.357	Thus,	Bralo	received	a	sentencing	reduction	of	five	years	that	accounts	for	all	




357  Prosecutor v. Bralo, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94, at para. 95. 
358 Plavšić, Sentencing Judgement, para. 59. See also CARLA DEL PONTE, MADAME PROSECUTOR, 








Prosecutor	 links	 the	mitigating	value	of	 an	 accused’s	 contribution	 to	 reconciliation	 to	
their	superior	position.		
Similarly,	in	cases	where	reconciliation	is	a	factor,	the	OTP	exercises	its	discretion	





grants	 early	 release	 after	 the	 defendant	 has	 served	 two-thirds	 of	 the	 sentence.361	
Accordingly,	 when	 the	 OTP	 recommends	 a	 prison	 term	 of	 twenty-five	 years,	 it	 is	
effectively	asking	for	a	sentence	of	a	little	more	than	sixteen-and-a-half	years.	Thus,	its	











359 Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgement, supra note 36, at para. 70 (emphasis added). 
360 Id. para. 59. See also CARLA DEL PONTE, MADAME PROSECUTOR, supra note 312, at 161. 
361 Ines Monica Weinberg de Roca & Christopher M. Rassi, Sentencing and Incarceration in the Ad Hoc 
Tribunals, 44 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 50-51 (2008) (“At the ICTY, early release is determined by the implied powers 
of the President, which is particularly instructive when examining the case of the eight ICTY-convicted persons 
granted early release, after serving approximately two-thirds of their sentence.”). 
362 Plavšić was granted early release on 29 Ocotober 2009. 
363 Prosecutor v. Bralo, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 94, at para. 90. 
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early	 release.367	 Although	 her	 application	 for	 early	 release	 was	 made	 after	 her	
repudiation	 of	 responsibility	 on	 public	 television,	 something	 she	 repeated	 again	 for	 a	






5. Future of Reconciliation Ideology in Atrocity Sentencing: The ICC a New Hope? 
It	 is	 too	early	 to	draw	broad	conclusions	about	the	 future	role	of	reconciliation	
ideology	 in	 atrocity	 sentencing	 at	 the	 ICC.	 There	 is	 some	 indication	 that	 the	 ICC	will	
incorporate	 the	 notion	 of	 reconciliation	 into	 its	 sentencing	 practice,	 but	 with	 a	 new	
orientation.	Following	the	 lead	of	 the	Special	Court	 for	Sierra	Leone,	 ICC	 judges	 in	the	
Katanga	case	prioritized	the	“punitive	aspects”	of	atrocity	sentencing.371	They	held	that	
																																																								
364 Id. at para. 62. 
365 Luxury prison for Bosnia’s Iron Lady, TELEGRAPH, June 7, 2013, 
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1030607/asp/foreign/story_2044806.asp.  
366 Id. 
367 See generally President of the Int’l Trib. Judge Patrick Robinson, IT-00-39 & 40/1-ES, Decision of 
the President on the Application for Pardon or Commutation of Sentence of Mrs. Biljana Plavšić (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 14, 2009) [hereinafter Plavšić Pardon Decision]. 
368 Carrie Schimizzi, Bosnia war crimes victims submit evidence against former Serbian officials, JURIST 
(Apr. 8, 2011), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2011/04/bosnia-war-crimes-victims-submit-evidence-against-former-
serbian-officials.php; Iva Martinović, Outcry at Plavsic’s Belgrade Welcome, INST. FOR WAR & PEACE 
REPORTING (Nov. 4, 2009), http://iwpr.net/report-news/outcry-plavsics-belgrade-welcome.  
369 See Plavšić Pardon Decision, supra note 306, at para. 8. 
370 See id. 




reflects	 the	 degree	 of	 culpability	 while	 contributing	 to	 the	 restoration	 of	 peace	 and	
reconciliation.”373	Thus,	ICC	judges	appear	to	be	saying	that,	when	the	sentence	reflects	
the	perpetrator’s	culpability,	punishment	can	contribute	to	peace	and	reconciliation	in	
the	 affected	 communities.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 its	 sentencing	 judgment,	 the	 Katanga	 Trial	
Chamber	leaves	some	room	for	efforts	to	promote	peace	and	reconciliation,	noting	they	
“could	potentially	mitigate	the	sentence.”374	
This	 anchoring	 of	 reconciliation	 to	 just	 punishment	 was	 absent	 in	 the	 ICTY’s	
approach.	 	 In	 the	Plavšić	 case,	 even	 if	we	 accept	 that	 Plavšić	 did	 her	 part	 to	 promote	
reconciliation	with	her	public	 apology,	 the	 ICTY	arguably	 failed	 to	do	 its	part	when	 it	
imposed	a	relatively	low	sentence.		The	consequence	in	the	communities	concerned	was	
to	reject	her	apology	as	genuine	and	to	perceive	her	admission	of	guilty	as	self-serving	
deal-making	 to	 avoid	 just	 punishment.	 Additionally,	 the	 focus	 is	 on	 “palpable	 and	
genuine”	efforts	on	the	part	of	the	accused,	not	on	speculative	results.		Had	ICTY	applied	
this	approach,	Bralo’s	contribution	to	reconciliation	would	have	merited	greater	weight	
and	 Plavšić	 would	 have	 received	 less	 mitigation.	 The	 Trial	 Chamber	 scrutinized	 the	
evidence	provided	by	Katanga	against	the	standard	of	palpable	and	genuine	efforts.	 	It	
concluded	that	his	efforts	were	not.		Thus,	while	the	Trial	Chamber	was	prepared	mitigate	












374 Katanga Trial Sentence at para. 91. 
375 Ben Child, Kony 2012: Angelina Jolie calls for Ugandan warlord’s arrest, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 
12, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/film/2012/mar/12/kony-2012-angelina-jolie; Angelina Jolie attends ICC 
hearing to witness Lubanga Decision, AFRICANEWSWIRE.NET, Mar. 14 2012, 
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Criminal	 Court	 has	 fueled	 high	 expectations.	 Yet,	 the	 growing	 list	 of	 aspirations	




to	 ICL	 sentencing.	 	 Other	 international	 tribunals,	 particularly	 the	 ICTY,	 advanced	
numerous	and	conflicting	rationales	for	ICL	sentencing.	 	In	addition	to	retribution	and	
deterrence,	 judges	 at	 the	 ad	 hoc	 tribunals	 also	 claimed	 that	 the	 purposes	 of	 ICL	
sentencing	 include	 reconciliation,	 rehabilitation,	 general	 affirmative	 prevention,	
expressivism,	historical	recording	building,	and	more.376	Moreover,	when	ICL	sentencing	
judgments	 embrace	 these	 various	 ideologies,	 the	 judicial	 narratives	 do	 more	 than	
identifying	them	as	achievable	goals	of	international	prosecutions;	they	also	considered	
them	fundamentally	to	be	factors	that	appropriately	influence	sentence	allocations.			
As	was	 the	 case	with	 its	predecessor	 institutions,	 the	 ICC	will	have	 to	navigate	
justice	 through	 these	 conflicting	 tensions.	 	 Should	 it	 prioritize	 punitive	 aims	 or	
restorative	aims?	Should	it	prioritize	criminal	justice	objectives	(such	as	deterrence	and	




sentencing	 outcomes.	 	 The	 sentencing	 phase	 allows	 ICL	 to	 inject	 granularity	 into	 the	
discourse	of	culpability	and	accountability	for	atrocity	crimes.	This	powerful	potential	is	
largely	underutilized.	For	example,	as	 this	chapter	demonstrates,	 ICL	 judges	state	that	
deterrence	 is	 a	 primary	 function	 universally	 applicable	 to	 all	 perpetrators	 in	 atrocity	
trials.	 	 Yet,	 their	 actual	 sentencing	 outcomes	 reveal	 sensitivity	 to	 the	 view	 that	 the	
suitability	of	deterrence	ideology	may	turn	on	the	perpetrator’s	role	in	the	conflict.		These	
nuances	do	not	 come	 through	 in	 their	sentencing	narratives.	More	direct	 and	 layered	
																																																								
http://www.africanewswire.net/story.php?title=angelina-jolie-attends-icc-hearing-to-witness-lubanga-decision. 
See Angelina Jolie in court as ICC finds Congo warlord Thomas Lubanga guilty of using child soldiers, 
TELEGRAPH, Mar. 14, 2012, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/democraticrepublicofcongo/9143254/Angeli
na-Jolie-in-court-as-ICC-finds-Congo-warlord-Thomas-Lubanga-guilty-of-using-child-soldiers.html, for a video 
of Ms. Jolie’s statements following the verdict. 




	Although	 ICL	 sentencing	 judgments	 ostensibly	 claimed	 retribution	 and	
deterrence	 to	 be	 the	 primary	 rationales	 influencing	 the	 quantum	 of	 punishment,	 the	
actual	sentence	pronounced	frequently	undermined	both,	or	at	a	minimum,	are	counter-
intuitive	to	a	punitive	orientation.		Given	the	recurring	tensions	between	what	ICL	judges	




atrocity	 trials,	 ICL	 judges	 come	 under	 intense	 pressure	 from	 powerful	 international	
actors	 and	 institutions,	 local	 politicians,	 special	 interest	 groups,	 and	 the	 media	 to	
consider	 and	 accommodate	 meta-judicial	 agendas.	 	 Admittedly,	 international	 judges	
themselves	 have	 at	 times	 bought	 into	 romanticized	 notions	 that	 ICL	 institutions	 can	
achieve	an	awesome	array	of	social	goals	and	policy	objectives,	even	when	some	of	them	
are	in	direct	conflict	with	each	other.		
	 This	 overreach,	 even	 when	 well	 intended,	 has	 had	 a	 negative	 impact	 on	 the	
sentencing	 of	 perpetrators	 of	 genocide,	 crimes	 against	 humanity,	 and	 war	 crimes,	
resulting	 in	 confusing	 justifications	 for	 individual	 sentences.	Although	deterrence	and	
retribution	appear	most	frequently	in	the	tribunal’s	sentencing	judgments,	international	
judges	appealed	to	a	much	wider	range	of	justifications,	legal	and	political,	to	legitimize	









the	 judicial	 decision-making	 process	 results	 in	 perverse	 outcomes	 in	 the	 sentencing	
																																																								














that	 high-ranking	 perpetrators	 in	 leadership	 positions	 receive	more	 reduction	 in	 the	
quantum	of	punishment	than	foot	soldiers	where	both	are	 found	to	have	“contributed	
toward	 reconciliation.”378	 Those	 most	 responsible	 for	 atrocities,	 in	 particular,	 have	










admission	 and	 acceptance	 of	 responsibility.	 	 When	 the	 ICTY	 announced	 Plavšić’s	
sentence,	Karadzić	and	Mladić	were	still	at	large	and	Krajišnik	rejected	any	responsibility	
for	his	crimes.379	If	that	consequentialist	aim	was	the	strategy,	then	it	failed	miserably.	
None	 of	 the	 remaining	 most	 wanted	 perpetrators	 followed	 Plavšić’s	 suit	 in	 either	
voluntarily	surrendering	to	the	court	or	admitting	responsibility.	Krajišnik	maintained	
																																																								
378 See generally Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Sentencing Judgment, supra note 36; Prosecutor v. Bralo, 
Judgment on Sentencing Appeal, supra note 94. 
379 Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Trial Judgment, para. 888 (Sept. 27, 2006). 
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his	 innocence	 and	 opted	 for	 a	 trial.380	 Karadzić	 and	 Mladić	 refused	 to	 surrender.381	





the	 culpability	 and	 just	 distribution	 of	 punishment	 among	 the	 various	 actors’	
responsibility	 for	 atrocity	 crimes	 in	 a	 situation.	 Moreover,	 the	 goals	 (such	 as	
reconciliation)	they	seek	to	achieve	through	their	sentencing	reductions	are	beyond	the	
immediate	capacity	of	criminal	courts.	International	prosecutions	should	assume	a	more	
modest	 posture	 regarding	 its	 capabilities,	 lest	 it	 damages	 its	 core	 responsibility	 of	
punishing	perpetrators	of	atrocities	crimes.	This	is	not	to	say	that	international	criminal	




This	Chapter	has	 sought	 to	 reflect	on	aspirations	associated	with	 international	
atrocity	 trials	 and	 analyze	 how	 they	 have	 impacted	 judicial	 determinations	 of	 the	
quantum	 of	 punishment.	 	 It	 has	 called	 for	 clarity	 and	 distinction	 between	 desired	
ideological	aspirations	of	international	prosecutions	and	those	rationales	that	ought	to	
(or	 ought	 not	 to)	 influence	 the	 sentence.	 	 While	 clarity	 on	 the	 purpose	 of	 atrocity	
sentencing	is	crucial	to	improving	judicial	narratives	about	punishing	atrocities,	it	does	
not	 on	 its	 own	 improve	 sentencing	 outcomes.	 	 Clarity	 on	 the	 purpose	 of	 atrocity	




380 Id.  
381 Ed Vulliamy, Twelve years on, a killer on the loose, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 1, 2007, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/dec/02/warcrimes.edvulliamy1. 
382 Serb ultranationalist disrupts ware crimes trial, REUTERS, Nov. 1, 2006, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2006/11/01/uk-warcrimes-seselj-idUKL0146563020061101; Serb nationalist 
rejects UN court, BBC, Nov. 8, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7084506.stm. 











atrocity	 crimes	 of	 similar	 gravity	 are	 sentenced	 to	 punishments	 of	 vastly	 different	
severity.1	 	 This	 raises	 questions	 about	 whether	 “gravity”	 is	 indeed	 the	 primary	









In	order	 to	answer	 these	questions,	 the	 research	 sought	 to	 identify	 individuals	
convicted	of	 the	same	crimes.	This	methodology	allowed	the	analysis	 to	hold	constant	
gravity	of	the	crime	as	a	sentencing	factor	while	evaluating	the	influence	of	other	factors	
on	 the	 quantum	 of	 punishment.	 It	 also	 allowed	 us	 to	 evaluate	 whether	 gravity	 is	
consistently	 the	primary	 factor	 influencing	 sentencing	outcomes.	This	approach	made	
significant	 the	 jurisprudence	 of	 the	 Special	 Court	 for	 Sierra	 Leone	 (SCLS)	 due	 to	 the	
prosecutor’s	 distinctive	 approach	 to	 charging	 atrocity	 crimes.	 The	 SCSL	 Prosecutor	
conducted	 a	 single	 trial	 for	 each	warring	 party	 in	 the	 armed	 conflict	 and	 prosecuted	
multiple	co-perpetrators	of	varying	rank	within	the	same	armed	group	under	a	single	
																																																								
1 See Pascale Chifflet and Gideon Boas, Sentencing Coherence in International Criminal Law: The Cases of 
Biljana Plavsic and Miroslav Bralo, 23 CRIMINAL LAW FORUM 135, 147 and 154 (2012); Jean Galbraith, The 
Good Deeds of International Criminal Defendants, 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 799, 800 (2012); Ines Monica 
Weinberg de Roca, Sentencing and Incarceration in the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 44 STANFORD. J. INT’L L. 1, 6-12 
(2008); MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 11, 15, 56-57 (2007); Mark B. 
Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 683, 684, 
710 (2007); Andrew Keller, Punishment for Violations of International Criminal Law, 12 INDIANA 
INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW 53, 65-66 (2001). 
2 Robert Sloane, Sentencing for the “Crime of Crimes”, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 713, 734 (2007) (rejecting the 









in	 particular	 has	 been	 largely	 ignored	 in	 academic	 literature.3	 This	 too	 informed	 the	
decision	 to	 include	 the	SCSL’s	 sentencing	 jurisprudence	 in	 this	study.	By	selecting	 the	
SCSL’s	jurisprudence	as	the	subject	of	study,	Chapter	Four	makes	an	important	and	new	
contribution	to	ICL	literature.	Furthermore,	among	the	ad	hoc	and	hybrid	tribunals,	the	
SCSL	enjoys	 the	distinction	of	being	 the	only	 international	 court	 to	sentence	a	 former	





Drawing	on	the	 jurisprudence	of	 the	SCSL,	 this	Chapter	offers	an	original	claim	
regarding	atrocity	sentencing.	I	theorize	that	judges	consider	an	atrocity	criminal’s	role	
in	enabling	the	context,	that	is	conflict,	in	which	atrocity	crimes	erupt	when	allocating	an	





3 But see Shahram Dana, The Sentencing Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 42 GEORGIA J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 615 (2014). 
4 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the 
Statute, (10 July 2012) (hereafter Lubanga Sentencing Judgment). 
5 Admittedly, I went back and forth on whether I should refer to the enabler concept as a “factor” or a “theory”. 
I settled on presenting the concept as a “factor” at this stage, believing that it is premature to present it as a 
theory.   
6 See, e.g., Tadic Appeals Sentence, para. 55-58 (instructing trial judges to “consider the need for sentences to 
reflect the relative significance of the role of the Appellant in the broader context of the conflict”); Prosecutor v. 
Rukundo (ICTR-2001-70 Trial Chamber), Judgment para. 605, (27 February 2009); See also, Prosecutor v. 
Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgment (May 18, 2012) [hereinafter Taylor Trial Judgment] paras.5834-
5835, 5842, and 6913-6915 (finding that “Taylor’s acts and conduct had a substantial effect on the commission 
of the crimes because they: (i) enabled the RUF/AFRC‘s Operational Strategy; (ii) supported, sustained and 







The	 enabler	 factor	 closes	 the	 explanatory	 gap	 in	 sentencing	 outcomes	 left	
unexplained	by	the	gravity	narrative.8	Taking	the	SCSL	as	a	case	study	(for	the	reasons	





his	 co-defendant	 Augustine	 Gbao	 (52	 years	 versus	 25	 years)	 even	 though	 both	were	
convicted	of	the	same	crimes.	This	Chapter	also	employs	the	enabler	factor	to	explain	the	
sizable	 differences	 between	 the	 punishment	 of	 individuals	 who	 fought	 against	 the	
government	 of	 Sierra	 Leone	 versus	 the	 comparatively	 light	 sentences	 of	 government	
supporters.	 	 Additionally,	 the	 enabler	 concept	 offers	 a	 pathway	 towards	 congruency	
between	 judicial	 narratives	 and	 actual	 sentencing	 allocations.	 It	 is	 also	 instructive	 to	
future	sentencing	determinations	by	the	ICC	and	other	international	tribunals.	Thus,	in	
addition	 to	 closing	 the	 explanatory	 gap	 in	 sentence	 allocations,	 it	 also	 integrates	
sentencing	 outcomes	 with	 sentencing	 narratives	 and	 the	 goals	 of	 international	
prosecutions.	
	 	Section	 II	 launches	 straight	 into	 applying	 the	 enabler	 factor	 to	 explain	 the	
sentencing	 outcomes	 at	 the	 Special	 Court	 for	 Sierra	 Leone.	 	 The	 enabler	 factor	 is	
examined	 in	 three	 distinct	 contexts.	 	 First,	 it	 is	 offered	 to	 explain	 the	 sentence	 of	 an	
individual	atrocity	perpetrator	at	the	highest	level	of	power	and	authority,	such	as	a	head	
of	 state,	 and	 to	 push	 back	 against	 criticisms	 that	 Liberian	 President	 Charles	 Taylor’s	
sentence	was	too	harsh.		Second,	through	the	prism	of	the	enabler	factor,	I	will	illuminate	
the	sentencing	of	three	co-perpetrators	of	the	same	crimes	in	a	way	that	“gravity”	alone	
cannot	 explain.	 	 Third,	 the	 enable	 factor	 closes	 the	 explanatory	 gap	 between	 the	
																																																								
7 Compare Taylor Trial Judgment with Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Sentencing Judgment 
(May 30, 2012) [hereinafter Taylor Sentencing Judgment]. 
8 Chifflet & Boas, Sentencing Coherence in ICL, supra note 1, at 147, 156, and 158 (suggesting that gravity 





considerations	 for	 punishing	 atrocities.	 It	 critically	 analyzes	 four	 recurring	 pillars	 of	
atrocity	 sentencing	 in	 ICL	 jurisprudence:	 gravity,	 individual	 circumstances	 of	 the	




I	 reimagine,	 re-conceptualize	 and	 restructure	 these	 four	 core	 elements	 with	 an	 eye	
towards	optimizing	their	integration	with	the	purpose	of	atrocity	sentencing.	Thus,	this	
Chapter	 pulls	 together	 these	 key	 factors	 to	 effectuate	 their	 harmonized	 consideration	
when	determining	sentence	allocations	and	just	distribution	of	punishment	among	actors	




II. ENABLERS AND MASS ATROCITIES IN SIERRA LEONE 
	
When	 heads	 of	 states	 or	 heads	 of	 armed	 groups	 enable	 mass	 conflict	 and	
criminality,	 an	ominous	environment	 for	atrocities	 is	 created.	 	The	number	of	victims	









9 For further reading on the conflict in Sierra Leone see IAN SMILLIE, LANSANA GBERIE, & RALPH 
HAZLETON, THE HEART OF THE MATTER: SIERRA LEONE, DIAMONDS & HUMAN SECURITY 8 (2001) 
(discussing the devastating nature of the conflict); Nicole Fritz & Alison Smith, Current Apathy for Coming 
Anarchy: Building the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 391, 394 (2001) (discussing a 
campaign of terror against civilians that included abducting children, forced prostitution, and the amputation of 
limbs). 
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In	 Sierra	 Leone’s	 1996	 democratic	 elections,	 Alhaji	 Ahmad	 Tejan	 Kabbah,	 an	
ethnic	Mandingo,	was	 elected	 President	 of	 Sierra	 Leone,	 becoming	 his	 country’s	 first	




war	 against	 the	 Sierra	 Leone’s	 government	 of	 President	 Kabbah	 and	 past	 ruling	
regimes.13	
	 In	 December	 1996,	 President	 Kabbah	 and	 RUF	 leader	 Foday	 Saybana	 Sankoh	
signed	a	peace	agreement,	 the	Abidjan	Peace	Accord,	bringing	a	 temporary	halt	 to	 the	
atrocities	and	granting	blanket	amnesty	to	the	RUF	fighters.	However,	peace	did	not	last	





the	 newly	 elected	 government	 with	 a	 brutal	 military	 assault	 on	 Freetown	 in	 which	
Liberian	 President	 Charles	 Taylor	 had	 “a	 heavy	 footprint”	 in	 planning,	 enabling,	 and	
																																																								
10 Charles C. Jalloh, Contributions of the Special Court for Sierra Leone on the Developments of International 
Law, 15 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 165, 169 (2007) (“Jalloh Contributions”). Prosecutor v. Sesay, Trial Chamber 
Sentencing Judgment, para. 146 (April 8, 2009) (“RUF Trial Sentencing”). 
11 Nsongurua J. Udombana, Globalization of Justice and The Special Court of Sierra Leone’s War Crimes, 17 
Emory Int’l. Rev. 55, 71 (2003) (stating that the atrocities were occasioned by the desire to control of the 
country’s natural resources). 
12 See, Babafemi Akinrinade, International Humanitarian Law and the Conflict in Sierra Leone, 15 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 391, 392 (2001); Jalloh Contributions, supra note 10, at 169; RUF Trial 
Sentencing para. 146. 
13 Jamie O’Connell, Here Interest Meets Humanity: How to End the War and Support Reconstruction in Liberia, 
and the Case for Modest American Leadership, 17 HARVARD. HUM. RTS. J. 207, 213 (2004); Nicole Fritz & 
Alison Smith, Current Apathy for Coming Anarchy: Building the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 25 FORDHAM 
INT'L L.J. 391, 394 (2001) (discussing how after the RUF entered Sierra Leone and controlled the Eastern 
region of the country, it implemented Charles Taylor’s a campaign of terror by abducting children, forcing 
prostitution, and amputating limbs). 
14 Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Trial Chamber Judgment para. 19 (March 2, 2009). 
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overseeing.15	 Establishing	 themselves	 as	 the	 Armed	 Forces	 Revolutionary	 Council	
(AFRC),	these	mutinous	officers	installed	one	of	their	own,	Johnny	Paul	Koroma,	as	Sierra	
Leone’s	new	Head	of	State.	




Leoneans.16	With	 the	 intervention	 and	 support	 of	 the	 Economic	 Community	 of	West	
African	States	Monitoring	Group	(ECOMOG),	forces	loyal	to	Kabbah,	including	the	CDF,	
managed	to	regain	control	of	Freetown	and	reinstate	Kabbah	as	Sierra	Leone’s	president.	
The	 civilian	 population	 of	 Sierra	 Leone,	 however,	 saw	 no	 respite	 from	 deliberate	
brutalization	 and	 horrific	 attacks	 against	 them.	 	 All	 parties	 to	 the	 conflict,	 including	
ECOMOG	and	Nigerian	armed	forces,	continued	to	mercilessly	attack,	kill,	and	terrorize	
civilians.	 	The	 retreating	AFRC	and	RUF	 fighters	 looted	and	pillaged	villages,	 killed	or	
imprisoned	 civilians,	 and	 otherwise	 terrorized	 the	 population,	 including	 widespread	
mutilations	and	amputations.	The	hostilities	and	accompanying	atrocities	were	intense,	






Two	peace	agreements	and	 two	 full	 amnesties	 failed	 to	deliver	 lasting	or	even	
short-term	peace	to	the	country,	or	respite	to	Sierra	Leoneans	from	the	horrors	and	hell	
																																																								
15 Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Sentencing Judgment para. 76, 77, and 98 (30 May 
2012); CDF Trial Sentencing para. 44.  See also Human Rights Watch, Sierra Leone: Getting Away with 
Murder, Mutilation, and Rape, 11 Human Rts. Watch 3(A), at 12 (July 1999); James Rupert, Diamond Hunters 
Fuel Africa’s Brutal Wars. Washington Post Foreign Service. (October 16, 1999); Ian Stewart, Rebels Set 
Freetown Ablaze, President Opens Talks, Associated Press (January 7, 1999). 
16 ANTONIO CASSESE, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 677 (2009). 
17 See further, IAN SMILLIE, LANSANA GBERIE, & RALPH HAZLETON, THE HEART OF THE MATTER: SIERRA 
LEONE, DIAMONDS & HUMAN SECURITY 8 (2001) (discussing the devastating nature of the conflict); Nicole 
Fritz & Alison Smith, Current Apathy for Coming Anarchy: Building the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 25 
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 391, 394 (2001) (discussing a campaign of terror against civilians that included abducting 
children, forced prostitution, and the amputation of limbs). 
18 Tony Karon, “The Resistible Rise of Foday Sankoh,” Time Magazine (May 12, 2000) available at 
http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,45102,00.html (last visited July 3, 2013); Obituaries, Foday 
Sankoh, The Telegraph (July 31, 2003) available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1437579/Foday-Sankoh.html (last visited March 18, 2013). 
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they	suffered.		More	hostilities	followed	and	so	too	did	graver	atrocities.	Throughout	the	
war,	 Charles	 Taylor,	 now	 President	 of	 Liberia,	 provided	 material	 support	 to	 the	
RUF/AFRC	armed	groups	 that	enabled	 them	 to	 continue	 the	hostilities	and	atrocities,	
including	supplying	arms,	weapons,	munitions,	and	military	personnel.	After	the	failures	
of	 the	 “peace	 with	 amnesty”	 strategy,	 movement	 towards	 accountability	 and	 justice	
gained	traction,	perhaps	encouraged	by	the	international	tribunal	model	in	response	to	
the	atrocities	in	Rwanda	and	Yugoslavia.		In	June	2000,	President	Kabbah	pleaded	to	the	
United	 Nations	 Security	 Council	 to	 establish	 a	 “special	 court	 for	 Sierra	 Leone”	 to	
prosecute	RUF	and	AFRC	leaders	for	planning	and	executing	terrible	atrocity	crimes	that	
brutalized	and	terrorized	the	people	of	Sierra	Leone	for	more	than	10	years.19	The	United	






government	 and	 members	 of	 the	 AFRC	 Supreme	 Council;	 Issa	 Sesay,	 senior	 military	







nuance	 our	 observations	 by	 examining	 separately	 the	 sentences	 in	 the	 trials	 of	
vanquished	opponents	of	the	Sierra	Leone	government	and	the	trial	of	the	victorious	pro-
Sierra	 Leone	 forces.	 The	 average	 sentence	 for	 the	 vanquished	 opponents	 (i.e.	 Charles	




19 President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, Annex to the Letter dated Aug. 9, 2000, from the Permanent 
Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. 
Doc. S/2000/786 (Aug. 10, 2000). 




comprising	 of	 individual	 sentences	of	 50	 years	 for	 Brima	 and	Kanu,	 and	 45	 years	 for	





A.  ENABLER FACTOR AS APPLIED TO CHARLES TAYLOR  






underlying	 Taylor’s	 conviction,	 aiding	 and	 abetting,	 does	 not	 justify	 his	 sentence.28		
Heller’s	dissatisfaction	stems	largely	from	what	he	characterizes	as	poor	reasoning	and	
scant	 explanation	 for	 departing	 from	 basic	 principles	 that	 the	 judges	 themselves	
proffered	as	controlling	the	quantum	of	punishment.			
Although	 subsequently	 overturned	 by	 the	 Appeals	 Chamber,29	 the	 trial	 judges	
took	the	position	that	aiding	and	abetting	warrants	a	lesser	punishment	and	furthermore	
proclaimed	this	 to	be	a	general	principle	of	criminal	 law.30	But	 then	they	 immediately	
tossed	 this	 declared	 principle	 aside,	 and	 decide	 that	 they	 will	 instead	 consider	 the	
																																																								
21 See, AFRC Appeals Judgment, Sentencing Disposition. 
22 See, RUF Appeals Judgment, Sentencing Disposition. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Mark Drumbl, “The Charles Taylor Sentence and Traditional International Law”, Opinio Juris Blog, 11 June 
2012, available at http://opiniojuris.org/2012/06/11/charles-taylor-sentencing-the-taylor-sentence-and-
traditional-international-law (last visited 14 April 2018) (hereafter “Drumbl, Punishing Heads of State (2012)”).  
26 Id. 
27 Id.; See also, Wayne Jordash and Scott Martin, Due Process and Fair Trial Rights at the Special Court: How 
the Desire for Accountability Outweighed the Demands of Justice at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 23 
Leiden Journal of International Law 585 (2010) (claiming that the quest for accountability of perceived leaders 
has trumped certain fair trial rights). 
28 Kevin Jon Heller, The Taylor Sentencing Judgment: A Critical Analysis, 11 J. Int’l Crim. Justice 835 (2013) 
(hereafter “Heller, Taylor Sentence (2013)”). 
29 Taylor Appeals Judgment paras. 666 and 670. 

























only	 one	 of	 his	 crimes;	 for	 all	 others	 he	 was	 convicted	 as	 an	 aider	 and	 abettor.	 	 An	
explanation	with	greater	legs	is	that	the	judges	considered	Taylor’s	contribution	to	the	
																																																								
31 The SCSL Appeal Chamber decisively concludes that it is not.  It holds that the Trial Chamber’s position is 
inconsistent with the SCSL’s statute, rules, and jurisprudence. See, Taylor Appeals Judgment paras. 666 and 
670. The Appeal Chamber further holds that the Trial Chamber’s ruling here is not supported by customary 
international law, nor a general principle of law, citing and discussing numerous jurisdictions including the 
Sierra Leone, the United States, Austria, Brazil, Costa Rica, Puerto Rico, France, and Italy.  See, Id. para. 667.  
The SCSL also persuasively demonstrates the error of arguments that rely on ICTY jurisprudence to claim that 
aiding and abetting as a mode of liability warrants lesser punishment. Id. paras. 666-669.   






enabled	 the	RUF/AFRC’s	 operational	 strategy,	which	 included	 the	 committed	 atrocity	
crimes,	by	supporting,	sustaining	and	enhancing	the	RUF/AFRC’s	capacity	to	carry	out	
these	activities.35	Taylor	supplied	arms	and	ammunitions	to	the	RUF	and	AFRC	that	was	
“indispensable”	 in	 empowering	 them	 to	 launch	 attacks.36	 The	 RUF	 repeatedly	
encountered	 the	problem	of	depletion	of	 its	 arms	and	military	 supplies	and	 time	and	
again	Taylor	responded	by	directly	supplying	them	with	more	weapons.37		Without	the	
shipment	of	weapon’s	from	Charles	Taylor,	the	RUF	could	not	have	sustained	their	attacks	
on	 civilians.38	 During	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 United	 Liberation	 Movement	 of	 Liberia	 for	
Democracy	 (ULIMO)	 was	 supposed	 to	 disarm	 and	 surrender	 its	 weapons	 to	 the	 UN.		






and	 AFRC,42	 the	 Sentencing	 Judgment	 does	 not	 explicitly	 identify	 “enabling”	 as	 a	
sentencing	 factor.	 Nevertheless,	 I	 argue	 the	 enabler	 factor	 influenced	 and	 increased	
Taylor’s	sentence.		Implicit	in	the	judges’	sentencing	narrative	is	their	grave	concern	that	
Taylor	 enabled	 the	 armed	 conflict	 and	 ensuing	 atrocities.	 When	 the	 Trial	 Chamber	
analyzes	the	“role	of	the	accused”	it	considers	Taylor’s	“sustained	operational	support;”	
																																																								
33 E.g. Taylor Trial Judgment para. 6914 (finding that Taylor “was critical in enabling” the RUF and AFRC). 
See also, Appeals Judgment para. 683. 
34 E.g. Taylor Trial Judgment paras. 5834, 5835, 5842, 6913-6915 (finding that “Taylor’s acts and conduct had a 
substantial effect on the commission of the crimes because they: (i) enabled the RUF/AFRC’s Operational 
Strategy; (ii) supported, sustained and enhanced the RUF/AFRC’s capacity to implement its Operational 
Strategy.”) 
35 Taylor Trial Judgment paras. 5834, 5835 5842, 6913-6915. 
36 E.g. Taylor Trial Judgment paras. 5835 and 6914. 
37 E.g. Taylor Trial Judgment paras. 5837 and 6914. 
38 E.g. Taylor Trial Judgment para. 6813. See also, Appeals Judgment para. 683. 
39 Taylor Trial Judgment para. 5835. 
40 Taylor Trial Judgment para. 5837. 
41 Taylor Trial Judgment paras. 5834, 5835, 5842, 6913-6915. 




might	 have	 end	 earlier.”44	 	 These	 finding	 concerning	 Taylor’s	 role	 in	 the	 atrocities	
strongly	 indicate	that	 the	 judges	considered	Taylor	to	be	an	enabler,	and	they	 further	








the	 goals	 of	 international	 criminal	 justice,	 a	 Head	 of	 State	 using	 his	 power	 and	 state	
resources	 to	enable,	 as	 the	SCSL	describes	 it,	atrocities	and	conflict	 in	 the	 territory	of	
another	 country	 is	 the	 archetype	 criminality	 that	 ICL	 is	 most	 concerned	 with.	 It	 is	
arguably	the	quintessence	of	atrocity	crimes.		This	wrongdoing	must	be	accounted	for	in	
the	punishment.	The	harm	here	goes	beyond	public	international	law	concerns	regarding	














43 Taylor Sentencing Judgment para. 76. 
44 Taylor Sentencing Judgment para. 76.    
45 Taylor Trial Sentencing Judgment para. 100. 
46 Taylor Sentencing Judgment para. 98. 
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47 RUF Appeals Judgment, Sentencing Disposition. 
48 Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Case No. SCSL – 2004-15-PT, Corrected Amended Consolidated 
Indictment (Aug. 2, 2006) [hereafter “RUF Indictment”]. 




Rape (CAH)  Sesay – 45 years 
Gbao – 15 years 
Sexual Slavery (CAH)  Sesay – 45 years 
Gbao – 15 years 
Pillaging (WC)  Sesay – 20 years 
Gbao – 6 years 
Terrorism (WC) Sesay – 52 years 
Gbao – 25 years 
Attacks against Peacekeepers (WC) Sesay – 51 years 
Gbao – 25 years 
Other inhumane acts (CAH) 
 
Sesay – 40 years 
Gbao – 11 years 
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The	 Trial	 Chamber	 treated	 Sesay	 as	 the	 most	 influential	 and	 highest-ranking	
battlefield	commander	of	RUF/AFRC;	in	other	words,	Sesay	was	the	ultimate	commander	
of	 the	 all	 rebel	 fighting	 forces.54	 Sesay’s	 power	 to	 end	 the	 conflict	 was	 amply	
demonstrated	when	under	his	orders	the	entire	rebel	forces	demobilized.	Given	Sesay’s	
crucial	role	in	sustaining	the	conflict	and	atrocities,	and	his	52-year	sentence	(the	highest	
at	 the	 SCSL)	 compared	 to	 the	 25	 years	 Gbao	 received,	 the	 sentencing	 practice	 here	
indicates	that	the	enabler	factor	will	enhance	punishment	by	more	than	100%.55		Thus,	
gravity	of	the	offense,	if	understood	as	the	seriousness	of	the	harm,	is	not	as	controlling	






“position	 as	 a	 superior”	 also	 does	 not	 convincingly	 account	 for	 the	 quantum	 of	 the	
increase.	Gbao	was	also	a	senior	commander.		
The	difference	is	also	striking	when	we	compare	Sesay	to	Kallon.		For	the	crime	of	




52 RUF Appeals Judgment, Sentencing Disposition. 
53 Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Case No. SCSL – 2004-15-PT, Corrected Amended Consolidated 
Indictment (Aug. 2, 2006). 
54 Id. paras. 22 and 23. 
55 RUF Appeal Judgment para. 1206 (finding that Sesay’s highly influential role increased the gravity of the 
offences).  





	 The	 sentences	 in	 RUF	 case	 demonstrates	 that	 even	 between	 high	 level	








enabler	 factor	 is	 a	more	 significant	 factor	 for	 sentencing	 than	 the	 accused’s	mode	 of	
liability.	Kallon	ordered	the	attacks	on	peacekeepers	and	he	even	personally	attempted	
to	kill	an	UNAMSIL	officer.		These	constitute	particularly	grave	modes	of	liability.	Kallon	
bore	 direct	 criminal	 responsibility	 for	 direct	 participation,	 according	 to	 the	 Trial	
Chamber.	 	 Sesay’s	 responsibility	 however	 was	 further	 removed	 and	 less	 culpable	
relatively	speaking.		The	Trial	Chamber	found	Sesay	to	be	only	indirectly	responsible	for	
the	attack	because	he	failed	to	punish	individuals	like	Kallon	who	ordered	and	carried	
out	 the	 attacks.	 	 Thus,	 Sesay’s	 only	 culpability	was	 by	 omission,	 compared	 to	 Kallon	
ordering	 and	 personally	 participating	 in	 the	 crime.	Nevertheless,	 for	 the	 same	 crime,	
Sesay	was	sentenced	to	11	more	years	of	imprisonment	than	Kallon.	
	 	Although	Sesay	was	not	a	head	of	state,	he	did	direct	and	enable	all	RUF	activities	
in	Sierra	Leone	after	Sankoh	was	 imprisoned.58	 	Thus,	he	was	 the	de	 facto	 head	of	 an	
organized	armed	group	in	armed	conflict	against	a	state.	I	theorize	that	accounting	for	
the	 enabler	 factor	 is	 implicitly	 what	 some	 international	 judges	 are	 doing	 in	 their	





57 RUF Appeals Judgment, Sentencing Disposition. 
58 Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Case No. SCSL – 2004-15-PT, Corrected Amended Consolidated 
Indictment para. 23 (Aug. 2, 2006) 
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increase	in	Sesay’s	punishment	compared	to	his	RUF	co-perpetrators.	Responsibility	for	




C.  ENABLER FACTOR AS APPLIED TO CDF CASE  
	 The	 CDF	defendants,	Moinina	 Fofana	 and	Allieu	Kondewa,	 received	 the	 lowest	
sentences	 of	 any	 atrocity	 perpetrator	 convicted	 by	 the	 SCSL.	 	 The	 Trial	 Chamber	
sentenced	 Fofana	 to	 six	 years	 of	 imprisonment	 and	 Kondewa	 to	 eight	 years	 for	 very	
heinous	 crimes	 including	 murder,	 cruel	 treatment,	 pillage,	 and	 using	 children	 in	
hostilities.59	These	are	similar	in	gravity	to	the	crimes	committed	by	other	perpetrators	
convicted	by	the	SCSL.60		Yet,	the	CDF	war	criminals’	punishment	is	drastically	lower	than	
the	 average	 sentence	 (48	 years)	 for	 other	 trials	 at	 the	 SCSL.	 	 Does	 the	 gravity	 of	 the	
offence	 factor	adequately	explain	 sentences	of	 six	 (6)	and	eight	 (8)	years	 for	murder,	
cruel	treatment,	pillaging,	and	using	children	in	hostilities?	Can	the	enabler	factor	better	












justify	 this	 comparatively	 low	 sentence?	 Part	 of	 the	 explanation	 lies	 in	 the	 judges’	
																																																								
59 CDF Trial Sentencing Judgment at p. 34.  The SCSL Appeals Chamber increased their sentences to 15 and 20 
years respectively for Fofana and Kondewa. See, CDF Appeal Judgment at 189. 
60 For a complete discussion and analysis of all crimes and punishment of defendants before the SCSL see 
Shahram Dana, The Sentencing Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 42 GEORGIA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
615 (2014). 
61 Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Sentencing Judgment para. 33. 
62 Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Sentencing Judgment para. 33. 
63 Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Sentencing Judgment paras. 47 and 52.  
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sympathy	for	the	reasons	the	CDF	Kamajor	fighters	entered	the	armed	conflict,	namely	in	
“defence	 of	 their	 communities	 .	 .	 .	 with	 the	 sole	 objective	 of	 …preventing	 the	 brutal	
killings”	of	their	families	and	to	“protect	their	lands	and	properties.”64		






in	 a	 judgment	 on	 criminality.	 The	 judges	 moralized	 that	 fighting	 to	 restore	 the	
“legitimate”	government	“atones”	for	their	“grave	and	very	serious”	crimes.69	Justifying	
reduction	of	punishment	based	on	fighting	for	the	good	guys	is	deeply	problematic,	and	
the	 SCSL	 Appeals	 Chamber	 promptly	 overturned	 this	 ruling.	 Mitigating	 a	 sentence	
because	the	war	criminal	fought	on	the	right	side	offends	a	core	value	of	international	















64 CDF Trial Sentencing Judgment para. 84. 
65 CDF Trial Sentencing Judgment para. 91 and 94. 
66 Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Sentencing Judgment paras. 82-94. 
67 Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Sentencing Judgment para. 87. 
68 Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Sentencing Judgment paras. 44 and 82-94. 
69 Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Sentencing Judgment paras. 82-94. 
70 See also, Taylor Trial Judgment para. 5834, 5835 5842, 6913-6915. 
 191 
conflict.71	 He	 also	 made	 substantial	 efforts	 to	 “ensur[e]	 that	 members	 of	 the	 CDF	
remained	committed	to	the	peace	process.”72	The	Trial	Chamber	commended	Fofana’s	
post-conflict	 efforts	 to	 foster	 the	peace	process.73	 	These	 findings	all	 indicate	 that	 the	
judges	 did	 not	 consider	 the	 CDF	defendants	 to	 be	 enablers	 of	 the	 armed	 conflict	 that	
spawned	 the	 atrocities.	 The	 judges	 recognized	 that	 these	 factors	 are	 significant	 in	





















The	reality	 is	 that	only	a	 few	war	criminals	have	the	capacity	 to	be	enablers	of	armed	
conflict.	 	 Second,	 it	 may	 also	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 enabler	 factor	 unfairly	 backdoors	
responsibility	 for	 aggression,	 violating	 nullum	 crimen	 sine	 lege.	 This	 criticism	
misunderstands	the	scope	of	 the	enabler	 factor.	 	 It	does	not	create	an	 independent	or	
																																																								
71 CDF Trial Sentencing Judgment para. 67. 
72 CDF Trial Sentencing Judgment para. 67. 
73 CDF Trial Sentencing Judgment para. 67. 
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separate	grounds	of	individual	criminal	responsibility	for	the	crime	of	aggression,	or	any	
other	atrocity	crime	for	 that	matter.	 	The	accused	must	still	 first	be	 found	guilty	of	an	
existing	 atrocity	 crime,	 thus	 respecting	 the	 principle	 of	 legality.	 	 Consideration	 as	 an	










the	 fighting	 in	“defence	of	 their	communities”	to	protect	 their	 families	 from	becoming	
victims	 of	 atrocities.74	 Based	 on	 these	 findings	 of	 fact,	 the	 Kamajor	 would	 not	 be	
considered	enablers	of	Sierra	Leone’s	civil	war.	Admittedly,	the	determination	of	who	are	
enablers,	 and	who	are	not,	 can	be	politicized.	 	However,	 this	does	not	undermine	 the	






To	be	clear,	 the	 fact	 that	 a	war	criminal	 is	not	an	“enabler”	does	not	exonerate	
them	 from	 their	 crimes.	 	 They	 are	 still	 criminally	 responsible	 for	 their	 hand	 in	 the	
atrocities.		A	non-enabler	can	still	be	guilty	of	atrocity	crimes	and	punished	accordingly.	





74 CDF Trial Sentencing Judgment para. 84. 
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E.  HOW THE ENABLER FACTOR FITS INTO ICL STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There	are	different	options	 for	 incorporating	the	enabler	 factor	 into	sentencing	
determinations.	The	statutory	language	through	which	it	could	be	incorporated	is	found	
in	the	basic	sentencing	provisions	of	all	tribunals.		International	judges	are	called	upon	to	
determine	 a	 sentence	 by	 considering	 “the	 gravity	 of	 the	 offence	 and	 the	 individual	
circumstances	of	the	convicted	person.”75		As	discussed	further	below,	I	propose	that	the	
latter	 consideration	 take	 into	 account	 the	 convicted	 person’s	 role	 as	 an	 enabler.	 The	
statutory	 criterion	 of	 “individual	 circumstances	 of	 the	 convicted	 person”	 has	 thus	 far	
been	 underutilized	 in	 ICL	 sentencing	 discourse,	 serving	mostly	 as	 an	 entry	 point	 for	
mitigating	circumstances	and	aggravating	factors.		Section	IV	below	provides	a	detailed	
consideration	 of	 how	 the	 enabler	 factor	 can	 be	 incorporated	 into	 the	 statutes	 of	




III.  SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS & THE AD HOC NATURE OF ICL SENTENCING  
	
This	 section	 critiques	 the	ad	hoc	 nature	of	 atrocity	 sentencing	by	 interrogating	
ICL’s	conceptualization	and	implementation	of	key	sentencing	factors.	ICL	judges	speak	
of	 four	 core	 considerations	 essential	 to	 determining	 an	 appropriate	 punishment	 for	
atrocity	 crimes:	 (1)	 the	 gravity	 of	 the	 offence;	 (2)	 individual	 circumstances	 of	 the	
convicted	person;	(3)	aggravating	factors	and	mitigating	circumstances;	and	(4)	the	law	
and	practice	of	sentencing	of	the	locus	delicti.76	How	have	ICL	judges	conceptualized	and	
interpreted	 these	 concepts?	 	What	problems	emerge	 from	 the	extant	approach	 to	 ICL	
sentencing?	 	Are	they	 isolated	or	systemic?	Specific	attention	 is	given	to	the	notion	of	
gravity,	 which	 has	 arguably	 been	 overplayed	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 other	 considerations,	
representing	 a	 lost	 opportunity	 to	 develop	 ICL	 sentence	 law	 sui	 generis	 to	 atrocity	
criminality.	 In	addition	to	offering	descriptive	claims	about	each	category,	 this	section	
also	 scrutinizes	 the	 application	 of	 these	 factors	 in	 practice,	 critically	 reflecting	 on	
recurring	conceptual	and	doctrinal	problems.			
																																																								
75 SCSL Article 19(2); ICC Article 77; ICTR article 23; ICTY Article 24. 
76 Taylor Trial Sentencing para. 18; AFRC Appeal Judgment para. 308-309; CDF Trial Sentencing para. 32; 
CDF Appeal Judgment para. 465; RUF Trial Sentencing para. 17; AFRC Appeal Judgment para. 313; RUF 
Appeal Judgment paras. 1129, 1236, 1239, and 1240. 
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and	 mitigating	 factors	 when	 determining	 a	 sentence.	 The	 statutes	 of	 all	 courts	 and	
tribunals	also	direct	the	judges	to	turn	the	sentencing	law	and	practice	of	the	locus	delicti,	
except	 for	 the	 sentencing	 provisions	 of	 the	 ICC.	 Additionally,	 the	 SCSL’s	 sentencing	
provisions	included	a	novel	statutory	requirement	for	its	judges:	an	explicit	reference	to	
the	 sentencing	 practice	 of	 another	 international	 criminal	 court,	 the	 ICTR,	 as	 an	
appropriate	 source	 of	 sentencing	 law.	 	 Interestingly,	 it	 selects	 only	 the	 ICTR	 and	
deliberately	excludes	the	ICTY’s	jurisprudence	on	sentencing.		However,	in	practice,	ICL	
judges	from	all	tribunals	make	use	of	referencing	the	sentencing	practice	of	other	ICC&Ts.	
	 Although	 ICL	 jurisprudence	 establishes	 four	 distinct	 categories	 for	 sentencing	
considerations,	the	judges	do	not	in	fact	follow	their	own	road	map.	They	often	collapse	
these	categories	in	their	sentencing	analysis.		One	illustration	of	this	is	the	unexplained	
collapsing	 of	 categories	 two	 (individual	 circumstances)	 and	 three	 (aggravating	 and	
mitigating	factors).82	ICL	judges	also	vacillate	in	their	treatment	of	particular	sentencing	
																																																								
77 ICTR Statute, Article 23; ICTY Statute, Article 24; SCSL Statute, Article 19; ICC Statute, Article 78. 
78 See generally, Chapter 2: Reimagining Nulla Poena Sine Lege. 
79 For a discussion on the death penalty for atrocity crimes see, Jens David Ohlin, Applying the Death Penalty to 
Crimes of Genocide, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 747 (2005). 
80 ICC Statute, Article 78. 
81 SCSL Statute, Article 19. See also, ICTR Statute, Article 23; ICTY Statute, Article 23; ICC Statute, Article 
79. 
82 Taylor Trial Sentencing para. 22. (“The Trial Chamber notes that ‘individual circumstances of the convicted 
person’ can be either mitigating or aggravating.”); CDF Appeal Judgment para. 498. (“The Appeals Chamber 
considers that the level of education and training of a convicted person is part of his individual circumstances 
which the Trial Chamber is required to take into consideration as an aggravating or mitigating circumstance.”); 





Furthermore,	 ICL	 judges	 have	 not	 developed	 a	 doctrinal	 approach	 to	 atrocity	
sentencing.	 Thus,	 the	 collapsing	 of	 categories	 and	 roulette	 treatment	 of	 sentencing	
factors	 is	not	a	surprise.	 	 It	 is	an	expected	outcome	of	a	process	unmoored	from	legal	
doctrine.		More	significantly,	as	this	Chapter	develops,	the	insipid	merger	of	categories	
two	and	three	represents	a	missed	opportunity	to	develop	a	sentencing	framework	sui	




manifest	 sentencing	 theory	 or	 doctrine	 specific	 to	 atrocity	 criminality.	 	 Arguably,	
enjoying	wide	discretion	in	sentencing	has	disincentivized	ICL	judges	from	developing	
doctrine	in	this	area	which	could	encroach	on	their	largely	unfettered	discretion.	Thus,	
ICL	 judges	 have	 predictably	 adopted	 a	 factor	 by	 factor,	 case	 by	 case,	 approach	 to	
sentencing.	 Under	 this	 approach,	 “gravity”	 has	 been	 proffered	 as	 the	 key	 sentencing	
factor	–	the	“litmus	test”	of	a	fair	punishment	and	“the	touchstone	of	sentencing.”84			
The	 following	 sections	 focus	 on	 how	 ICL	 judges	 conceptualize	 and	 apply	 core	
sentencing	considerations	such	as	“gravity	of	the	offence”,	“individual	circumstances	of	
the	convicted	person”,	and	“the	role	of	the	accused.”		Has	“gravity”	been	overplayed?		Has	
“individual	 circumstances	 of	 the	 convicted	 person”	 been	 underdeveloped?	 	 Does	 the	





Appeal Judgment para. 592 (3 May 2006), quoting Blaškić Appeal Judgment para. 679 (“the individual 
circumstances of the accused, including aggravating and mitigating circumstances”). 
83 Philippe Kirsch, The International Criminal Court: From Rome to Kampala, 43 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 
515, 519-520 (2010); See also, Shahram Dana, Law, Justice & Politics: A Reckoning of the International 
Criminal Court (Forward), 43 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. xxiii, xxvi (2010). 
84 Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Judgment, Case No. IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998), para.1260 [hereafter 
Delalić Trial Judgment]. 
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A.  GRAVITY: A COLORLESS LITMUS TEST 
	 ICL	 sentencing	 jurisprudence	 presents	 “gravity	 of	 the	 offence”	 as	 the	 primary	
consideration	in	determining	an	appropriate	sentence.85			Judges	declare	gravity	to	be	the	
key	 differential	 principle	 –	 the	 “litmus	 test”	 and	 “touchstone”	 –	 of	 sentencing	
allocations.86	 Beyond	declaring	 its	 importance,	 however,	 ICL	 judges	 generally	 did	 not	




six	 to	 eight	 factors	 including	 	 (1)	 the	 “scale”	 of	 the	 offenses	 committed;	 (2)	 their	









it	 an	 outright	 a	 “fiction.”92	 He	 questions	 the	 very	 “idea	 that	 ‘gravity	 of	 the	 offence’	
functions	as	one	of	two	principle	determinants	of	the	sentence.”93		
																																																								
85 Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Judgment, IT-95-5/18, 24 March 2016, para. 6030; AFRC Trial Sentencing para. 19; 
CDF Trial Sentencing para. 33; RUF Trial Sentencing para. 19; Taylor Trial Sentencing para. 19; AFRC Appeal 
Judgment para. 308; CRF Appeal Judgment para. 465; RUF Appeal Judgment para. 1229. 
86 Delalić Trial Judgment para. 1260; AFRC Trial Sentencing para. 19; CDF Trial Sentencing para. 33; RUF 
Trial Sentencing para. 19; Taylor Trial Sentencing paras. 19-20; AFRC Appeal Judgment para. 308; CRF 
Appeal Judgment para. 465; RUF Appeal Judgment para. 1229. 
87 Karadžić Trial Judgment para. 6031; AFRC Trial Sentencing para. 19; CDF Trial Sentencing para. 33; RUF 
Trial Sentencing para. 19; Taylor Trial Sentencing paras. 19-20; CRF Appeal Judgment para. 465; RUF Appeal 
Judgment para. 1229. 
88 See generally Pascale Chifflet & Gideon Boas, Sentencing Coherence in International Criminal Law: The 
Cases of Biljana Plavsic and Miroslav Bralo, 23 CRIMINAL L. FORUM 135 (2012). 
89 AFRC Trial Sentencing para. 19; CDF Trial Sentencing para. 33; RUF Trial Sentencing para. 19; Taylor Trial 
Sentencing paras. 19-20. 
90 AFRC Trial Sentencing para. 19; CDF Trial Sentencing para. 33; RUF Trial Sentencing para. 19; Taylor Trial 
Sentencing paras. 19-20. 
91 KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW VOLUME II: CRIMES AND SENTENCING 285 (2014). 
92 Sloane Sentencing, supra note 2 at 734. 
93 Id. See further Margaret M. DeGuzman, Harsh Justice for International Crimes, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 17-24 
(2014) (raising concerns that the gravity “rhetoric and narratives risk misleading sentencing decisionmakers”). 
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While	 Sloane’s	 damning	 judgment	 is	 based	 largely	 on	 an	 analysis	 of	 ICTR	
sentences	for	genocide,	his	criticism	can	be	extended	to	sentences	at	other	international	
tribunals	for	crimes	against	humanity	and	war	crimes.	An	examination	of	ICL	sentences,	









assuming	 there	 is	 any	 difference	 in	 this	 regard.	 	 Nevertheless,	 even	 conceding	 for	
argument’s	sake	that	there	is	some	minor	difference	in	their	aggravating	and	mitigating	
circumstances,	 this	 explanation	 attempts	 to	 account	 for	 a	 300%	 difference	 in	 the	
sentences.	 	 	 	 If	 aggravating	 and	 mitigating	 factors	 are	 in	 fact	 responsible	 for	 300%	
increase	in	punishment	for	the	same	crime,	it	can	hardly	be	said	that	gravity	is	the	litmus	
test.		
	 Additionally,	 the	 primacy	 of	 gravity	 as	 the	 controlling	 factor	 determining	 the	
quantum	of	punishment	can	be	called	into	question	from	a	different	set	of	observations.	




of	 life	 imprisonment.	 Instead,	 they	 sentenced	 Nikolic	 to	 twenty-three	 (23)	 years	 of	
imprisonment	after	consideration	of	mitigating	factors.97	Nikolic	is	now	free,	having	been	
granted	 early	 release	 in	 August	 2013,	 less	 than	 ten	 (10)	 years	 from	 when	 the	 trial	
chamber	first	sentenced	him.98	It	would	be	reasonable	to	question	whether	gravity	is	in	
																																																								
94 Prosecution v. Dragan Nikolic, Sentencing Judgment, IT-94-2-S (18 December 2003) [hereafter “Nikolic 
Sentencing Judgment”].  
95 Nikolic Sentencing Judgment p. 73 (Disposition).  
96 Nikolic Sentencing Judgment para. 214.  
97 Nikolic Sentencing Judgment p. 73 (Disposition).  The Appeals Chamber confirmed the Trial Chamber’s 
findings on law and fact and it application of them to Nikolic’s sentence but reduced the sentence to 20 years. 
Prosecution v. Dragan Nikolic, Judgment on Sentencing Appeal, IT-94-2-A (4 February 2005). 
98 Prosecution v. Dragan Nikolic, Decision of the President on Early Release, IT-94-2-ES (16 January 2014). 
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fact	the	“primary”	sentencing	factor	when	gravity	of	the	crime	demanded	a	life	sentence	
but	 final	 sentence	 was	 substantially	 reduced	 due	 to	 mitigating	 factors.	 Perhaps,	 in	










contradicts	 the	rulings	of	 the	SCSL	 in	the	RUF,	AFRC,	and	Taylor	cases.101	 	 It	also	cuts	

















99 See supra Section II(C). 
100 Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Sentencing Judgment para.33. 
101 Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Sentencing Judgment para. 33. 
102 See, supra Sections II2B and 3B.  
103 For a full account of their crimes see supra Section II(C). 
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Thus,	 a	 reorientation	 away	 from	 gravity	 and	 punitive	 ideologies	 became	 a	
necessity	in	the	sentencing	narrative	to	sustain	such	low	penalties.	The	entire	sentencing	
analysis	 is	 designed	 to	 loosen	 gravity’s	 dominance	 in	 determining	 the	 appropriate	
quantum	of	punishment.	But	given	the	entrenchment	of	gravity	as	the	“litmus	test”	for	
the	 quantum	 of	 punishment,	 the	 shift	 had	 carefully	 and	 subtly	 orchestrated	 or	 risk	
appearing	blatantly	contrary	to	the	general	ICL	jurisprudence.	And	the	judges	delivered.		
Every	 sentencing	 determinant	 is	 singularly	 funneled	 towards	 supporting	 a	 merciful	
sentence,	beginning	with	CDF	Trial	Chamber’s	restorative	orientation,	to	its	treatment	of	






factors.	 Failure	 to	 adequately	 conceptualize	 gravity	 may	 explain	 why	 ICL	 judges	
frequently	 vacillate	 between	 treating	 a	 particular	 factor	 as	 a	 gravity	 factor	 in	 one	
judgment,	 but	 as	 an	 aggravating	 factor	 in	 another.	 They	 frequently	 reach	 opposing	
conclusions,	 blurring	 the	 line	 between	 “gravity”	 considerations	 and	 aggravating	
factors.104	 	 	 Indeed,	 some	 ICL	 judges	 have	 altogether	 abandoned	 the	 attempt	 to	
distinguish	 between	 gravity	 factors	 and	 aggravating	 factor	 or	 include	 separate	
discussions	and	examinations	of	gravity	and	aggravating	factors	in	their	judgment,	opting	
for	a	combined	discussion	of	both	under	a	single	conflated	analysis.105		
Although	 the	 ICL	 sentencing	practice	unfortunately	permits	 some	 factors	 to	be	





as	much:	 “gravity”	 is	 the	 “litmus	 test”	of	 a	 fair	 sentence,	not	aggravating	 factors.106	Of	
																																																								
104 Taylor Trial Sentencing para. 102. 
105 E.g. Prosecution v. Dragan Nikolic, Sentencing Judgment, IT-94-2-S (18 December 2003),  paras.  176 – 
213. 
106 AFRC Trial Sentencing para. 19; CDF Trial Sentencing para. 33; RUF Trial Sentencing para. 19; Taylor 













or	 more	 of	 the	 aggravating	 circumstances	 listed	 in	 Rule	 145.110	 Thus	 under	 the	 ICC	















Finally,	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 conceptualization	 of	 gravity	 suitable	 for	 atrocity	
sentencing	 has	 also	 festered	 legitimacy	 issues	 for	 international	 criminal	 justice.	 ICL	
sentencing	 outcomes	 often	 do	 not	match	 the	powerful,	 condemning	 judicial	 narrative	
																																																								
107 See generally, Lubanga Sentencing Judgment. 
108 ICC Statute, Article 77(1)(a). 
109 ICC Statute, Article 77(1)(b) (emphasis added). 
110 ICC RPE, Rule 145(3). 
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B.  COLLAPSING DISTINCT CATEGORIES   








consideration,	 separate	 and	 distinct	 from	 aggravating	 and	 mitigating	 factors.111	 	 In	
practice,	however,	ICL	judges	routinely	collapsed	these	two	categories	in	their	sentencing	
analysis,	despite	 the	 fact	 that	 they	enumerated	them	as	separate	 considerations	when	
laying	out	the	applicable	legal	framework.112	 	This	analytical	deficiency	accents	a	deep	
automatism	 in	 ICL	 judicial	 sentencing	 analysis.	 Consequentially,	 “individual	
circumstances	of	the	convicted	person”	has	unimaginatively	become	a	dumping	ground	
for	 aggravating	 and	mitigating	 factors.	 	 In	my	 opinion,	 this	 collapse	 represents	 a	 lost	
opportunity	 to	 develop	 a	meaningful	 sui	 generis	 penology	 for	 ICL	 that	 is	 optimal	 for	
punishing	atrocity	crimes.	The	enabler	factor	and	the	sentencing	framework	proposed	
below	 seize	 upon	 this	 lost	opportunity	 and	 also	 infuses	 sentencing	 judgments	with	 a	
voice	 capable	 of	 linking	 to	 broader	 narratives	 about	 atrocity	 crimes,	 accountability,	
justice,	human	nature,	and	war.	
	 Regarding	 aggravating	 circumstances,	 the	 law	 of	 atrocity	 sentencing	 holds	 a	
number	of	factors	as	aggravating,	such	as	superior	position,	abuse	of	power,	betrayal	of	
trust,	 exploitation	 of	 war	 for	 personal	 financial	 gain,	 excessive	 brutality,	 attacking	
																																																								
111 AFRC Appeal Judgment para. 308-309; CDF Trial Sentencing para. 32; CDF Appeal Judgment para. 465; 
RUF Trial Sentencing para. 17; Taylor Trial Sentencing para. 18. 
112 AFRC Appeal Judgment para. 308-309; CDF Trial Sentencing para. 32; CDF Appeal Judgment para. 465; 
RUF Trial Sentencing para. 17; Taylor Trial Sentencing para. 18. 
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traditional	places	of	sanctuary,	and	more.113		However,	the	absence	of	a	strong	analytical	




circumstances:	 his	 leadership	 role;	 his	 special	 status	 as	Head	 of	 State;	 his	 betrayal	 of	
trust;	 the	extraterritorial	 reach	of	his	 crimes;	and	his	 exploitation	of	war	 for	personal	
financial	gain.114		According	to	Kevin	Jon	Heller,	the	judges’	sentencing	analysis	here	falls	
short	 of	 sufficiently	 distinguishing	 the	 first	 three	 aggravating	 factors,	 suggesting	
discernable	error	due	to	double	counting.115		For	example,	regarding	betrayal	of	public	
trust	 as	 an	 aggravating	 factor,	 Taylor	 abused	 his	 position,	 authority,	 and	 power	 over	
“state	 machinery	 and	 public	 resources,”116	 including	 military	 assets,	 to	 assist	 in	 the	
commission	of	atrocity	crimes.		This	same	type	of	abuse	of	authority	is	germane	to	the	
judges’	justification	for	aggravating	his	sentence	on	the	account	of	his	“leadership	role”	
and	 “status	 as	 Head	 of	 State.”117	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 judges	 arguably	 correctly	
appreciated	 that	 these	 three	 factors	–	 leadership	 role,	 crimes	by	a	Head	of	 State,	 and	
betrayal	of	trust	–	have	converged	to	aggregately	enhance	both	Taylor’s	culpability	and	
the	harms	resulting	 from	his	wrongful	conduct	 in	a	way	that	 the	combined	damage	 is	
more	 than	 each	 factor	 could	 inflict	 in	 isolation.	 The	 judges	 sensibly	 understand	 and	
recognize	 that	 this	 warrants	 a	 more	 severe	 punishment,	 but	 the	 ICL	 sentencing	
framework	 is	 insufficient	 to	 capture	and	 logically	account	 for	 this	 form	of	 criminality.		
Consequently,	 observers	 interpret	 the	 sentencing	 judgment	 as	 flawed	 for	 double	
counting	 or	 emotively	 fixating	 on	 status.118	 	 Adding	 to	 the	 confusion	 is	 the	 judges’	
imprecise	 language,	 which	 blurs	 the	 line	 between	 “gravity”	 considerations	 and	
aggravating	factors	as	noted	above.119			




113 Taylor Trial Sentencing paras. 95-103. 
114 Taylor Trial Sentencing paras.95-103. 
115 Heller, Taylor Sentence (2013), supra note 28. 
116 Taylor Trial Sentencing Judgment para. 97. 
117 Taylor Trial Sentencing Judgment para. 97. 
118 E.g. Heller, Taylor Sentence (2013), supra note 28, at 47; Drumbl, Punishing Heads of State (2012), supra 
note 25.   
119 Taylor Trial Sentencing Judgment para. 102.   
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held	 a	 number	 of	 factors	 to	 constitute	 mitigating	 circumstances:	 expression	 of	
remorse;122	 good	 character	 with	 no	 prior	 conviction;123	 acknowledgment	 of	
responsibility;124	 the	 accused’s	 lack	 of	 education	 or	 training;125	 advanced	 age	 of	 the	
accused;126	duress;127	indirect	participation.128	Additionally,	a	few	trial	judges	at	the	SCSL	
controversially	held	 that	 “legitimate	 cause”	 constitutes	a	mitigating	 factor.129	 Some	of	
these	 mitigating	 factors	 are	 particularly	 problematic	 conceptually	 and	 theoretically.	
Others	 are	 arguably	 conceptually	 sound,	 but	 the	 court’s	 method	 of	 analysis	 and	
application	of	them	raises	concerns	or	exposes	doctrinal	deficiencies.	For	the	purpose	of	
this	section,	 I	will	 focus	 further	on	“indirect	participation”	as	 it	bears	on	assessing	the	
perpetrator’s	mode	of	liability.		
																																																								
120 Drumbl, Punishing Heads of State (2012), supra note 25; Heller, Taylor Sentence (2013), supra note 25. 
121 CDF Trial Sentencing Judgment para. 38; see also supra Section II.C (discussing the punishment of CDF 
defendants). 
122 AFRC Trial Sentencing para. 25; CDF Trial Sentencing para. 40; CDF Appeal Judgment para. 489-490; RUF 
Trial Sentencing para. 29; Taylor Trial Sentencing para. 34.  
123 CDF Appeal Judgment para. 511; Taylor Trial Sentencing para. 34. 
124 AFRC Trial Sentencing para. 25; CDF Trial Sentencing para. 40; CDF Appeal Judgment para. 489-490; RUF 
Trial Sentencing para. 29; Taylor Trial Sentencing para. 34.  
125 CDF Appeal Judgment para. 498; RUF Trial Sentencing para. 29; Taylor Trial Sentencing para. 34. 
126 AFRC Trial Sentencing para. 25. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 CDF Trial Sentencing. 
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Treating	 “indirect	participation”	as	a	mitigating	 factor	unsettles	 the	 sentencing	
matrix	 because	 the	 accused’s	 mode	 of	 liability	 is	 often	 already	 accounted	 for	 in	 the	





law	 do	 not	 support	 the	 notion	 that	 aiding	 and	 abetting	 ipso	 jure	 warrants	 a	 lesser	
sentence	than	more	direct	 forms	of	participation.130	 	The	court	refused	to	 introduce	a	
hierarchy	of	modes	of	liability	for	the	purpose	of	sentencing,	just	as	the	judges	at	the	ad	
hoc	tribunals	declined	to	impose	a	hierarchy	of	crimes.		This	is	not	surprising	as	any	such	
ruling	 would	 curtail	 the	 wide	 discretion	 ICL	 judges	 enjoy	 in	 sentencing	 matters,	 a	
discretion	 they	 guard	 very	 watchfully	 as	 noted	 above.	 	 Previously,	 the	 Taylor	 Trial	









that	 “aiding	 and	 abetting	 warrants	 a	 lesser	 sentence”	 does	 not	 apply	 to	 planning	 or	
ordering	atrocity	crimes	(depending	on	the	facts).133	 	ICL	statutory	law	treats	these	as	






130 Taylor Appeals Judgment 
131 Taylor Trial Sentencing Judgment para. 21 (emphasis added).  Overruled on appeal. 
132 Taylor Trial Sentencing Judgment para. 21. 
133 SCSL Article 6(1); ICC Article 25; ICTR Article 6(1); ICTY Article 7(1).  
134 SCSL Article 6(1); ICC Article 25; ICTR Article 6(1); ICTY Article 7(1).  
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crimes.		That	said,	drawing	a	distinction	between	planning	and	aiding	and	abetting	does	
not	 cover	 sufficient	ground	 to	explain	why	Taylor’s	 lengthy	 sentencing	 is	 appropriate	















C.  THE MANY FACES OF “THE ROLE OF THE ACCUSED” 
What	do	international	judges	mean	by	“role	of	the	accused?”		How	does	it	operate	





discussion	of	“gravity	of	 the	offense”	but	 the	decisions	are	not	consistent	 in	how	they	
																																																								
135 Taylor Trial Judgment para. 5834, 5835, 5842, 6913-6915 (finding that Taylor “enabled the RUF/AFRC’s 






accused”	 in	 three	 different	ways.	 Recalling	 the	 analysis	of	 gravity	 in	 Section	A	 above,	
“gravity	of	the	offense”	consists	of	two	considerations:	the	gravity	of	the	crime	and	the	
criminal	 conduct	 of	 the	 accused.	 The	 former	 consists	 of	 a	 bunch	 of	 different	 “gravity	
factors”	and	the	latter	includes	the	accused’s	mode	of	liability	and	the	nature	and	degree	
of	his	participation	 in	 the	 crime.138	 	 Some	sentencing	 judgments	 treat	 “the	 role	of	 the	
accused”	as	one	of	the	many	enumerated	“gravity”	factors,	but	other	judgments	treat	it	as	
part	 of	 the	 accused’s	 mode	 of	 liability	 and	 participation	 in	 the	 crime.139	 	 Still,	 other	











precisely	what	 it	entails.140	 	This	 latter	group	describes	the	“role	of	 the	accused	 in	the	
																																																								
136 Cf., Prosecutor v. Taylor, Appeals Judgment, para. 19 (May 20, 2012); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-
95-14-A, Appeal Judgment para. 683 (29 July 2004); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Trial Chamber Sentencing Judgment, 
para. 40 (April 8, 2009); Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Trial Sentencing Judgment, para. 33 
(Oct. 9, 2007); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeal Judgment para. 182 (24 March 2000); 
Prosecutor v. Brma, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T; Trail Sentencing Judgment, para. 19 (July 19, 2007); Prosecutor 
v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Appeal Judgment para. 249 (21 July 2000); Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., 
(“Ćelebići Case”), Appeal Judgment para. 731 (20 February 2001). 
137 See cases cited supra. 
138 See e.g., RUF Trial Sentencing para. 20; Taylor Trial Sentencing para. 21. 
139 This ambivalent treatment of “role of the accused” traces its origins to the early jurisprudence of the ICTY. 
See, Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Appeal Judgment para. 249 (21 July 2000); Prosecutor 
v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeal Judgment para. 683 (29 July 2004); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case 
No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeal Judgment para. 182 (24 March 2000); Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., (“Ćelebići Case”), 
Appeal Judgment para. 731 (20 February 2001).  
140 CDF Trial Sentencing para. 34. 
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crime”	 in	 terms	 of	 (1)	 the	mode	 of	 liability	 attributed	 to	 the	perpetrator,	 and	 (2)	 the	
nature	and	degree	of	his	participation	in	the	crime.141		
However,	 under	 this	 approach,	 a	 cogent	 conceptualization	 of	 this	 factor	 is	




example,	 in	 the	 CDF	 case,	 trial	 judges	 attempted	 to	 make	 the	 above	 assessment	 by	
considering	whether	 the	accused	was	a	direct	or	 indirect	participant	 in	 the	 crimes.142		
However,	they	typically	do	not	identify	what	modes	of	liability	they	consider	to	be	direct	








factor.	 	 But	 questions	 relevant	 to	 determining	 its	 content	 and	 influence	 remain	
unresolved,	making	it	an	important,	but	unpredictable	factor	at	sentencing.	This	raises	
further	questions:	for	judges	for	whom	“the	role	of	the	accused”	is	not	a	measure	of	the	
accused’s	 participation	 in	 the	 crime,	 such	 as	 ordering,	 planning,	 or	 command	
responsibility,	then	what	is	it?		And	for	judges	who	insist	on	treating	it	as	a	“gravity	factor”	
instead	of	an	aggravating	circumstance,	why	is	that	difference	important?		An	important	
contribution	of	 the	enabler	 factor	 is	 that	 it	conceptualizes	“the	role	of	 the	accused”	as	
something	 distinct	 from	 the	 concepts	 of	 gravity,	 modes	 of	 liability,	 and	 aggravating	
factors.		Moreover,	the	enabler	factor	also	infuses	the	concept	of	“the	role	of	the	accused”	
with	substance	significant	and	distinctive	to	international	criminality	and	mass	atrocities,	





143 An example of this is the ICTY Blaškić case.  See, Shahram Dana, Revisiting the Blaškić Sentence: Some 
Reflections on the Sentencing Jurisprudence of the ICTY, 4 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 321, 336-340 (2004).    
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and	understood	as	 the	accused’s	responsibility	 for	enabling	the	situation	or	milieu	 for	
mass	atrocity	criminality.			
	
D.  NATIONAL LAW PROVISION 




quantum	of	punishment,	despite	 the	 fact	 that	a	provision	 to	 this	 effect	 appears	 in	 the	
statutes	of	all	international	criminal	courts	and	tribunals	discussed	herein,	except	for	the	
ICC.	 	Some	consider	the	marginalization	of	the	national	law	provision	to	be	an	error	in	




IV. CONSTRUCTING A FRAMEWORK FOR PUNISHING ATROCITIES 
	
International	 criminal	 law	 has	 not	 developed	 an	 analytical	 framework	 for	
sentencing.	The	extant	practice	of	international	judges	is	to	enumerate	many	“sentencing	
factors”	under	various	headings	 found	 in	the	statute	or	RPE	with	great	 laxity	allowing	
each	panel	of	judges	to	conceptualize	the	factors	as	suits	their	purpose	so	long	as	they	are	
careful	to	not	double	count.	There	is	no	common	approach	among	ICL	judges	regarding	
the	 categorizations.	 	 Even	 if	 we	 assume	 that	 this	 method	 has	 some	 semblance	 of	 a	
framework,	it	is	far	too	weak	and	underdeveloped	to	handle	the	complexity	of	sentencing	
perpetrators	of	atrocity	crimes.		The	weakness	of	the	current	approach	is	demonstrated	
by	 observing	 a	 troubling	 pattern	 in	 sentencing	 judgments	 of	 (1)	 articulating	 guiding	
principles	that	are	no	actually	adhered	to	in	the	analysis	or	determination	of	the	quantum	
																																																								




of	 punishment;147	 or	 (2)	 proffering	 differential	 considerations	 that	 are	 not	 doing	 any	
heavy	lifting.148				
	 In	this	section,	I	develop	an	innovative	framework	for	ICL	sentencing.	As	discussed	






















understood	 through	 the	 prism	 of	 the	 enabler	 factor,	 greater	 congruency	 is	 achieved	
between	judicial	narratives	about	the	atrocities	and	their	actual	sentences.		This	does	not	
																																																								
147 See supra Section II.A (discussing the Trial Chamber’s treatment of sentencing for aiding and abetting); see 
also, Heller Taylor Sentence (2013) at 835-840. 
148 Taylor Trial Sentencing para. 22. (“The Trial Chamber notes that ‘individual circumstances of the convicted 
person’ can be either mitigating or aggravating.”); CDF Appeal Judgment para. 498. (“The Appeals Chamber 
considers that the level of education and training of a convicted person is part of his individual circumstances 
which the Trial Chamber is required to take into consideration as an aggravating or mitigating circumstance.”); 
RUF Appeal Sentencing para. 1296; Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilić and Vinko Martinovi, Case No. IT-98-34-A, 
Appeal Judgment para. 592 (3 May 2006), quoting Blaškić Appeal Judgment para. 679 (“the individual 
circumstances of the accused, including aggravating and mitigating circumstances”). 
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gravity	 of	 the	offense	 and	 gravity	 of	 the	 crime.	 	 It	 implies	 that	 the	 latter	 is	 narrower,	
limited	 to	 the	 elements	 of	 the	 crime	whereas	 the	 former	 is	 broader	 and	 includes	 an	
assessment	of	the	form	and	degree	of	participation	as	well	as	the	elements	of	the	crime.	
Thus,	we	may	understand	 the	Trial	Chamber’s	 approach	 to	 conceptualizing	gravity	as	
requiring	 a	 two-prong	 assessment	 of	 the	 perpetrator’s	 criminality.150	 The	 first	 prong	
requires	a	determination	of	 “the	 inherent	 gravity	of	 the	crime”,	 and	 the	 second	prong	
considers	the	“criminal	conduct	of	the	accused.”151	Determining	inherent	gravity	calls	for	
an	assessment	of	the	seriousness	of	harm	(gravity)	as	determined	by	the	elements	of	the	
crime	 (inherent)	 for	which	 the	 perpetrator	was	 found	 criminally	 responsible.152	 This	
assessment	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	 sentencing	 because	 it	 ties	 the	 perpetrator’s	
criminality	directly	to	deviations	from	the	community’s	norms	and	values.	
																																																								
149 Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Sentencing Judgment para. 19 (30 May 2012) 
[hereafter “Taylor Trial Sentencing Judgment”]. 
150 Taylor Trial Sentencing Judgment para. 19. 
151 Id. (emphasis added). 
152 See further JAN PHILIPP BOOK, APPEAL AND SENTENCE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2011). 
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To	 positively	 utilize	 this	 conceptualization	 of	 gravity,	 however,	 requires	 an	
adjustment	in	how	judges	narrate	their	sentencing	opinions.		Formulistic	recitations	of	
an	 enumerated	 list	of	 gravity	 factors	 of	 general	 applicability	must	 be	 replaced	with	 a	
focused	gravity	assessment	of	the	specific	elements	of	the	crime.	This	is	after	all	what	an	
“inherent”	 examination	 demands.	 Unfortunately,	 although	 the	 Taylor	 Trial	 Chamber	
make	this	important	contribution	to	the	conceptualization	of	“gravity”	for	the	purpose	of	
sentencing,	it	did	not	actually	engage	in	an	assessment	of	the	inherent	gravity	of	the	crime.		
Instead,	 it	 reverted	 back	 to	 a	 gravity-in-fact	 analysis	 by	 simply	 regenerating	 a	 list	 of	
“gravity”	factors,	some	of	which	could	be	treated	as	aggravating	factors.153	This	reversion	
back	to	the	enumerated	list	of	gravity	factors	may	be	out	of	habit	or	it	may	be	due	to	the	
Trial	Chamber’s	overly	broad	construction	of	 the	 scope	of	 the	 considerations	 that	 fall	
under	the	second	prong.		
The	 judges	 explained	 that	 a	 determination	 of	 the	 second	 prong	 –	 the	 criminal	
conduct	of	the	accused	–	“requires	consideration	of	the	particular	circumstances	of	the	
case	and	the	crimes	for	which	the	person	was	convicted	as	well	as	the	form	and	degree	of	
participation	of	 the	Accused	 in	 the	 crime.”154	Thus,	 the	 second	prong	 itself	 consists	of	
several	additional	considerations.	Thus,	the	scope	of	the	second	prong	is	so	broad	that	
literally	 any	 factor	 could	 be	 considered	 here,	 including	 factors	 from	 the	 enumerated	
gravity	list,	aggravating	factors,	and	even	mitigating	factors	alongside	modes	of	liability,	
so	 long	 as	 what	 is	 being	 considered	 falls	 under	 the	 general	 umbrella	 of	 “particular	
circumstances	of	the	case.”	Recall	that	the	judges	considered	two	aspects	of	the	alleged	
criminality	as	integral	to	their	conceptualization	of	gravity:	“the	inherent	gravity	of	the	
crime	 and	 the	 criminal	 conduct	 of	 the	 accused.”155	 The	 scope	 of	 the	 former	 has	 clear	
parameters	and	is	well-defined.		But	the	trial	chamber	has	given	the	second	prong	such	
an	 overly	 broad	 construction	 that	 it	 marginalizes	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 first	 prong	 (the	
inherent	 gravity	 assessment).	 What	 started	 out	 as	 a	 promising	 analysis	 offering	 a	




153 Taylor Trial Sentencing Judgment para. 20 
154 Taylor Trial Sentencing Judgment para. 19. 






of	 perpetration.	 	 As	 discussed	 above,	 many	 of	 these	 so-called	 gravity	 factors	 could	
logically	and	conceptually	be	treated	as	aggravating	factors.156	The	absence	of	a	doctrinal	
approach	to	gravity	explains	why	ICL	judges	have	difficulty	deciding	if	a	particular	factor	




pertains	not	only	to	doctrinal	 issues,	but	also	extends	to	the	role	 that	gravity	plays	 in	
judicial	 narratives	 about	 punishing	 atrocities.	 	 ICL	 sentencing	 narratives	 are	 too	
dominated	 by	 gravity	 rhetoric.	 Recall	 the	 CDF	 trial	 sentencing	 judgment.	 Whatever	
criticisms	 the	 sentences	 in	 that	 case	 may	 merit,	 the	 trial	 judges’	 downscaling	
characterization	 of	 gravity	 as	 an	 “important”	 but	 not	 “primary”	 factor	 in	 punishing	
atrocities	 arguably	 better	 reflects	 the	 generally	 body	 of	 ICL	 sentencing	 outcomes	 in	
practice.157	Connecting	the	dots	to	other	tribunals,	this	conceptualization	–	that	gravity	is	






that	 the	 insistent	 gravity	 rhetoric	 in	 sentencing	 narratives	 can	 “narrow	 the	 range	 of	




156 See supra Sections III(A) and III(B). 
157 See also, Chifflet & Boas, Sentencing Coherence in ICL, supra note 1, at 147 and 158 (claiming that “judges 
and their staff are primarily focused” on a perpetrator’s responsibility for the atrocities, not the gravity of 
crimes). 
158 For more examples from the ICTY see generally Id. 
159 Margaret M. DeGuzman, Harsh Justice for International Crimes, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 19 (2014) quoting 
ANTHONY AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2000). 
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such	 as	 “primary”	 or	 “litmus	 test”.160	 	 Likewise,	 in	 the	 Lubanga	 case,	 the	 sentencing	
judges,	 like	 the	 SCSL	 judges	 in	 the	 CDF	 case,	 treated	 “gravity”	 as	 an	 important	




	 Determining	 a	 just	 distribution	 of	 punishment	 among	 actors	 who	 perpetrate	
atrocity	crimes	requires	careful	consideration	of	various	ICL	modes	of	liability.	Debate	
surrounding	ICL	modes	of	liability	remain	unresolved,	especially	concerning	theoretical	
and	 doctrinal	 aspects	 of	 accomplice	 liability.	 It	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 research	
questions	 of	 this	 study	 to	 resolve	 the	 elemental	 debates	 surrounding	 ICL	 modes	 of	
liability.162		For	the	purpose	of	this	study	on	sentencing,	it	is	sufficient	to	reflect	on	the	
board	categorizations	 influencing	the	sentence.	Because	of	 the	peculiarities	of	atrocity	
criminality,	 domestic	 concepts	 of	 “accessory	 liability”	 and	 understandings	 of	 “direct”	
versus	 “indirect”	 participation	 are	 often	 insufficient	 as	 differential	 doctrines	 in	
international	 criminal	 law,	 or	 at	 least	 require	 some	 adjustment	 when	 transposed.	












160 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-
01/07 (23 May 2014). 
161 Lubanga Sentencing Judgment para. 36;  
162 See generally, MILES JACKSON, COMPLICITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2015); Kai Ambos, Treatise on 
International Criminal Law Volume 1: Foundations and General Part (2013); Miles Jackson, The Attribution of 
Responsibility and Modes of Liability in International Criminal Law, 29 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 879 (2016); James G 
Stewart, The End of 'Modes of Liability' for International Crimes, 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 165 (2012). 
163 By operation of its statute, the ICC permits appointment of diplomats and other persons without legal 
training or judicial experience to serve as judges. 
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regarded	 as	 indirect	 participation.	 	 In	 terms	 of	 the	 ICC	 statute,	 modes	 of	 liability	
articulated	 in	 Article	 25(3)(a),	 (b)	 and	 (e)	 are	 direct	 forms	 of	 participation	whereas	
liability	pursuant	to	Article	28	is	indirect	participation	in	the	crime.	However,	it	should	












power	 of	militaries	 and	 armed	 forces	 and	 enabling	 crimes	 against	humanity	 and	war	
crimes	 in	 another	 country	 is	 quite	 something	 else.	 	 I	 have	 argued	 elsewhere	 against	
decontextualized	transposition	of	national	criminal	law	concepts	to	international	law.165		
The	nature	of	domestic	criminality	for	ordinary	crimes	in	national	law	is	not	the	same	as	
criminality	 underlying	 atrocity	 crimes,	 even	 if	 they	 share	 certain	 characteristics.	
Describing	 Taylor	 as	 simply	 an	 “accessory”	 risks	 giving	 the	 misimpression	 that	 his	
wrongdoing	 and	 criminality	 was	 not	 serious	 or	 grave	 or	 central.	 Moreover,	 Heller’s	
position	doesn’t	distinguish	between	“aiding	and	abetting”	and	“planning”	treating	both	




164 Heller, Taylor Sentence (2013) at 855-860. 
165 Dana Revisiting the Blaškić Sentence, supra note 143, at 330-336. 








their	 failures	as	differential	 concepts	at	 sentencing,	many	national	 legal	 systems	have	
abandoned	legal	categorization	of	perpetrators	into	“principles”	and	“accessories”	for	the	










B.  AN ORIGINAL FRAMEWORK FOR ICL SENTENCING 
	 ICL	sentencing	practice	suffers	 from	the	absence	of	an	analytical	 framework	to	
support	 international	 judges	 when	 exercising	 their	 discretion	 to	 arrive	 at	 a	 just	




the	effort	may	possibly	overlook	or	under-appreciate	 issues	 that	 impact	 the	outcome.	
Difficult	because	a	hard	choice	had	to	be	made:	should	the	proposal	develop	a	framework	
that	maps	 onto	 the	 declared	 sentencing	methodology	 as	 stated	 in	 the	 judgments?	 Or	
																																																								
167 ICC Statute, Article 25. 
168 Taylor Appeals Judgment paras. 666-670. 
169 Taylor Sentencing Judgment para. 37.    
170 Prosecutor v. Krstić, Judgement, IT-98-33-T, 2 August 2001 (sentencing Krstić to 46 years of 
imprisonment). On appeal, the ICTY sentenced him to 35 years’ imprisonment. Prosecutor v. Krstić, 
Judgement, IT-98-33-A, 19 April 2004. 
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should	 the	 proposed	 sentencing	 framework	map	 onto	 what	 is	 actually	 happening	 in	
practice?		As	analyzed	above,	ICL	judges	in	practice	do	not	actually	follow	their	avowed	
structure	 of	 four	 distinct	 pillars	 of	 atrocity	 sentencing.	 For	 this	 reason,	 I	 propose	 a	
sentencing	framework	that	maps	onto	the	actual	sentencing	practice.			
A	 synthesis	 of	 ICL	 sentencing	 practice	 reveals	 three	 core	 determinants	 of	 the	
quantum	 of	 punishment:	 (1)	 gravity	 of	 the	 crime;	 (2)	 individual	 circumstance	 of	 the	
convicted	person;	and	(3)	aggravating	factors	and	mitigating	circumstances.	The	national	
law	provision,	often	declared	as	a	fourth	determinant	of	a	sentence,	never	meaningfully	
influenced	 ICL	 sentencing	 outcomes	 in	 general.171	 Although,	 some	 ICTR	 judgments	
justified	higher	sentences	on	the	grounds	that	Rwanda	domestic	law	permitted	the	death	
penalty.172	Additionally,	 as	discussed	above,	 in	practice	 ICL	 judges	 collapse	 categories	
two	 and	 three.	 	 “Individual	 circumstances	 of	 the	 convicted	 person”	 has	 been	
conceptualized	in	terms	of	aggravating	and	mitigating	factors.		My	proposed	framework	







general	 that	 combines	 the	 constitutive	 sentencing	 considerations,	 identified	 in	 ICL	
sentencing	jurisprudence,	with	the	Taylor	Trial	Chamber’s	conceptualization	of	gravity.		
The	 constitutive	 elements	 of	 atrocity	 sentencing	 are:	 (1)	 gravity	 of	 the	 crime;	 (2)	







171 See generally Chapter 2 Reimagining Nulla Poena Sine Lege. 
172 Rwanda’s parliament controversially voted to abolish the death penalty in 2007, while the ICTR was in 
operation.  See, Rwanda Scraps the Death Penalty, BBC News at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6735435.stm. 
173 Taylor Trial Sentencing Judgment para. 18 (30 May 2012); Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, 
Sentencing Judgment para. 17 (April 8, 2009); RUF Appeals Judgment para. 1201; AFRC Trial Sentencing 
Judgment para. 30B; CDF Appeals Judgment para. 20B.   
 217 
	 More	 specifically,	 under	my	 framework,	 judges	 initially	 assess	 inherent	 gravity	
independently.	The	 concept	of	 inherent	gravity	entails	 an	objective	assessment	of	 the	
seriousness	of	the	elements	of	the	crime.	As	noted	above,	an	assessment	of	the	inherent	
gravity	 of	 the	 crime	 is	 an	 essential	 step	 in	 tying	 the	 perpetrator’s	wrongdoing	 to	 the	
community	norms	embedded	in	the	prohibited	conduct	as	reflected	in	elements	of	the	
crime.	This	link	is	vital	to	retributive	justifications	and	expressive	goals	of	punishment.	
Next,	 judges	 consider	 the	mode	 of	 liability	 attributed	 to	 the	 accused	 specific	 to	 each	
proven	crime.		I	gradate	modes	of	liability	into	three	groups.174		The	most	severe	for	the	
purpose	of	punishment	are	 forms	of	responsibility	 that	reflect	grave	responsibility	 for	
the	 crime.	 	 This	 includes	 personally	 committing	 the	 crime	 as	 well	 as	 planning	 and	










than	the	 first	category	because	 it	 is	 indirect	 liability	based	on	an	omission.	 	 It	 is	still	a	
serious	 form	of	 criminal	 liability	 and	 can	 attract	 a	 substantial	 sentence.	 But	 failing	 to	
prevent	or	punish	subordinates	who	commit	crimes	is	ordinarily	not	as	serious,	in	terms	




Next,	 the	 judges	would	 then	 determine	 the	 accused’s	 enabler	 responsibility	 or	
role,	 if	 any,	 for	 maintaining,	 facilitating,	 and/or	 sustaining	 the	 context	 in	 which	 the	
atrocity	 crimes	 were	 committed.	 This	 consideration	 informs	 the	 second	 constitutive	
																																																								
174 See, supra section IV-A-2. 
175 Compare ICC Statute, Article 25(3)(b) and Article 25(3)(b); ICTY Article 7(1); ICTR Article 6(1); SCSL 
Article 6(1). 
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second	 constitutive	 sentencing	 consideration	 with	 criteria	 and	 content	 specifically	
pertinent	to	atrocity	crimes	as	distinct	from	ordinary	crimes.	This	approach	gives	a	more	
purposive	 application	 to	 the	 second	 constitutive	 element,	 which	 has	 thus	 far	 been	 a	
dumping	ground	for	aggravating	and	mitigating	factors,	despite	the	fact	that	ICL	judges	
consider	them	to	be	separate	and	distinct	considerations.		Thus,	my	proposed	framework	
has	 the	advantage	of	 also	preserving	 the	 integrity	of	 the	 third	 constitutive	 sentencing	
consideration.		The	“individual	circumstances	of	the	convicted	person”	encompasses	an	
evaluation	of	“role	of	the	accused”	as	determined	by	the	enabler	factor,	i.e.	the	defendant’s	
role	or	 responsibility	 in	 enabling	 and/or	maintaining	 a	milieu	 or	 situation	 of	 atrocity	
crimes.177	The	accused’s	punishment	would	be	largely	the	product	of	the	overall	gravity	
and	his	responsibility	as	an	enabler	to	arrive	at	the	totality	of	the	accused’s	criminality.		






Following	 the	 above-proposed	 sentencing	 framework	 advances	 a	 more	 analytical	





176 See, supra section III-C. 
177 The introduction of the enabler factor can potentially raise questions as to its relationship to substantive 
criminal law, in particular modes of liability. However, as conceived here, the enabler factor is not presented as 
a new mode of liability. The accused would have to first be found guilty on an existing mode of liability.  The 




	 Presently,	 the	 normative	 expressions	 are	 compromised	 under	 an	 exclusive	
reliance	 on	 hyper	 “gravity”	 imagery	 that	 far	 outpaces	 and	 overshadows	 the	 actual	
quantum	of	punishment.	Judicial	narratives	tirelessly	badger	the	reader	about	the	gravity	
of	the	offence	and	how	monstrous	the	accused’s	crimes	are.179	Yet,	the	final	sentences	are	
underwhelming	 in	 the	 face	of	 such	explosive	 rhetoric.	This	method	of	 communication	
surrenders	 too	much.	 	Gravity	needs	 to	yield	 its	monopoly	as	an	explanatory	 tool	 for	
punishing	atrocity	crimes.		The	enabler	factor	allows	the	judges	to	speak	the	language	of	
gravity	to	acknowledge	the	harms	suffered	by	the	victims	and	yet	explain	why	every	war	
criminal	 is	 not	 being	 sentenced	 to	 life	 imprisonment	 or	 a	 lengthy	 prison	 term.	 	 The	





counting	 that	 currently	 problematizes	 ICL	 sentencing.	 	 The	 current	 sentencing	
methodology	of	ICL	judges	bombards	the	judgments	with	an	unstructured	catalogue	of	






	 While	 in	 a	 general	 sense	 gravity,	 broadly	 conceived,	may	 also	 include	 enabler	
responsibility,	for	the	purposes	of	sentencing	discourse	it	is	important	and	beneficial	to	





178 On the expressive capacity of international atrocity trials see Robert Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of 
International Punishment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal 
Law, 43 STANFORD J. INT’L L. 39, 50-51 (2007). 
179 Margaret M. DeGuzman, Harsh Justice for International Crimes, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 17-24 (2014). 
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form	 and	 shape,	 becoming	 leaner	 and	 stronger,	 rather	 than	 remaining	 a	 bloated	 and	
formless	notion	where	all	sentencing	factors	are	rolled	into	some	broad	notion	of	gravity.			
	 Moreover,	 gravity	 of	 the	 offense	 implies	 a	 focus	 on	 individual	 crimes	 because	




properly	 assessed	 and	 conceptualized	 is	 crime	 specific.	 The	 enabler	 factor,	 however,	
potentially	has	a	nexus	 to	all	 the	 commander’s	 crimes.	 	This	 is	 another	 reason	why	 it	




can	 account	 for	why	 individuals	whose	 crimes	 are	 of	 comparable	 gravity,	 like	 Sesay,	
Kellon,	 and	 Gbao,	 received	 substantially	 different	 penalties.	 	 Victims	 can	 better	








or	 diminishing	 the	 gravity	 of	 the	 accused’s	 crimes.	 	 An	 independent	 assessment	 of	 a	
convicted	person’s	responsibility	as	an	enabler	furthers	the	different	goals	that	ICL	has	
ascribed	 to	 including	 retribution,	 deterrence,	 reconciliation,	 and	 expressivism	 as	
discussed	 in	Chapter	Three.	 	Supporters	of	each	of	 these	theories	ought	 to	welcome	a	
sentencing	framework	that	properly	accounts	for	enabling	conflicts	that	fuel	atrocities.			









than	 25	 years	 or	 more	 than	 double	 as	 happened	 in	 the	 RUF	 case,180	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	
attribute	the	extreme	difference	as	merely	a	consequence	of	an	aggravating	factor.		The	
notion	 of	 aggravating	 circumstance	 simply	 cannot	 cope	 with	 that	 magnitude	 of	 an	







ICL	 sentencing	 jurisprudence	 identifies	 four	 core	 considerations	 essential	 to	
determining	an	appropriate	sentencing	for	atrocity	crimes:	(1)	gravity	of	the	offense;	(2)	
individual	 circumstances	 of	 the	 convicted	 person;	 (3)	 applicable	 aggravating	 and	
mitigating	factors;	and	(4)	the	sentencing	law	and	practice	of	the	locus	delicti.181		Although	
these	 four	 considerations	 are	 tributized	 in	 every	 ICL	 sentencing	 judgment,	 giving	 the	
semblance	of	a	robust	approach	to	sentencing,	in	practice	however,	ICL	judges	did	not	
adhere	to	this	structure	in	their	sentencing	analysis.	These	proffered	considerations	were	
either	effectively	sidelined,	such	as	 the	national	 law	provisions	on	sentencing,	or	 they	
were	 banally	 lumped	 into	 an	 amebic	 consideration	 of	 gravity.	 	 The	 assessment	 of	
“individual	 circumstances	 of	 the	 convicted	 person”	 was	 unimaginatively	 limited	 to	




180 Sesay and Gbao were convicted of substantially the same crimes, but the former received double the sentence 
of the latter. See, supra section II-B. 
181 Taylor Trial Sentencing para. 18; AFRC Appeal Judgment para. 308-309; CDF Trial Sentencing para. 32; 
CDF Appeal Judgment para. 465; RUF Trial Sentencing para. 17; AFRC Appeal Judgment para. 313; RUF 
Appeal Judgment paras. 1129, 1236, 1239, and 1240. 
182 Taylor Trial Sentencing para. 22. (“The Trial Chamber notes that ‘individual circumstances of the convicted 
person’ can be either mitigating or aggravating.”); CDF Appeal Judgment para. 498. (“The Appeals Chamber 
considers that the level of education and training of a convicted person is part of his individual circumstances 
which the Trial Chamber is required to take into consideration as an aggravating or mitigating circumstance.”); 
RUF Appeal Sentencing para. 1296; Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilić and Vinko Martinovi, Case No. IT-98-34-A, 
Appeal Judgment para. 592 (3 May 2006), quoting Blaškić Appeal Judgment para. 679 (“the individual 
circumstances of the accused, including aggravating and mitigating circumstances”). 
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terms	 of	 “gravity”,	 which	 has	 arguably	 been	 overplayed.	 	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 other	
considerations,	such	as	“individual	 circumstances	of	 the	 convicted	person”,	have	been	
underdeveloped,	representing	a	lost	opportunity	to	advance	sentencing	considerations	
sui	generis	to	punishing	atrocities.		
	 The	Chapter	argues	 for	a	departure	 from	this	approach	to	punishing	atrocities,	
which	has	largely	transposed	domestic	sentencing	practices	applied	to	ordinary	crimes.		
After	 discussing	 the	 methodological	 and	 conceptual	 problems	 in	 the	 sentencing	
narratives	 and	 allocations	 in	 international	 criminal	 law,	 this	 Chapter	 offers	 several	
suggestions	 to	 advance	 the	 law	 of	 atrocity	 sentencing.	 First,	 it	 conceptualizes	 key	
sentencing	 criteria,	 such	 as	 gravity	 and	 individual	 circumstances	 of	 the	 accused,	
cohesively	 integrating	 them	 to	 a	 sentencing	 process	 that	 more	 robustly	 intertwines	
narratives	 about	 the	 accused’s	 wrongdoing,	 the	 gravity	 of	 the	 atrocities,	 the	 role	 of	






The	 third	 contribution	 of	 this	 Chapter	 is	 developing	 the	 scaffolding	 towards	 a	
sentencing	framework	for	atrocity	crimes.		The	methodology	of	the	proposed	framework	
begins	with	 consideration	of	 the	 inherent	gravity	of	 crime	and	 the	 convicted	person’s	
mode	of	liability.	The	quantum	of	punishment	can	then	be	adjusted	significantly	upward	
where	 the	 convicted	 person	 is	 found	 to	 be	 an	 enabler.	 	 This	 sentence	 could	 then	 be	
moderately	adjusted	upward	or	downward	based	on	aggravating	or	mitigating	factors.		
The	 proposed	 sentencing	 framework	 combined	 with	 the	 enabler	 factor	 offers	
several	 advantages	 to	 ICL	 sentencing.	 By	 departing	 from	 a	 sentencing	 discourse	 that	
narrates	 the	 analysis	 entirely	 in	 terms	 of	 gravity,	 my	 approach	 allows	 a	 space	 for	
important	nuances	to	be	communicated	and	expressed	in	the	sentencing	process.		It	also	
closes	 the	 gap	 between	 judicial	 narratives	 about	 atrocities	 and	 sentencing	 outcomes.	
Additionally,	 the	 enabler	 factor	 allows	 ICL	 judges	 to	 account	 for	 a	 convicted	 person’s	















perpetrators	 of	 the	 crime	 received.	 	 The	 enabler	 factor	 explains	why	 his	 sentence	 is	
appropriate,	notwithstanding	the	fact	that	his	criminal	liability	is	based	on	an	omission.		








183 Several observers believe his punishment is too high.  See e.g. Heller, Taylor Sentence (2013) at 835-840; 
Drumbl, Punishing Heads of State (2012), supra note 25. 













in	 light	 of	 the	 evidence	 produced,	 in	 sentencing	 judgments,	 ICL	 judges	 demonstrate	
greater	willingness	 to	be	more	 reflective,	philosophical,	 and	 loquacious.	 In	sentencing	






international	 judges	 is	 the	 sentencing	 phase.1	 As	 was	 the	 case	 at	 predecessor	








and	 retroactive	 punishment.	 	 In	 Chapter	 Two,	 this	 study	 broadened	 the	 discussion	
																																																								
1 Philippe Kirsch, The International Criminal Court: From Rome to Kampala, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 515, 
519-520 (2010); Shahram Dana, Law, Justice & Politics: A Reckoning of the International Criminal Court, 43 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. xxiii, xxvi-xxvii (2010). 
2 KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW VOLUME II: CRIMES AND SENTENCING 268 (2014); 
Pascale Chifflet and Gideon Boas, Sentencing Coherence in International Criminal Law: The Cases of Biljana 
Plavsic and Miroslav Bralo, 23 CRIM. L. FORUM 135, 147 and 154 (2012); MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, 
PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007); Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Ordinary Sentences for 
Extraordinary Crimes, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 683 (2007); OLAOLUWA OLUSANYA, SENTENCING WAR CRIMES 
AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA (2005).  
3 See Chapter 2 Reimagining Nulla Poena Sine Lege; see further AMBOS, ICL TREATISE II (2014), supra note 2 
at 276-278 (outlining minimalist and maximalist positions on null poena). 
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regarding	 the	 role	of	NPSL	 in	 ICL	 to	 include	positive	 justice	 features	of	NPSL,	such	as	







among	others,	with	 this	 argument	 is	 that	 it	 considers	 the	 legality	 issue	only	once	and	
assumes	 that	 the	 assessment	 is	 frozen	 in	 time.	 It	 wants	 to	 ignore	 subsequent	
developments	in	law,	penal	standards,	and	human	rights.		
As	applied	to	the	ICTY,	this	argument	is	extended	by	analogy	and	generalization:	
it	was	 foreseeable	to	all	 in	 the	 former	Yugoslavia	 that	 these	crimes	attracted	a	severe	
penalty;	 therefore,	whatever	punishment	 the	 ICTY	Statute	allows	does	not	violate	 the	
principle	of	 legality.	 	But	 this	generalization	 is	 arguably	 too	vague.6	 	A	punishment	of	
twenty	years	imprisonment	is	severe;	so	too	is	life	imprisonment	and	the	death	penalty.		
Yet,	they	are	not	all	necessarily	foreseeable,	especially	where	domestic	law	prohibits	one	
of	 these	 punishments	 as	was	 the	 case	 in	 Yugoslavia.	 The	 drafters	 of	 the	 ICTY	 statute	
appeared	 to	 recognize	 this	 potential	 legality	 issue	 and	 inserted	 the	 national	 law	






the	 death	 penalty.	 	 Would	 the	 reasoning	 above	 similarly	 justify	 imposing	 the	 death	
																																																								
4 See sources cited supra in Chapter 2 Reimagining Nulla Poena Sine Lege. 
5 KEVIN JON HELLER, THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW (2011); NEIL BOISTER AND ROBERT CRYER, THE TOKYO INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL: A 
REAPPRAISAL 248 (2008). 
6 Damien Scalia, Long-Term Sentences in International Criminal Law: Do They Meet the Standards Set Out by 
the European Court of Human Rights? 9 J. INT’L CRIM JUSTICE 669, 684 (2011) (arguing that this interpretation 
by the ICTY “fails to fulfil the foreseeability criteria established by the [European Court of Human Rights].”). 
Scalia concludes that the ICTY and ICTR does not comply with nulla poena sine lege.   
7 AMBOS, ICL TREATISE II (2014), supra note 2 at 277. 





	 More	 importantly,	 these	 arguments	 overlook	 the	 positive	 justice	 role	 of	 NPSL.		







prohibition	 against	 retroactive	 punishment,	 this	 research	 project	 deconstructed	nulla	
poena	sine	lege	into	four	underlying	attributes.	They	include	two	threshold	requirements	
pertaining	 to	nulla	 poena’s	 positive	 justice	 function:	 lex	 scripta	 (punishment	must	 be	
based	on	written	law)	and	lex	certa	(the	form	and	severity	of	punishment	must	be	clearly	
defined).		The	other	two	attributes	are	prohibitions	pertaining	to	nulla	poena’s	negative	
justice	 function:	 lex	 praevia	 (the	 prohibition	 against	 retroactive	 application)	 and	 lex	
stricta	 (the	 prohibition	 against	 applying	 a	 penalty	 by	 analogy).	 Chapter	 Two	 further	
identified	 sources	 of	 international	 law	 pertaining	 to	 the	 normative	 quality	 of	 each	
underlying	 attribute	 specifically.	 These	 sources	 reveal	 a	 more	 robust	 nulla	 poena	
principle	 than	 is	 conceived	 of	 by	 ICL	 judges,	 drafters	 of	 tribunal	 statutes,	 and	
commentators.11			
	 Based	 on	 these	 findings,	 section	 IV	 of	 Chapter	 Two	 critiqued	 the	 statutory	
provisions	and	sentencing	practice	of	ad	hoc	tribunals	and	the	ICC.		As	the	latter	presently	
represents	 the	permanent	 legal	regime	for	 international	criminal	 justice,	Chapter	Two	
elucidated	the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	the	ICC	Statute’s	penalty	provisions	in	light	
of	nulla	poena	and	its	potential	contribution	to	international	criminal	justice.	The	efforts	
made	 by	 the	 drafters	 of	 the	 ICC	 statute	 to	 satisfy	 nullum	 crimen	 sine	 lege	 was	 not	
replicated	 in	 their	 approach	 to	 nulla	 poena.	 	 This	 study	 concluded	 that,	 while	 some	
																																																								
9 Scalia implies that the argument is flawed because it “fails to fulfil the foreseeability criteria.” He concludes 
that “the principle of legality of sentences does not therefore seem to be complied with by the [ICTY and 
ICTR].” Scalia, Sentencing in ICL, supra note 6, at 684.  
10 See Chapter 2 Reimagining Nulla Poena Sine Lege, Section III. 
11 See Chapter 2 Reimagining Nulla Poena Sine Lege, Section III (E). 
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authors	 argue	 that	 one	 of	 the	 concerns	 underlying	 nulla	 poena,	 namely	 preventing	
retroactive	 punishment	 or	 abuse	 of	 power,	 may	 not	 raise	 serious	 concerns	 for	




poena	 in	advancing	 international	 law	and	 justice.	There	are	positive	signs	 in	 the	early	
jurisprudence	of	the	ICC	that	international	judges	are	taking	note	that	nulla	poena	offers	
more	 to	 the	 decision	 making	 than	 simply	 prohibiting	 retroactive	 punishment.12	
Specifically,	there	is	recognition	of	its	lex	certa	function	in	ICL	and	punishing	atrocities.13	








the	 quantum	 of	 punishment,	 from	 punitive	 rationales	 rooted	 in	 traditional	 domestic	
penology	to	international	diplomatic	and	policy	goals.15	The	punitive	rationales	consist	
of	 retribution	 and	 deterrence.	 Other	 aspirations	 include	 reconciliation,	 establishing	 a	
historical	 record	 of	 the	 conflict	 and	 atrocities,	 and	 building	 international	 law	 and	
jurisprudence.		Beyond	these,	ICL	judges	claimed	that	the	purposes	of	atrocity	sentencing	
also	 include	 rehabilitation,	 general	 affirmative	 prevention,	 expressivism,	 and	more.16		
Some	 ICL	 judgments	 went	 beyond	 identifying	 these	 various	 ideologies	 as	 achievable	
goals	of	 atrocity	 trials,	but	also	 considered	 them	 to	be	 factors	 that	 can	 fundamentally	
influence	sentence	allocations.	Further	impairing	clarity	is	cross	talk	and	argumentation	
confusing	 justification	 for	 international	 criminal	 justice	 mechanisms	 and	 rationales	
																																																								
12 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/07 
(23 May 2014) para. 39 (recognizing the lex certa requirement of nulla poena in ICL sentencing). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 





	 Chapter	 Three	 contributed	 to	 this	 debate	 in	 a	 number	 of	 ways.	 	 Early	
commentaries	criticized	ICL	sentencing	jurisprudence	for	vacillating	between	retribution	
and	 deterrence	 rationales.17	 	 Chapter	 Three	 scrutinized	 and	 reframed	 this	 vacillation	
debate.		This	study	argues	that	the	vacillation	is	not	between	retributive	and	deterrence	
rationales,	 but	 rather	 between	 punitive	 approaches	 (including	 both	 retribution	 and	
deterrence)	 to	 atrocity	 crimes	 and	 restorative	 ones	 (restoration	 of	 peace,	 national	
reconciliation,	 preventing	 revisionism).	 ICL	 sentencing	 rationale	 for	 atrocity	 crimes	
continues	to	lack	cohesion	but	is	crystalizing	as	having	a	more	punitive	orientation	than	
a	 restorative	 one.	 Significantly,	 the	 SCSL	 contributed	 towards	 directing	 international	
criminal	 law	 sentencing	 toward	 a	 punitive	 orientation,	 settling	 on	 retributive	 and	
deterrence	 rationales.18	 	 Early	 ICC	 sentencing	 judgments	 evince	 retribution	 and	
deterrence	 in	 ascendency	 over	 other	 ideological	 approaches	 to	 punishing	 atrocities.		
Chapter	 Three	 argued	 in	 favor	 of	 a	 punitive	 orientation	 towards	 punishing	 atrocities.		
This	 study’s	 findings	 caution	 against	 international	 criminal	 justice	 mechanisms	
embarking	 on	 ambitious	 entanglements	 with	 consequentialist	 aspirations,	 such	 as	
deterrence	or	reconciliation.		Chapter	Three	offered	an	original	account	of	the	impact	of	
reconciliation	 ideology	 on	 punishing	 atrocities.19	When	 implemented	 as	 a	 sentencing	
factor,	 it	 disproportionately	 favored	 those	 bearing	 the	 greatest	 responsibility	 for	 the	
atrocities,	 substantially	 reducing	 their	 punishment.20	 While	 international	 trials	 may	
contribute	towards	a	wider	set	of	diplomatic	and	policy	goals	such	as	reconciliation	and	
building	 a	 historical	 record,	 these	 aspirations	are	 beyond	 the	 institutional	 capacity	 of	
international	criminal	courts	and	can	only	receive	partial	fulfillment,	if	that,	within	this	
context.		





17 See MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007). 
18 E.g., Taylor Trial Sentencing Judgment para. 79; CDF Appeals Judgment para. 100b; RUF Trial Sentencing 
Judgment para. 100b. 
19 See Chapter 3 Ideologies and Sentencing Rationales for Atrocity Crimes, Section IV(B) and Section II(D). 





convicted	 co-defendant	 who	 was	 sentenced	 to	 25	 years	 imprisonment.	 	 In	 some	
instances,	Sesay	was	sentenced	to	three	times	the	prison	term	that	Gbao	received	for	the	
exact	 same	 crime	 based	 on	 the	 same	 underlying	 facts.	 For	 example,	 Count	 Six	 of	 the	
indictment	 charged	 both	 Sesay	 and	 his	 co-defendant	 with	 rape	 as	 a	 crime	 against	
humanity	for	specific	incidences	of	rape.22	Both	were	found	guilty.	Sesay	was	sentenced	
to	45	years	of	imprisonment,	whereas	Gbao	received	only	15	years.	These	exponential	
differences	 in	 the	 quantum	 of	 punishment	 cannot	 be	 explained	 by	 gravity.	 These	
outcomes	 suggest	 that	 gravity	 is	 not	 doing	 the	 heavy	 lifting	 when	 ordering	 the	
appropriate	 punishment	 between	 co-defendants.	 If	 gravity	 does	 not	 explain	 the	
difference,	then	what	does?	We	can	rule	out	aggravating	factors	as	an	answer	because,	as	
the	Trial	Chamber	found,	there	were	no	aggravating	factors	in	Sesay’s	case.23		
	 Chapter	 Four	 engaged	 this	 question	 by	 taking	 the	 inquiry	 beyond	 the	 gravity	
narrative	 and	 rhetoric.	 Here,	 the	 research	 project	 responded	 with	 an	 original	 claim.	














21 See Chapter 4 Reconceptualizing Atrocity Sentencing, Section II-B. 
22 Id. 
23 RUF Trial Sentencing para. 219. 
24 See Chapter 4 Reconceptualizing Atrocity Sentencing, Section II. 
25 See Chapter 4 Reconceptualizing Atrocity Sentencing, Section II; see further Mark Drumbl, “The Charles 




abetting	 was	 crucial	 to	 enabling	 a	 prolonged	 armed	 conflict	 and	 mass	 atrocities.26		
Therefore,	his	criminality	merited	a	severe	punishment.		
The	 enabler	 factor	 captures	 a	 dimension	 of	 atrocity	 criminality	 that	 has	 been	
largely	overlooked.	Furthermore,	understanding	atrocity	sentencing	through	the	enabler	
factor	has	additional	advantages.	For	example,	it	allows	the	sentencing	narrative	to	track	
narratives	 about	 the	 role	 of	 atrocity	 trials.	 	 International	 criminal	 justice	 places	 a	
premium	on	bringing	 to	 justice	persons	 that	bear	 the	greatest	 responsibility	 for	mass	
atrocities.	 	 The	 enabler	 factor	 brings	 the	 sentencing	 phase	 into	 view	 of	 the	 goal	 of	
achieving	accountability	for	those	that	bear	the	greatest	responsibility.	Atrocity	crimes	








to	articulate,	on	a	case	by	case	basis,	a	variety	of	sentencing	 factors	 that	 influence	the	




clarity	 around	 key	 ICL	 sentencing	 criteria	 presented	 an	 initial	 hurdle	 to	developing	 a	
sentencing	framework.		Thus,	in	addition	to	proposing	a	sentencing	framework,	Chapter	
Four	offered	concrete	conceptualizations	of	key	sentencing	criteria	such	as	gravity,	the	




(last visited 14 April 2018); Kevin Jon Heller, The Taylor Sentencing Judgment: A Critical Analysis, 11 J. Int’l 
Crim. Justice 835 (2013). 
26 See Chapter 4 Reconceptualizing Atrocity Sentencing, Section II-A. 
27 See Chapter 4 Reconceptualizing Atrocity Sentencing, Section IV. 
28 See Chapter 4 Reconceptualizing Atrocity Sentencing, Section IV-A. 
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to	atrocity	crimes.	By	(re)conceptualizing	and	structuring	consideration	of	concepts	such	
as	 gravity,	 modes	 of	 liability,	 and	 the	 role	 of	 the	 accused,	 the	 proposed	 sentencing	
framework	capitalizes	on	their	potential	to	atrocity	sentencing	in	particular.		Moreover,	
the	 framework	 proposed	 in	 this	 study	 facilitates	 a	 shared	 understanding	 among	 ICL	
defense	lawyers,	prosecutors,	and	judges	regarding	key	factors	that	impact	the	sentence.		
	 A	 synthesis	 of	 ICL	 jurisprudence	 reveals	 that	 judges	 typically	 articulate	 four	
considerations	relevant	to	determining	an	appropriate	sentence:	(1)	gravity	of	the	crime;	
(2)	 individual	 circumstance	 of	 the	 convicted	 person;	 (3)	 aggravating	 factors	 and	
mitigating	circumstances;	and	(4)	the	sentencing	law	and	practice	of	the	locus	delicti.	The	
latter	consideration	was	declared	to	be	non-binding,29	although	some	ICTR	 judgments	
relied	 on	 it	 to	 justify	 higher	 sentences	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 Rwanda	 domestic	 law	
permitted	 the	 death	 penalty.30	 	 More	 significantly,	 in	 practice,	 ICL	 judges	 collapse	
categories	two	and	three.		“Individual	circumstances	of	the	convicted	person”	has	been	
conceptualized	 in	 limited	 terms	 of	 aggravating	 and	mitigating	 factors.31	My	 proposed	
framework	creates	 independent	space	 for	consideration	of	aggravating	and	mitigating	
factors	and	consideration	of	“individual	circumstances	of	the	convicted	person.”	It	infuses	
the	 latter	with	 substance	 that	 is	 sui	 generis	 to	 atrocity	 crimes,	 namely	 the	 role	of	 the	
accused	as	an	enabler.	
	 Chapter	Four	proposed	an	 ICL	 sentencing	 framework	 that	 calls	upon	 judges	 to	
take	into	account	three	considerations:	gravity	of	the	crime,	the	individual	circumstances	






crime.	 	As	discussed	 in	Chapter	Four,	modes	of	 liability	 can	be	 categorized	 into	 three	
groups.33	The	first	consists	of	modes	of	liability	reflecting	grave	responsibility	for	atrocity	
																																																								
29 See generally Chapter 2 Reimagining Nulla Poena Sine Lege. 
30 Rwanda’s parliament controversially voted to abolish the death penalty in 2007, while the ICTR was in 
operation.  See, Rwanda Scraps the Death Penalty, BBC News at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6735435.stm. 
31 See Chapter 4 Reconceptualizing Atrocity Sentencing, Section III. 
32 The advantages of this approach are discussed supra Chapter 4 Reconceptualizing Atrocity Sentencing, 
Section IV-B-2. 






sentencing	 framework	treats	planning	and	ordering	as	direct	 forms	of	participation	 in	
atrocity	 crimes.	 While	 from	 a	 certain	 perspective	 planning	 and	 ordering	 can	 be	




two	 aspects	 of	 the	 accused’s	 criminality	 (the	 inherent	 gravity	 of	 his	 offences	 and	 the	
perpetrator’s	 mode	 of	 liability)	 determine	 the	 overall	 gravity	 of	 the	 crime,	 the	 first	
consideration	listed	above.	Next,	the	judges	would	then	determine	the	accused’s	role	as	












criteria	and	content	 specifically	pertinent	 to	atrocity	 crimes	as	distinct	 from	ordinary	
crimes.	 This	 approach	 gives	 a	 more	 purposive	 application	 to	 the	 second	 sentencing	
consideration,	 which	 has	 thus	 far	 been	 limited	 to	 consideration	 of	 aggravating	 and	
mitigating	factors.		Thus,	my	proposed	framework	has	the	advantage	of	also	preserving	
the	 integrity	 of	 the	 gravity	 narrative.	 By	 creating	 distinct	 spaces	 for	 consideration	 of	
gravity	and	the	role	of	the	accused	as	an	enabler,	my	sentencing	framework	allows	ICL	
																																																								
34 See Chapter 4 Reconceptualizing Atrocity Sentencing, Section III. 
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judges	to	justify	their	sentencing	outcomes	without	undermining	their	gravity	narrative.		
It	 therefore	 also	 enhances	 the	 expressive	 and	 communicative	 capacity	 of	 sentencing	
narratives.	The	enabler	factor	and	the	proposed	sentencing	framework	work	jointly	to	
achieve	 harmonious	 and	 consistent	 consideration	 of	 factors	 pertinent	 to	 punishing	




are	 drawn	 directly	 from	 general	 principles	 of	 law	 in	 national	 jurisdictions.35	 	 Some	
examples	 include:	 (1)	 where	 a	 factor	 has	 already	 been	 taken	 into	 consideration	 in	
assessing	the	gravity	of	the	offence,	it	cannot	be	considered	as	an	additional	aggravating	
factor	and	vice	versa;36	(2)	if	a	factor	is	an	element	of	the	underlying	crime,	it	cannot	be	
used	 as	 an	 aggravating	 factor;37	 (3)	 aggravating	 factors	 must	 be	 related	 to	 the	
commission	 of	 the	 offense;38	 (4)	 mitigating	 circumstances	 need	 only	 be	 proven	 by	 a	
preponderance	of	the	evidence;39	(5)	mitigating	circumstances	need	not	to	be	related	to	
the	 offense;40	 and	 (6)	 aggravating	 factors	must	be	 established	 beyond	 the	 reasonable	




Punishing	 atrocity	 crimes	 is	 complex;	 yet	 key	 doctrinal	 aspects	 of	 the	 law	 of	







35 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, T.Ch. I, Decision on Sentence pursuant to 
Article 76 of the Statute, para. 15 (10 July 2012) (“Lubanga Sentencing Judgment”). 
36 Taylor Trial Sentencing Judgment para. 25 (listing aggravating circumstances). 
37 Taylor Trial Sentencing Judgment para. 28. 
38 Taylor Trial Sentencing Judgment para. 24. 
39 Taylor Trial Sentencing Judgment para. 34 (listing mitigating circumstances). 
40 Taylor Trial Sentencing Judgment para. 31. 
41 Taylor Trial Sentencing Judgment para. 24. 
42 Lubanga Sentencing Judgment. 
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outcomes	in	empirical	or	quantitative	terms,	but	to	stimulate	normative,	doctrinal,	and	
theoretical	 rethinking	 on	 punishing	 atrocities.	 	 It	 has	 offered	 innovative	 claims	 and	
opened	new	spaces	 for	debate.	 	 It	reimagined	new	roles	 for	nulla	poena	sine	 lege	 that	
reassert	this	old	maxim’s	relevance	to	international	criminal	justice.43		It	uncovered	an	
identity	 crisis	 in	 international	 trials	 and	 atrocity	 sentencing	 between	 punitive	 and	
restorative	orientations,	 reframing	and	 replacing	 the	earlier	debates	 that	 situated	 the	
tension	as	one	between	retributive	and	deterrence	ideologies.	It	tied	the	consequences	of	
the	fractured	identity	of	international	criminal	justice	mechanisms	to	the	realization	of	




discussion.	 	 Rather,	 I	 have	 sought	 to	 open	 new	 spaces	 and	 debates	 for	 fundamental	





43 See KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW VOLUME II: CRIMES AND SENTENCING 275 
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